ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005789 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS MARR PHUM KDEM KAWC TT BM TW ID SUBJECT: ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SECGEN JAKARTA 00005789 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman met Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary General Imron Cotan on April 12. Both expressed strong interest in expanding military ties. Imron pressed for USG training for Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus); ASD Rodman said the USG needed to proceed carefully with Kopassus. ASD Rodman pressed for Indonesian participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and for an Article 98 agreement; Imron indicated the GOI would not proceed with either at this time and specifically highlighted the parliament's role in endorsing international agreements, saying the Yudhoyono administration could not proceed "unilaterally." ASD Rodman expressed interest in accountability for human rights violations in East Timor, and the Ambassador emphasized the importance of the Commission on Truth and Friendship building international credibility. ASD Rodman explained the USG interest in supporting maritime security and safeguarding the Malacca Strait; Imron noted Taiwan had offered use of an AWACS aircraft to assist with aerial coverage of the Strait, but the GOI had not decided its response to the offer. The Ambassador noted USG interest in pursuing a SOFA with the GOI, and Imron requested a draft for GOI study. Imron also explained GOI efforts to press the government of Burma to democratize, voiced concern that Indonesians might try emulating recent demonstrations in Bangkok, and expressed hope for an improved relationship with Australia in coming months. End Summary. ¶2. (U) ASD Rodman accompanied by Ambassador Pascoe, Brigadier General John Allen, OSD/ISA Country Director for Southeast Asia Peter Ipsen, the Embassy's Defense Attache, ODC officer, Poloff (notetaker),and ASD Rodman's Military Assistant called on Secretary General Imron, accompanied by two DFA officials. DESIRE TO REENGAGE -------------- ¶3. (C) ASD Rodman opened the meeting by explaining the context of his visit and the ongoing USG effort to restore and expand security ties with Indonesia. The USG wanted to be a reliable security partner and help the Armed Forces (TNI) become a modern, capable, and professional force; toward that end, the USG would explore ways for providing appropriate equipment and training. Imron responded that the United States represented a valuable strategic partner for Indonesia. The GOI welcomed USG assistance in both the security field and democratization. KOPASSUS TRAINING -------------- ¶4. (C) On two separate occasions, Imron raised what appeared as one of his main points for the meeting, pressing ASD Rodman to allow potential leaders from the Special Forces (Kopassus) to receive U.S. training. This would have the positive effect of exposing Kopassus soldiers to different values and norms than those prevailing in Indonesian military circles. ASD Rodman acknowledged Imron's interest in training for Kopassus, but stressed the importance of proceeding in a careful manner. Rodman noted the participation of the Kopassus Commander in the recent Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC),but indicated that sensitivities in Washington likely precluded robust engagement with Kopassus in the near future. PSI --- ¶5. (C) ASD Rodman suggested the GOI consider participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Imron noted that FM Wirajuda had explained the GOI's legal reasons for not participating in PSI and added practical concerns underpinning the GOI's reluctance: as an archipelagic nation, Indonesia relied heavily on transportation by boat. The Australian Navy already intercepted over 200 Indonesian ships each year; the GOI therefore did not want to take any further steps that could impede Indonesian shipping. ASD Rodman JAKARTA 00005789 002.2 OF 003 described PSI as a flexible program; every country could set the parameters for its own participation. Rodman suggested that the U.S. and Indonesia could begin subject matter expert exchanges and proliferation-related elements could get injected into bilateral military exercises as a way to improve Indonesia's comfort with PSI. Citing FM Wirajuda's views, Imron appeared pessimistic about the prospects of Indonesian participation in PSI, a step backwards from Indonesia's expressed willingness to do "PSI-like" activities while not actually joining PSI during the A/S Hillen visit in February. ARTICLE 98 -------------- ¶6. (C) Noting that over 100 countries had signed Article 98 agreements with the U.S., ASD Rodman suggested that the GOI consider following suit. Imron said he would raise the matter with his DFA colleagues. He implied that since the GOI had not become a party to the Rome Statute, the GOI questioned the need for an Article 98 agreement. More significantly, however, he said that the administration could not "unilaterally" conclude such an agreement without the endorsement of the House of Representatives (DPR). Dealing with the DPR, and especially Commission I (responsible for defense, foreign affairs, and information),proved difficult, painful, and time consuming for DFA. When ASD Rodman asked if the GOI might conclude an executive agreement not requiring endorsement by the DPR, Imron said, "we cannot afford to do that here." ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EAST TIMOR -------------- ¶7. (C) ASD Rodman noted the need to show that renewed military ties promoted progress on reform and accountability. BGEN Allen asked for an update on the work of the Indonesia-East Timor Commission on Truth and Friendship. Imron, encouraged by the Commission's work, described the Commission as "the only alternative" for resolving the prior human rights abuses. He predicted the Commission's work would lead to a South Africa style outcome, with people summoned to provide accounts, mutual forgiveness, and possible compensation for victims. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador suggested the GOI work to ensure a sufficient international role in the process and noted the possibility of Carter Center involvement. Imron acknowledged the importance of international involvement and consultations with NGOs. The Commission, however, still had underway technical work, such as site visits and the collection of evidence and statements. After this technical phase, the Commission would consider how to consult with other organizations. The Ambassador explained that the Carter Center represented one alternative; others might seem equally credible, but some international involvement would appear needed. MALACCA STRAIT -------------- ¶9. (C) ASD Rodman said the USG would like to support the efforts of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia to ensure the security of the Malacca Strait. Imron replied that the GOI would accept USG equipment and training toward that end, although he emphasized responsibility for the Strait lay with the littoral states. Imron said Taiwan had offered to provide equipment as well, including an AWACS plane operated by a mixed team of Taiwanese and Indonesian pilots. The GOI had not decided how to respond to this offer, however, as it felt concerned about the possible reaction from China. Imron requested that the USG provide a document explaining what equipment it could provide. SOFA -------------- ¶10. (C) Citing the upcoming visit of the hospital ship Mercy, as well as other training programs, the Ambassador mentioned the need for a permanent SOFA. Imron requested that the USG provide a draft that the GOI could study; he promised to raise the matter with FM Wirajuda and discuss it with a "troika" consisting of the Secretaries General from the DFA, JAKARTA 00005789 003.2 OF 003 Defense Ministry, and Ministry of Home Affairs. BURMA, THAILAND, AND AUSTRALIA -------------- ¶11. (C) When the Ambassador asked Imron for his sense of developments in ASEAN, Imron explained a growing sense of the need for a "code of conduct" for ASEAN states, stating that ASEAN could suspend Burma's membership if Burma failed to apply a roadmap to democracy. A group of "eminent persons" had begun studying the possibility of an ASEAN Charter, including a provision for suspension of membership. This would provide a useful source of pressure on Burma, which otherwise appeared likely to become an irritant in ASEAN's relations with the United States and EU. Although the GOI sought to become more firm with Burma, Imron explained, engagement remained important, to expose the Burmese to the democratic drive within Southeast Asia, and to ensure Burma would not be left behind. ¶12. (C) Imron noted recent mass demonstrations in Bangkok caused some officials in Indonesia to worry that democracy in the region could get "hijacked." The GOI wanted to see whether similar (opposition) demonstrations would begin in Manila or Jakarta. Imron expressed confidence that President Yudhoyono could control the situation in Indonesia. ¶13. (C) Imron also noted that Indonesia currently had a "very delicate" relationship with Australia, but he said that relations had begun moving in the right direction, and he hoped that "things will be better" within one or two months. ¶14. (U) ASD Rodman has cleared this cable. PASCOE