INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT TAKES UP DRAFT ACEH LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001374 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EINV EFIN KDEM KISL ID SUBJECT: INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT TAKES UP DRAFT ACEH LAW REF: A. JAKARTA 1176 (FEW LEGISLATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS) ¶B. 05 JAKARTA 15860 (RESHUFFLE) ¶C. 05 JAKARTA 13111 (FUEL SUBSIDY CUTS) ¶D. 05 JAKARTA 12822 (RETIRED GENERALS) ¶E. 05 JAKARTA 12416 (OPPOSITION FOCUS ON ACEH) ¶F. 05 JAKARTA 11124 (SIGNING OF PEACE ACCORD) ¶G. 05 JAKARTA 9749 (ASSESSMENT OF AGREEMENT) ¶H. 05 JAKARTA 4027 (RESPONSE TO FUEL SUBSIDY POLICY) ¶I. 03 JAKARTA 2360 (ELECTION LAW) ¶J. 02 JAKARTA 7294 (POLITICAL PARTY LAW) JAKARTA 00001374 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Yudhoyono administration on January 26 delivered its draft Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA) to the House of Representatives (DPR) for debate. The August 15, 2005 GOI-GAM MOU, which ended the armed conflict, requires the law's passage by March 31 -- a deadline that would require legislative deliberation at a pace never before seen in the post-Suharto era. The administration's bill appears generally consistent with the provisions of the MOU. Up to this point, opposition to the MOU (and provisions in the draft law) has most often focused on the legalization of local political parties. Other important aspects of the law cover economic activity and enhance the role of Islamic Law to a greater extent that the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy. Although the administration has won most of its recent battles in the legislature, and eventual passage of the LOGA appears likely, we see no basis for believing that opposition politicians will pull their punches or allow expeditious passage. End Summary. TIMEFRAME -------------- ¶2. (U) Having received the draft LOGA, the DPR leadership will raise it at a plenary session scheduled for February 7. Under normal procedures, the plenary session would send the draft law to the Steering Committee, which would then determine whether to send the bill to one of the DPR's 11 substantive committees, or to set up a Special Committee (PANSUS) for deliberations. If the latter option is chosen -- as appears likely, given that the issues covered by the bill do not fit neatly into the mandate of any one existing committee -- legislators would require further time to establish a PANSUS, elect its leadership, and carve out time for its proceedings. (Note: Yudhoyono has designated State Secretary Yusril Mahendra and Minister of Home Affairs SIPDIS Mohammad Ma'ruf to represent the administration's position during hearings at the DPR. Lead Aceh negotiator and Law/Human Rights Minister Hamid Awaludin, who helped draft the Aceh MOU, told the Ambassador that Ma'ruf, and not Hamid, had responsibility for the LOGA. End Note.) As noted in ref A, the DPR has moved slowly in its 2004-2009 term, passing only two substantive laws in 2005. Passage of as important and high-profile a bill as the LOGA prior to the March 31 deadline would appear unprecedented in the post-Suharto era. LOGA GENERALLY TRACKS WITH MOU -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The administration's bill appears generally consistent with the provisions of the MOU (ref F and G). It defines Aceh as a province with "special authority to regulate and manage by itself affairs of administration and local community interests in accordance with the legal regulations in the system and principles of the Unitary State of Indonesia." Article 7 provides the authority for Aceh to administer itself "in all public sectors," except for those in the central government's realm: "international affairs, defense, security, certain judicial matters (justisi), national monetary and fiscal matters, and certain affairs in the religious field." This list tracks closely with the provisions of the MOU (1.1.2),but Article 7 (3) also opens the door to removing from the Aceh government's realm other matters "that are determined by legal regulations as within the authority of the (central) Government." ARMED FORCES, SECURITY PROVISIONS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The LOGA bill also appears to stop short of the MOU JAKARTA 00001374 002.2 OF 004 (1.4.5) provision that "all civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh will be tried in civil courts in Aceh." Instead, Article 154 of the draft LOGA simply states "crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces in Aceh will be tried in accordance with legal regulations" and that these trials will be conducted "in an open and public manner." The draft LOGA does not cover demobilization or the withdrawal of troops (which was accomplished by the end of 2005, in accordance with the MOU). Article 153 does, however, specify that the TNI "is responsible for implementing national defense and other missions in Aceh, in accordance with legal regulations... (including) defending, protecting, and safeguarding the unity and sovereignty of the state (of Indonesia) in Aceh." Article 155 specifies that the Police are responsible for maintaining security and order, and the LOGA reinforces that the Aceh Police are a component of the National Police. (Note: The LOGA does not cover aspects of the MOU dealing with amnesty, reintegration, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, or dispute resolution and the GOI and GAM had not intended to cover such issues in the LOGA. End Note.) LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES: A HOT BUTTON ISSUE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While the MOU required a Law on Governing Aceh to be promulgated by March 31, it allowed the government up to 18 months from the signing of the MOU to create "the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh." Given the controversy surrounding this issue, the administration might have sought to postpone consideration of local parties until a later time. Instead, though, the administration has confronted the issue head-on in the draft LOGA, with a 10-article chapter defining local parties and their rights and responsibilities. Although their participation in elections for local legislatures is explicit, it remains unclear from the draft whether local parties would be entitled to participate in national elections. The only hint that they might be able to is in Article 73, which specifies that these parties are entitled to "equal and fair treatment by the (central) Government." ¶6. (U) In the immediate aftermath of the MOU's signing, political party leaders principally focused their opposition to the peace agreement on the MOU's provisions for local political parties. Former President Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P) and former President Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB) led the charge. Together, these parties control roughly one-third of the seats in the House of Representatives. Opponents of the MOU cited the requirements in existing law that all political parties have a national presence. Aiming specifically to prevent the establishment of local parties, Article 2 of the 2002 Law on Political Parties (ref J) required that parties have Executive Boards in half the country's provinces, half of the cities or regencies in those provinces, and half of the subdistricts in those cities or regencies. Article 6 (1) (a) of the same law specified that political parties must have as their goal the realization of "Indonesia's national aspirations." ¶7. (U) The 2003 Law on General Elections (ref I) went further, requiring that political parties contesting a national election must have boards of administrators in two-thirds of Indonesia's provinces, two-thirds of the cities or regencies in those provinces, and at least 1,000 members (or membership equal to 1/1000th of the population) in the subdistricts in those cities or regencies (Article 7). Article 9 of that law also barred from participation in subsequent elections any political party that failed to win at least three percent of the seats in the national legislature, or four percent of the seats in various local legislatures in half of the country's provinces, cities/regencies, or subdistricts. Due to this threshold requirement, numerous parties that currently hold seats in the legislature will have to reincorporate themselves to participate in 2009's election. ¶8. (C) PDI-P, which has remained a consistent opposition force in the legislature, is likely to continue to oppose provisions for the establishment of local political parties. This issue resonates deeply with many Indonesian nationalists, who genuinely see the MOU as eroding the supremacy of national unity, one of the core principles of Indonesia's "Pancasila" ideology, which has sacred status for many. PKB's opposition is uncertain; Wahid was a leading JAKARTA 00001374 003.2 OF 004 critic of the MOU (ref E),but he has become more closely aligned with Yudhoyono's administration since the December 2005 cabinet reshuffle (ref B). (Ref D explained the importance of opposition by retired military figures to the MOU; this opposition could resurface.) WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN PARTY LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶9. (U) Article 67 of the draft law specifies that local political parties must have women in 30 percent of their leadership positions. There is no similar requirement for national level parties. The closest provision one can find on the national level is weak language in the 2003 election law requiring that parties consider selecting women for at least 30 percent of the candidate slots on their party lists (ref I). INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMITTEE -------------- ¶10. (U) Expanding on the political provisions in the MOU, the draft LOGA provides for the establishment of an Independent Election Committee (KIP),to be formed by the Acehnese legislature, that would take on many of the functions performed in other provinces by regional branches of the General Election Commission (KPU). The bill specifies that the KIP will administer the elections of the Governor, Regents, and Mayors. It also provides that the KIP "may be given tasks" for the national elections and elections of the local legislatures in Aceh. ECONOMIC PROVISIONS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The draft LOGA includes the central economic provisions of the MOU: - The draft LOGA allows Aceh slightly greater authority than the MOU stipulated; Article 123 provides for the Aceh Government to manage all natural resources in Aceh and its territorial waters. However, while Article 128 stipulates that the Aceh Government can grant rights for fishing, mining, and forestry ventures, there is no parallel language on the exploitation of oil and gas reserves. In addition, Article 199 stipulates that the contracts between the central Government and foreign countries or other parties related to oil and natural gas in Aceh remain valid. - While the MOU had simply stipulated that Aceh would retain 70 percent of its revenues from hydrocarbon deposits, Article 141 of the draft law specifies that it also would receive 80 percent of the revenues from mining, fishing, and forestry. The 80 percent figure tracks with language from the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy. That law stipulated that Aceh would receive, through a special fund, 15 percent of oil revenues and 30 percent of natural gas revenues. - Article 135 requires that the Aceh Government give "opportunity and protection" for workers from outside of Aceh, but it also requires them to register with the authorities. Article 136 applies stricter standards for foreign workers in Aceh. - The Aceh Government's ability to borrow funds from domestic or foreign sources requires the agreement of the Finance Minister and "consideration" of the Minister of Home Affairs (Article 143). - The Aceh Government controls the right to lease or use property, for both domestic and foreign investors, "in accordance with existing norms, standards, and procedures" (Article 162). ROLE OF ISLAMIC LAW -------------- ¶12. (U) Although the MOU made no mention of Islamic Law, the draft LOGA has numerous provisions mandating or supporting the imposition of Islamic Law in Aceh. These include: - Assigning the Aceh government responsibility for "arranging religious life, (by) implementing Islamic Law for (Islam's) adherents in Aceh, while protecting inter-religious harmony," and providing for a "clerics' role in the determination of JAKARTA 00001374 004.2 OF 004 Aceh policy" (Article 15). - Requiring that any candidate for Mayor, Regent, or Governor "carry out the religious law of his faith" (Article 61). - Requiring that local political parties "reflect" the "religion... of the Acehnese people," "put into effect and advance Islamic values," and "strive for the implementation of Islamic Law" (Articles 70, 71, and 74). - Recognizing the Court of Islamic Law for Muslims (Chapter XVII). - Requiring all Muslims to follow Islamic Law, and for all people in Aceh to respect the implementation of Islamic Law (Article 107). (This will be further regulated in the Qanun Aceh, a form of provincial law that takes into account Aceh's culture and traditions.) ¶13. (SBU) The 2001 Law on Special Autonomy had also provided for a Court of Islamic Law (Article 25). Abdullah Puteh, the then-Governor of Aceh, announced in 2002 that the province would adopt Islamic Law, and the provincial legislature on numerous occasions took steps to advance and institutionalize the role of Islamic Law in Aceh. While the draft LOGA's Islam-related provisions will not dramatically change the way of life in Aceh, they nevertheless would represent the strongest endorsement yet provided by the national legislature for Islamic Law in a part of Indonesia. The religious provisions of the draft LOGA go significantly beyond the provisions of the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy, which did not explicitly require Muslims to follow Islamic Law. Unlike the Law on Special Autonomy, the draft LOGA makes numerous scattered references to Islamic values and Islamic Law, beyond those listed above. OUTLOOK -------------- ¶14. (C) The administration has secured a favorable result in recent high-profile parliamentary debates -- e.g., on fuel subsidy cuts (ref C and H) and rice importation (ref A). Given the commitment of President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kalla (concurrently the Chairman of Golkar, Indonesia's largest political party) to the Aceh peace agreement, we believe that the draft LOGA will eventually pass. We doubt that the bill will enjoy a smooth or easy process, however, and passage within the time frame specified by the MOU would be extraordinary, given the DPR's extremely slow legislative pace. Only budgetary bills and amendments have passed under tight deadlines. GAM or Acehnese civil society concerns about delays in promulgating the LOGA might be assuaged somewhat if the DPR's debate and modification of the bill's controversial provisions take place in a transparent and open fashion. PASCOE