INDONESIA - SUPREME AUDIT BOARD LOSING ITS WAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 006018 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/IFD/ODF TREASURY FOR IA-ANNA JEWELL DEPARTMENT PASS AID DEPARTMENT PASS FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT PASS GAO--WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EAID KCOR PGOV ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA - SUPREME AUDIT BOARD LOSING ITS WAY REF: 05 JAKARTA 6277 JAKARTA 00006018 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK),one of Indonesia's key anti-corruption institutions, appears losing its way because of weak leadership, internal power struggles and a lack of reform. The BPK's first "Advisory Board on Tsunami-Related Audit" conference April 24-25 in Jakarta SIPDIS came off as poorly prepared, and supreme auditors from Europe, Asia and the Middle East recommended BPK improve audit planning goals and procedures. The conference showed that the BPK was not prepared to audit one of the best functioning agencies in government -- the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR) -- which confirmed our views of the BPK's overall lack of direction. BPK Chairman Dr. Anwar Nasution has proven a poor and often absent manager, and done little to make the BPK more effective and independent. Nasution, who lacks formal audit training, has struggled with a political board and has little control over budget and staff. The Ministry of Finance has begun drafting a new regulation to clarify the roles of Indonesia's four overlapping audit institutions. Developing more credible audit and inspector general functions will comprise an important component in Indonesia's corruption prevention efforts and overall governance reform. End Summary. Advisory Board Meeting a Dud -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The BPK hosted auditors from the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) at an April 24-25 "First Meeting of the BPK Advisory Board on Tsunami-Related Audit". The event left many attendees SIPDIS disappointed, especially compared to the BPK's well-attended April 2005 tsunami audit conference (ref). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) opened last year's conference, which featured a major presentation by U.S. Comptroller General David Walker. This year's event proved much smaller and lacked focus. At some of the sessions, INTOSAI advisors and the BPK spent significant amounts of time simply trying to understand each other. BPK officials appeared not to understand basic audit procedures, objectives for tsunami audits, and how to set audit parameters with the auditee. BPK's lack of preparation perplexed and frustrated INTOSAI attendees from the supreme audit offices of Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Japan, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, Korea and the UK. "The BPK missed a great opportunity here," one observer noted. An international journalist attending commented at the end, "Can someone tell me what these two days were about?" ¶3. (SBU) This year's BPK presentations repeated facts related to tsunami damage and had little discussion of audit strategies and procedures. At one point the BPK asked how it could audit the two-thirds of Aceh reconstruction funds flowing through international funds and non-governmental organization (NGO) channels. Given that this activity does not form part of BPK's already huge and largely unfulfilled mandate - bilateral and NGO donors have their own audit guidelines - the remark sounded out of place and told much about the agency's failure to dig into its core task of auditing Government of Indonesia (GOI) tsunami reconstruction spending. The head of the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR), Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, made an excellent presentation on reconstruction challenges including rebuilding human resources--replacing a school is easier than replacing a teacher, he noted. Kuntoro acknowledged tension between the need for accountability and proceeding quickly and flexibly with reconstruction. Audit Plan Over-Ambitious, Lacks Focus -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The BPK's presented an "Audit Action Plan for 2006" at the conference that many participants found hastily drafted, rudimentary and unrealistic. The BPK did not give INTOSAI Steering Committee members a copy in advance and JAKARTA 00006018 002.2 OF 004 senior advisors to BPK Chairman Nasution did not participate in the drafting. Neither did the BPK give the Asian Development Bank (ADB),which has a multi-million dollar program to assist Indonesia's auditors, a copy of the plan in advance nor an opportunity to comment on it. The plan focuses on three areas: --Auditing the financial statements of BRR; --Performance audit of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process and specific sectors; --Audit of specific Areas: internal controls, computer systems, procurement. ¶5. (SBU) According to the plan, BPK will audit five tsunami- related sectors in 2006 including infrastructure, housing and land, education, health, economy and business. When INTOSAI Steering Committee members asked whether BPK would start or finish the audits in 2006, BPK had no answer. The 2007 plan includes each of these sectors but adds the religious and social sectors. The BPK had not consulted with BRR on the parameters of the audit plan, and dismissed suggestions that it should have. ¶6. (SBU) INTOSAI attendees noted that the plan would prove ambitious even for an institution with experience in performance auditing, and that each sector audit could take 12-15 months. They asked Nasution to comment on areas he considered high risk; he responded that infrastructure has the highest risk, with housing currently the most visible sector. He said the public has high expectations and claimed the BPK would "audit everything." INTOSAI recommended that BPK seek to perform smaller, more manageable audits in areas judged high risks to the economy. INTOSAI also suggested that BPK adopt an approach to undertake a combination of sector-based and cross-sectoral audits. They suggested that BPK needed to communicate with bodies under audit to initiate beneficial change. BRR representatives said they have ramped up their own internal audit office with donor technical assistance. What's Wrong with BPK? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Nasution, a Harvard-trained economist and former Senior Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia, noted that he feels out of place heading the BPK without any experience as an auditor. He has provided lackluster leadership in recent months, spending a great deal of time at conferences and lecturing overseas, and not in Jakarta. At one point during the tsunami audit conference, Nasution made an apology of sorts: "Indonesia is in a difficult transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy...Previously, audit reports were only discussed internally with the government: we were not independent. Please don't have high expectations of us. We are in the process of learning and building capacity. We need your help to broaden our vision and our ability." (Comment: While on one level true, the BPK has received generous donor assistance and training over the past year, which seems to have made little impact on performance.) ¶8. (SBU) BPK's board is approved by Parliament, and with two of seven members party politicians, has proven a major obstacle to rapid reform. One commentator said he knows no other supreme audit institutions that have a politically- appointed board. The board has undermined Nasution both privately and publicly on several occasions. BPK's internal management and public statements often display "mixed and confusing signals," the commentator noted. One advisor noted that the BPK's structure is at odds with its operational needs. Nasution also does not have control of his organization's budget, in the hands of Secretary General Dharma Bhakti. With no real control over budget or staff, and a political board that does not support him, Nasution has little power. ¶9. (SBU) In addition to leadership weaknesses, the BPK has other internal challenges. Advisors have noted that the JAKARTA 00006018 003.2 OF 004 BPK's audit reports, poorly structured, do not present a user-friendly executive summary, and do not highlight the areas of greatest concern for the government, the auditee or the public. The BPK's information technology and internal communications systems seem inadequate. It has not yet adopted international audit standards in many areas and lacks capacity to perform performance and investigative audits. Perhaps most important, the BPK does not have a system for prioritizing audits based on risk, nor does it employ consistent follow-up on audit recommendations. Too Many Auditors, Not Enough Direction -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Indonesia has four sets of audit institutions that frequently overlap and conflict with each other: --BPK (15 regional offices, 3000 staff). --Inspectors General (IGs) in most ministries and Agencies. --The internal GOI Comptroller of Finance and Development or BPKP (28 offices, 6000 staff). --Provincial and local auditors or BAWASDAS (over 400 offices at provincial and district levels, of varying capacity). Decentralization and the transition to democracy has benefited these organizations, but has resulted in a lack of clarity, overlapping mandates and authorities, and uncoordinated audit work. The BPK's authority and budget have grown, but it still lacks capacity to conduct meaningful performance and investigative audits. BAWASDAs, gaining authority, lack trained staff. Ministry Inspector General (IG) offices appear inadequately staffed, under- funded, and largely dependent on the commitment of their ministers. The Minister of Finance has cited USAID's activities to develop IG capacity at her Ministry as an exemplary example of donor support helping "change mindsets." Few Ministry IG offices perform meaningful audit or oversight work. One advisor suggested Indonesia needs a national "IG Act" to define and regularize the roles, functions, and authorities of the IGs. ¶11. (SBU) Two advisors to Indonesia's audit institutions have noted that the BPKP forms part of the problem. Under former President Soeharto, the BPKP ensure that Soeharto received his share of revenues and kept local officials in line, sometimes through intimidation. Although the BPKP has a great deal of audit expertise, it has lost most of its mandate to coordinate and perform internal GOI audits. It, nonetheless, retains its staff of 6000 and its budget, and the other three audit institutions mistrust and resent it. Advisors and consultants have offered several suggestions for reorganizing Indonesia's audit agencies: --Dissolving the BPKP and moving its auditors and budget to other audit institutions; --Giving BPKP a coordination function over IGs and BAWASDAs; --Merging the BPKP with the BPK. ¶12. (SBU) The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has begun considering a new government regulation to rationalize audit and internal control functions of the government. One Embassy contact said BPKP head Arie Soelandro is working hard behind the scenes to keep as much power as possible. He seeks to control all non-BPK audit functions and have all BAWASDAs and IGs report through BPKP. However, the contact noted, "That would be like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank." Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Although donors have focused most of their anti- corruption assistance on the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) and other law enforcement organizations, well- functioning Inspectors General and effective auditing remain JAKARTA 00006018 004.2 OF 004 crucial to Indonesia's drive to reduce corruption. Like many other GOI agencies, the BPK struggles to shake off its Soeharto-era legacy of direct political control and largely meaningless audit activity. Unfortunately for the BPK, Nasution does not seem the right man for the job--his commitment to the hard work of reform pales in comparison to some of SBY's more energetic ministers, particularly Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati. We have experienced Nasution's failure to exert control over his agency firsthand: he failed to stop a campaign by senior staff to oust two highly qualified USAID advisors only a few weeks after they completed a tactical implementation plan for improving BPK performance. While the BPK drifts, fortunately most of the money for Aceh reconstruction moves through donors and NGOs with audit controls in place. On- budget funds move through BRR, which has much stronger leadership, standards and guidelines for project management and procurement, and robust donor support. PASCOE