IRANIAM PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S MAY 10 - 13 VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005705

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP KISL AORC IR ID
SUBJECT: IRANIAM PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S MAY 10 - 13 VISIT
TO INDONESIA

REF: A. JAKARTA 5702 (IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S ENGAGEMENT
WITH INDONESIAN LEGISLATURE)

B. JAKARTA 01178 (INDONESIA BRIEFED ON IRAN'S GAS
CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM)

Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. Prior to participating in the D-8 Summit in
Bali on May 12 - 13, Iranian President Ahmadinejad will be
hosted to a state visit in Jakarta, including meetings with
President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda as well as
meetings with parliamentarians and appearances at
universities and before Muslim organizations. On May 5,
Ambassador met with Presidential Spokesman and Foreign Policy
Advisor Dino Patti Djalal and strongly cautioned against
publicly characterizing the Iranian nuclear program as
"peaceful." He urged the Indonesians to press Ahmadinejad,
both privately and publicly, to conform with UN Security
Council and IAEA requirements. He further raised our deep
concern that Indonesia's hospitality to Ahmadinejad endangers
Indonesia's carefully cultivated image as a moderate and
tolerant Muslim power. We nonetheless anticipate intemperate
statements by some Muslim leaders and politicians. We have
not found evidence to support a claim that Ahmadinejad has
been invited to tour an Indonesian civilian nuclear facility.
End summary.

Red Carpet For Ahmadinejad
--------------


2. (C) Iranian President Mahoumd Ahmadinejad will make a
state visit to Indonesia on May 10 - 11 prior to
participating in the D-8 Summit in Bali on May 12 - 13. The
Iranians have reportedly lobbied hard for the visit over the
past six months, having hosted Foreign Minister Wirajuda as
well leaders of Parliament and Islamic groups in Teheran, and
their efforts have paid off handsomely in the form of a state
visit which will allow Ahmadinejad to make Iran's case in a
variety of high-profile public venues.


3. (C) In Jakarta, Ahmadinejad will meet with President
Yudhoyono, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, and most likely with
Parliamentary leaders. (Additional information on Indonesian
parliamentarians' attitudes towards Ahmadinejad and Iran ref.
A.) Ahmadinejad will also deliver speeches at the University
of Indonesia and at Jakarta's State Islamic University, site
of a speech by Undersecretary Karen Hughes last year. State
Islamic University sources confirmed that they are planning
for a visit and speech by Ahmadinejad. A Foreign Ministry
spokesman noted that the Iranian President will also have a
discussion with Islamic leaders organized by the Indonesian
Ulama Council (MUI),Indonesia's supreme arbiter of Islamic
jurisprudence, and will likely visit the headquarters of
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),Indonesia's largest Islamic
organization. We expect Ahmadinejad to be given an
exceedingly warm and enthusiastic reception at all of these
venues, and further expect Ahmadinejad to seek to tap into
and exploit for maximum PR gain the latent disaffection
toward aspects of United States foreign policy that is
prevalent among many students and politicized Muslims.


4. (C) We are seeking to confirm a report circulating among
the Jakarta diplomatic corps that Ahmadinejad has been
invited to tour Indonesia's civilian nuclear facility. As of
May 5, working-level officials in the Indonesia's nuclear
agency told us that they knew of no such plans.

Ambassador Cautions GOI
--------------


5. (C) On May 5, the Ambassador met with Dino Patti Djalal,
Presidential Spokesman and National Security Advisor to
discuss the Ahmadinejad visit. The Ambassador stressed our
concerns about Ahmadinejad's dubious legitimacy as elected
President, Iran's abysmal human rights record, destabilizing

JAKARTA 00005705 002 OF 003


policies in the Mideast, and well-documented, clandestine
program to develop nuclear weapons. He stated firmly that
the USG would be extremely distressed if the GOI were to
characterize, whether publicly or privately, Iran's nuclear
program as being for peaceful purposes. Even worse would be
any discussion of nuclear cooperation with Iran. The optics
of any visit by Ahmadinejad to an Indonesian nuclear facility
would be disastrous, should such plans exist. He urged the
GOI to not only push the Iranians to meet their obligations
to the UN Security Council and the IAEA, but to do so in a
public statement that leaves no doubt about Indonesia's
position. Ambassador stated further that a warm welcome and
public platfor
m for a proven extremist like Ahmadinejad would damage
Indonesia's carefully cultivated image as a "moderate and
tolerant" Muslim state. In short, Ambassador argued,
Indonesia was risking a setback in the overall recent
improvement in its relationship with the United States. The
DCM made the same points in a call on North and Central
American Affairs head Harry Purwanto in the Ministry of of
Foreign affairs.


6. (C) Djalal took our points on board and admitted that
"internal pressures" had influenced planning for the visit,
and agreed to convey our concerns to the President.

What Is The D-8, Anyhow?
--------------


7. (U) The D-8 ("Developing 8") is a grouping of large,
mostly Muslim countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Iran,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey. Founded as an
initiative by Turkish then-Prime Minister Erbakan in 1997, it
has an economic focus and a rotating Presidency. Iran, as
current President, hosted the D-8's last summit in Teheran in
2004, and will hand off leadership of the group to Indonesia
in Bali this year. This summit's theme is "Enhancing D-8
Intra Trade," and it will consist of several events including
a Business Forum and a Trade Fair. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria will be
represented by heads of state or government, while Egypt will
send its Minister of International Cooperation.


8. (C) An Egyptian diplomat complained that the GOI had not
sent over a copy of a draft D-8 communique and did not expect
to see a copy of the draft until shortly before the meeting
begins. He further opined that the document would likely
focus only on economic and trade issues. A GOI Foreign
Ministry spokesman confirmed the meeting's economic emphasis,
telling the local press that the Summit would not address
nuclear-related issues.

Indonesian Thinking On Iran's Nuclear Program
--------------


9. (C) Indonesia is nonetheless focused on Iran's nuclear
program. The object of a U.S. full-court press (ref. B)
prior to the crucial February 4 IAEA Board of Governors vote
on referring Iran to the Security Council, Indonesia was one
of five abstentions (with South Africa, Belarus, Algeria, and
Libya). At that time, Indonesia stressed its commitment to
the right of countries to develop nuclear power for peaceful
purposes (despite ample derogatory evidence concerning Iran's
record) and its concern over the implications of
international pressure on Iran for Indonesia's own nuclear
program. Indonesia's national power authority plans to have
a nuclear generator online by 2016.


10. (C) These are still Indonesia's paramount concerns in
connection with the Iranian nuclear program, as evidenced by
an April 27-28 conference sponsored by the Department of
Foreign Affairs' Research and Policy Development Bureau
entitled "Experts Conference On Indonesia's Policy On The
Iranian Nuclear Issue." Held in the Central Java city of
Solo, conference participants included academics,

JAKARTA 00005705 003 OF 003


representatives of government agencies, journalists, and
scientists. According to a Foreign Ministry participant, the
conference did not broach the possibility of nuclear
cooperation between the Indonesia and Iran. However, a
consensus emerged that Indonesia should take a "non-coercive"
approach to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Once again,
participants fretted that the international community's
reaction to Iran's nuclear program may somehow have
implications for Indonesia's own plans to develop nuclear
power. The conference's participants wrote recommendations
to be used by the Department of Foreign Affairs in
formulating policies on these questions.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) The "internal pressures" to which Djalal referred are
not only from Muslim leaders and politicians, but probably
from the Department of Foreign Affairs as well, which has
been recalcitrant and unhelpful on these matters in the past.
President Yudhoyono and Djalal have just returned from a
week-long visit to the Mideast, and in the meantime, the DFA
has thrown itself into its usual chaotic, last-minute frenzy
of planning for the Ahmadinejad visit and the D-8 summit. We
will continue to work to dissuade the GOI from making
damaging statements or commitments during the upcoming visit.
Our primary goal should be to persuade the Indonesians to
burnish their often-stated commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation by pressing Ahmadinejad, both privately and
publicly, to abide by Iran's obligations to the IAEA and
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even if we succeed in
this, however, we fully expect that some Muslim leaders and
politicians will be overly effusive in their welcome for the
Iranian president. End comment
PASCOE