INDONESIA: A/S HILLEN'S MEETING WITH DEPARTMENT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001817 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA: A/S HILLEN'S MEETING WITH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY GENERAL COTAN Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary General Imron Cotan February 1 expressed to SIPDIS Assistant Secretary John Hillen his great pleasure that the U.S. had taken steps to end the "embargo" on military-to-military cooperation and suggested that the countries needed to start further cooperation. Openly pleased with the new bilateral dynamic possible following the U.S. decision, he raised with the Ambassador and the Assistant Secretary areas in which he wished to see greater U.S. involvement to further strengthen bilateral understanding. The Ambassador pressed Cotan to engage to resolve two bilateral issues: prospective regulations that would limit foreign broadcasting in Indonesia; and the case of a U.S. citizen, David William Ray, who was currently being tried on immigration charges in Madura. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Dr. John Hillen, following day-long political-military discussions with the Indonesian Government, called on Imron Cotan, the Department of Foreign Affairs' new Secretary General. Just returned to Jakarta following his tenure as Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Cotan exuded obvious interest in becoming personally involved in the bilateral U.S.-Indonesia relationship. He expressed to A/S Hillen his great pleasure that the U.S. had taken steps to end the "embargo" on military-to-military cooperation, noting that the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) had decayed and become ineffective. He expressed thanks for the Administration's initiative and noted that the countries needed to start further cooperation. A/S Hillen responded that the U.S. was also pleased, although some in the U.S. did not want to see the U.S. and Indonesia move forward in mil-to-mil cooperation. He acknowledged that Indonesia still faced important challenges and the U.S. would continue to seek to help in this regard. Grassroots Perceptions and Education -------------- ¶3. (C) Cotan said he wished to raise his concern that at the grassroots level in Indonesia perceptions of the West "remained wrong." The only way to correct these misperceptions was through education. The GOI had programs 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) had the ability to act directly. If possible, however, he wanted the U.S. to consider assistance to build an education infrastructure so the grass roots could see how Indonesia and the U.S. can work cooperatively together on Indonesia's future. Indonesia's education sector should be a priority. Establishment of centers of education -- at first in Java and in Aceh -- could move forward democratization of the country. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. had in place a USD 157 million education program to assist in teacher training and other efforts to improve basic education. He added that the U.S. was working on a concrete proposal and pushing hard for funding for a Peace Corps program for Indonesia. Cotan said that DEPLU had available to it some money for education centers in Nias and Aceh (Note: We understand from DEPLU contact that DEPLU has funding for "long-term goals" made available from donations for Tsunami relief. End comment.) Cotan said he needed assistance to expand such a program to other areas. Schools built with U.S. assistance could have a plaque that stated "Built by the USA." The result, he suggested, would be that "then the struggle against terrorism would be a lot easier." The Ambassador assured Cotan that the U.S. strongly supported education initiatives for Indonesia. Iran's Nuclear Program -------------- ¶5. (C) Cotan said that he had discussed with Foreign Minister Wirajuda U.S. concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. He understood that President Yudhoyono did not wish to rush to bring the issue to the UNSC. Cotan emphasized that Indonesia "fully shared the concerns of the U.S." and did not want Iran to be a nuclear weapons country. He noted that if Iran cut off oil exports, serious economic difficulties would result from increased oil prices. He suggested that if the issue were sent to the UNSC it could cause a "crescent of instability" from Afghanistan through JAKARTA 00001817 002 OF 002 Iran to Iraq. For Indonesia, the issue was "more or less a domestic concern" with popular charges that the West had imposed a "double standard" in the case of Iran because it is an Islamic country. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador replied that he understood the issue would go to the UNSC. He noted it was important Indonesia take responsibility in an area in which it professed concern. Cotan said that Foreign Minister Wirajuda had made clear during his visit to Iran January 25 that Iran pursue the Russian offer and remain engaged with the IAEA. He said that Indonesia had to remain very careful; Indonesia wanted to contribute positively in the matter, but it did not believe that confrontation was an option. Once the issue was in the hands of the UNSC, Indonesia could not control the process and Indonesia was very concerned with the domestic reaction. ¶7. (C) A/S Hillen told Cotan that President Yudhoyono had achieved such stature in the U.S. that it would be a shame if he were to be seen as an out-player on this issue. He added he did not want to see the U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship damaged because of Iran. Cotan replied that Indonesia had decided to get involved, but that limitations remained, and Indonesia wanted to avoid any measures that would "create uneasiness." The Ambassador responded that the U.S. strongly wished for Indonesia to have a more energetic foreign policy and wished for it to become more active. Cotan replied that Indonesia currently was drafting the ASEAN Charter and had decided it must "be out front" in the region and had to pursue these ideas. The U.S. should help Indonesia progress forward. Dealing with the U.S. Congress -------------- ¶8. (C) Cotan said Indonesia needed help on dealing with the U.S. Congress and asked that the Administration please advise a course of action. He emphasized that Indonesia wanted a "stable relationship" with the U.S. The Ambassador responded that two current issues needed DEPLU attention: regulations with limits on foreign broadcasting that would adversely affect VOA and BBC broadcasting in Indonesia; and the case of a U.S. citizen, David William Ray, who was currently being tried on immigration charges in Madura. These were issues that the Indonesian government should have resolved before they became public problems. Now, even if they are ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of all parties, it will be very difficult for Indonesia to overcome the initial bad press it will receive in the United States. The Ambassador asked that DEPLU turn its attention to both issues. Cotan undertook to look into the issues and to raise them with the Minister of Justice and Human Rights. ¶9. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable. PASCOE