HELPING DENMARK AND OTHER EUROPEANS WEATHER THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001651 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, DS/ITA AND DS/IP/EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2014 TAGS: PREL KISL PTER ASEC ID DA SUBJECT: HELPING DENMARK AND OTHER EUROPEANS WEATHER THE CARTOON STORM REF: A. JAKARTA 1456 (INDONESIANS VENT) ¶B. JAKARTA 1507 (DEMONSTRATION AT U.S. CONSULATE) ¶C. JAKARTA 1622 (MEETING WITH POLICE) ¶D. STATE 20453 (ASSISTING DENMARK) Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe. Reason: 1.4 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: We have maintained close and cooperative contact with our Danish and Norwegian diplomatic colleagues as violent demonstrators have targeted Danish and American diplomatic missions. We have offered various types of security assistance and weighed in with the GOI at senior levels to assure adequate protection for all diplomatic missions and personnel, particularly those of nations most closely associated with the cartoon flap. We will continue to provide whatever assistance we can, including the housing/protection of the Danish Ambassador. However, to safeguard our own personnel and facilities, our assistance should remain out of the public eye. End Summary. ¶2. (C) We reported (ref A) on a rowdy February 3 demonstration outside the Danish Embassy, noting the potential for a possible spillover on U.S. interests in Indonesia. Danish diplomats took a low-profile over the weekend. We established contact with the Danish DCM on Monday morning February 6. He informed us that the Danish Ambassador had met officials of the GOI Department of Foreign Affairs to raise security concerns, but had not received GOI assurances of additional police protection for Danish diplomatic facilities. He agreed to stay in close contact on related developments, but said the Danes did not require USG assistance. We later learned that Austria, in its capacity as EU Presidency country, had failed to secure an appointment at the Department of Foreign Affairs to raise security concerns until late Monday afternoon. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador also called the Danish Ambassador to discuss the evolving demonstration situation on Monday and offered to provide whatever assistance the Danes required. In addition, the Danish and U.S. Consulates General in Surabaya remained in close communication regarding a planned demonstration outside both Consulates. The acting chief of the Danish Consulate declined RSO Surabaya's offer of assistance. Violent demonstrations subsequently took place at both sites, and both sustained property damage and closed (ref B). We contacted police officials before and during the protests to urge adequate protection. Later that day, we held an EAC and contacted Presidential advisor Andi Mallarangeng to request additional security presence for all diplomatic missions, particularly those of European countries affected directly by the cartoon flap and that might not have the contacts to request police assistance. Andi informed us that President Yudhoyono had ordered the GOI National Police Chief to provide enhanced security to all diplomatic missions. The Ambassador could not make contact with the Danish Ambassador that evening, but conveyed the information to the Austrian Ambassador. He also asked the British Ambassador to weigh in with his police contacts (and his less-seasoned EU colleagues) to ensure a more robust GOI security presence at EU embassies. ¶4. (C) We followed up on our security concerns and Mallarangeng's assurance in a February 7 meeting with senior police officials, who told us that we would see no repeat of the February 6 protests (ref C). They also said that orders had gone out to regional police chiefs to increase security at all diplomatic facilities. The Ambassador conveyed this information to the Danish Ambassador, and met the Norwegian and Swedish Ambassadors to discuss their security concerns. Their embassies occupy office in the same high-rise tower as the Danish Embassy, which remains closed. The Swedish and Norwegian ambassadors asked RSO to examine their existing security arrangements and offer suggestions. The Ambassador and Ambassador Cain in Copenhagen discussed our efforts to assist the Danish mission in Indonesia. ¶5. (C) After an early morning February 8 Ops Center call asking us to provide protection to the Danish Ambassador, we contacted him and again offered assistance. The Danish Ambassador and DCM advised RSO that they had moved to a local hotel and felt concerned about their personal safety. RSO transported the two men in an armored vehicle with local security escort to a U.S. Embassy-owned residential compound that also includes the Marine House, where they have quartered on a temporary basis. The two Danes told us they plan to stay in Indonesia for an additional 1-2 days to facilitate the departure of Danish nationals pursuant to a Danish government travel advisory. We have increased security coverage at the residential compound, and will provide security for needed travel by the two men around Jakarta. The Danish Ambassador said his security concerns stem from death threats by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a thuggish local group that staged the embassy and consulate demonstrations. Past FPI threats of violence (e.g., threats to kill American diplomats at the time of our liberation of Iraq) have not come to pass. ¶6. (C) Also February 8, we had frequent contact with the Danish Ambassador and the acting chief of the Danish Consulate in Surabaya regarding a planned demonstration in that city. As before, we offered any assistance required. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We have and will continue to provide whatever assistance our Danish and Norwegian diplomatic colleagues request. Due to concerns over the safety of our own personnel and facilities, our assistance should remain behind the scenes and out of the public eye. PASCOE