IRANIAM PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S MAY 10 - 13 VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005705 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP KISL AORC IR ID SUBJECT: IRANIAM PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S MAY 10 - 13 VISIT TO INDONESIA REF: A. JAKARTA 5702 (IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S ENGAGEMENT WITH INDONESIAN LEGISLATURE) ¶B. JAKARTA 01178 (INDONESIA BRIEFED ON IRAN'S GAS CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM) Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Prior to participating in the D-8 Summit in Bali on May 12 - 13, Iranian President Ahmadinejad will be hosted to a state visit in Jakarta, including meetings with President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda as well as meetings with parliamentarians and appearances at universities and before Muslim organizations. On May 5, Ambassador met with Presidential Spokesman and Foreign Policy Advisor Dino Patti Djalal and strongly cautioned against publicly characterizing the Iranian nuclear program as "peaceful." He urged the Indonesians to press Ahmadinejad, both privately and publicly, to conform with UN Security Council and IAEA requirements. He further raised our deep concern that Indonesia's hospitality to Ahmadinejad endangers Indonesia's carefully cultivated image as a moderate and tolerant Muslim power. We nonetheless anticipate intemperate statements by some Muslim leaders and politicians. We have not found evidence to support a claim that Ahmadinejad has been invited to tour an Indonesian civilian nuclear facility. End summary. Red Carpet For Ahmadinejad -------------- ¶2. (C) Iranian President Mahoumd Ahmadinejad will make a state visit to Indonesia on May 10 - 11 prior to participating in the D-8 Summit in Bali on May 12 - 13. The Iranians have reportedly lobbied hard for the visit over the past six months, having hosted Foreign Minister Wirajuda as well leaders of Parliament and Islamic groups in Teheran, and their efforts have paid off handsomely in the form of a state visit which will allow Ahmadinejad to make Iran's case in a variety of high-profile public venues. ¶3. (C) In Jakarta, Ahmadinejad will meet with President Yudhoyono, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, and most likely with Parliamentary leaders. (Additional information on Indonesian parliamentarians' attitudes towards Ahmadinejad and Iran ref. A.) Ahmadinejad will also deliver speeches at the University of Indonesia and at Jakarta's State Islamic University, site of a speech by Undersecretary Karen Hughes last year. State Islamic University sources confirmed that they are planning for a visit and speech by Ahmadinejad. A Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that the Iranian President will also have a discussion with Islamic leaders organized by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI),Indonesia's supreme arbiter of Islamic jurisprudence, and will likely visit the headquarters of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),Indonesia's largest Islamic organization. We expect Ahmadinejad to be given an exceedingly warm and enthusiastic reception at all of these venues, and further expect Ahmadinejad to seek to tap into and exploit for maximum PR gain the latent disaffection toward aspects of United States foreign policy that is prevalent among many students and politicized Muslims. ¶4. (C) We are seeking to confirm a report circulating among the Jakarta diplomatic corps that Ahmadinejad has been invited to tour Indonesia's civilian nuclear facility. As of May 5, working-level officials in the Indonesia's nuclear agency told us that they knew of no such plans. Ambassador Cautions GOI -------------- ¶5. (C) On May 5, the Ambassador met with Dino Patti Djalal, Presidential Spokesman and National Security Advisor to discuss the Ahmadinejad visit. The Ambassador stressed our concerns about Ahmadinejad's dubious legitimacy as elected President, Iran's abysmal human rights record, destabilizing JAKARTA 00005705 002 OF 003 policies in the Mideast, and well-documented, clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. He stated firmly that the USG would be extremely distressed if the GOI were to characterize, whether publicly or privately, Iran's nuclear program as being for peaceful purposes. Even worse would be any discussion of nuclear cooperation with Iran. The optics of any visit by Ahmadinejad to an Indonesian nuclear facility would be disastrous, should such plans exist. He urged the GOI to not only push the Iranians to meet their obligations to the UN Security Council and the IAEA, but to do so in a public statement that leaves no doubt about Indonesia's position. Ambassador stated further that a warm welcome and public platfor m for a proven extremist like Ahmadinejad would damage Indonesia's carefully cultivated image as a "moderate and tolerant" Muslim state. In short, Ambassador argued, Indonesia was risking a setback in the overall recent improvement in its relationship with the United States. The DCM made the same points in a call on North and Central American Affairs head Harry Purwanto in the Ministry of of Foreign affairs. ¶6. (C) Djalal took our points on board and admitted that "internal pressures" had influenced planning for the visit, and agreed to convey our concerns to the President. What Is The D-8, Anyhow? -------------- ¶7. (U) The D-8 ("Developing 8") is a grouping of large, mostly Muslim countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey. Founded as an initiative by Turkish then-Prime Minister Erbakan in 1997, it has an economic focus and a rotating Presidency. Iran, as current President, hosted the D-8's last summit in Teheran in 2004, and will hand off leadership of the group to Indonesia in Bali this year. This summit's theme is "Enhancing D-8 Intra Trade," and it will consist of several events including a Business Forum and a Trade Fair. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria will be represented by heads of state or government, while Egypt will send its Minister of International Cooperation. ¶8. (C) An Egyptian diplomat complained that the GOI had not sent over a copy of a draft D-8 communique and did not expect to see a copy of the draft until shortly before the meeting begins. He further opined that the document would likely focus only on economic and trade issues. A GOI Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed the meeting's economic emphasis, telling the local press that the Summit would not address nuclear-related issues. Indonesian Thinking On Iran's Nuclear Program -------------- ¶9. (C) Indonesia is nonetheless focused on Iran's nuclear program. The object of a U.S. full-court press (ref. B) prior to the crucial February 4 IAEA Board of Governors vote on referring Iran to the Security Council, Indonesia was one of five abstentions (with South Africa, Belarus, Algeria, and Libya). At that time, Indonesia stressed its commitment to the right of countries to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes (despite ample derogatory evidence concerning Iran's record) and its concern over the implications of international pressure on Iran for Indonesia's own nuclear program. Indonesia's national power authority plans to have a nuclear generator online by 2016. ¶10. (C) These are still Indonesia's paramount concerns in connection with the Iranian nuclear program, as evidenced by an April 27-28 conference sponsored by the Department of Foreign Affairs' Research and Policy Development Bureau entitled "Experts Conference On Indonesia's Policy On The Iranian Nuclear Issue." Held in the Central Java city of Solo, conference participants included academics, JAKARTA 00005705 003 OF 003 representatives of government agencies, journalists, and scientists. According to a Foreign Ministry participant, the conference did not broach the possibility of nuclear cooperation between the Indonesia and Iran. However, a consensus emerged that Indonesia should take a "non-coercive" approach to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Once again, participants fretted that the international community's reaction to Iran's nuclear program may somehow have implications for Indonesia's own plans to develop nuclear power. The conference's participants wrote recommendations to be used by the Department of Foreign Affairs in formulating policies on these questions. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The "internal pressures" to which Djalal referred are not only from Muslim leaders and politicians, but probably from the Department of Foreign Affairs as well, which has been recalcitrant and unhelpful on these matters in the past. President Yudhoyono and Djalal have just returned from a week-long visit to the Mideast, and in the meantime, the DFA has thrown itself into its usual chaotic, last-minute frenzy of planning for the Ahmadinejad visit and the D-8 summit. We will continue to work to dissuade the GOI from making damaging statements or commitments during the upcoming visit. Our primary goal should be to persuade the Indonesians to burnish their often-stated commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by pressing Ahmadinejad, both privately and publicly, to abide by Iran's obligations to the IAEA and under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even if we succeed in this, however, we fully expect that some Muslim leaders and politicians will be overly effusive in their welcome for the Iranian president. End comment PASCOE