IO PDAS WARLICK'S MEETING WITH FORMER FORMIN ALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 013609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC AORC PHUM MNUC KNNP BM IR ID
SUBJECT: IO PDAS WARLICK'S MEETING WITH FORMER FORMIN ALI
ALATAS

Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. On December 19, IO PDAS James B. Warlick met
with Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia
(1987-99),to discuss Indonesia's upcoming term as a
non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Alatas
said that both President Yudhoyono (SBY) and Foreign Minister
Hassan Wirajuda were interested in practical and flexible
approaches. He cautioned that external players, even
including ASEAN, had limited leverage over the Burmese
regime, but he opined that there may be an opening for a
constructive UN role. Alatas said he believed that SBY
wanted to become a player on Mideast issues, but recognized
Indonesia's limitations in this area. On the Iranian nuclear
issue, Alatas said he thought that the GOI was not yet fully
convinced that Iran intends to develop weapons. He
criticized the U.S. for "inconsistency" on nuclear issues,
citing the cases of the DPRK and India. End summary.

Burma
--------------

2.(C) PDAS Warlick said that by placing Burma on its agenda,
the Security Council was acknowledging the regional
destabilizing effect of outflows of refugees and other
consequences of the SPDC's repressive policies. Warlick said
that we wanted to call the Burmese regime to accountability,
and noted that Indonesia's position would be very
influential. Alatas replied that Indonesia's position on any
UNSC resolution would depend on its substance, but would also
require close coordination with other ASEAN members. He
averred that external actors such as the UN or even ASEAN had
very little influence with the SPDC. (Note: Alatas has
extensive first-hand knowledge of the regime. He served as
Presidential Envoy to Burma under former President Megawati
and accompanied President Yudhoyono to Rangoon in his March.
End note.) The SPDC, Alatas said, does not care what the
outside world thinks, and has shrugged off foreign pressure
in the past. He noted, however, that Under Secretary General
Gambari's call on Aung San Suu Kyi seems to indicate that the
SPDC has heeded advice "not to make the U.N. the enemy."


3. (C) Alatas said he "didn't dare predict" the outcome of
the SPDC's national dialogue. Indonesia, he said, had been
frustrated in its efforts to interest the SPDC in its own
experience as a model for reform. The SPDC still saw the
Suharto-era New Order as a paradigm, since that former
Indonesian regime institutionalized military participation in
political and economic life. Alatas noted, however, that the
Burmese regime seems to trust Indonesia more than other
international actors. This is because of the two countries'
mutual support during their struggles for independence, and
because unlike Thailand and Singapore, Indonesia's engagement
with the SPDC is not influenced by commercial factors.


4. (C) PDAS Warlick said that the U.S. needed the support of
China and others to conclude an effective UNSC resolution on
Burma, and would have to work with other members such as
China. Alatas said that the GOI had urged both China and
India not to "become protectors" of the Burmese regime. He
observed that this would be a difficult issue for Indonesia,
since Jakarta would have to reconcile its responsibilities as
a UNSC member and an ASEAN leader. Alatas said that ASEAN
foreign ministers tend to take a tougher line on Burma than
ASEAN heads of government, who remain reluctant to confront
the SPDC.

NAM
---


5. (C) PDAS Warlick asked how Indonesia's role as a leader of
the Non-Aligned Movement would influence its behavior on the
UNSC. Alatas said that while the GOI would consult with the
NAM caucus, he doubted whether this grouping would often
reach a unified position. President Yudhoyono, he said, was
interested in concrete outcomes, and this meant that
Indonesia would likely take a relatively flexible approach to
issues before the UNSC. Foreign Minister Wirajuda, he said,
was similarly-minded, but Alatas cautioned that we might have
difficulty with positions developed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) bureaucracy.

Mideast
--------------

JAKARTA 00013609 002 OF 002




6. (C) Alatas said SBY wanted to be more active in the
Mideast than past Indonesian presidents. It had taken some
time for SBY to grasp the complexities of the region but he
was now up to speed. In Palestine, Alatas said, SBY is
trusted by both President Abbas and Hamas, and he is also on
good terms with the Arab countries and Iran. Indonesia does
not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Alatas conceded,
but the relationship "is not one of hostility" and "the
Israelis know what we think." Alatas commented that
Indonesia's role would be limited, because "both carrots and
sticks are needed," and Indonesia has few of either. The
United States would remain the most important mediator of the
conflict. Nevertheless, SBY was "collecting inputs" in order
to decide how the GOI could be helpful in the region, but
this would not necessarily translate into an Indonesian
Mideast initiative on the UNSC.


7. (C) Alatas said he hoped that we would reinvigorate the
Quartet. PDAS Warlick said this is what we intend to do
under the incoming Secretary General. We want to address the
Mideast in the U.N., he said, but we want to avoid exercises
such as debating unacceptable UNSC resolutions - of the type
repeatedly introduced by Qatar, for example - that serve only
to isolate the U.S. and compel our use of the veto. Alatas
said that he felt Qatar behaved the way it did because it
wanted to be seen as "doing something" by the Palestinians
and by other OIC members. He added that he did not believe
that Indonesia would resort to such tactics on the UNSC.

Iranian Nuclear Program/IAEA
--------------


8. (C) PDAS Warlick asked for Alatas' interpretation of the
GOI's stance on the Iranian nuclear issue, including
Indonesia's abstention on the IAEA Board of Governors' vote
last February. This was an issue that the Security Council
would take up, he noted. Alatas responded that the GOI's
long-held basic position on the matter is straight-forward:
Indonesia is "totally opposed" to the development of nuclear
weapons, but "totally supportive" of individual countries'
right to develop civilian nuclear power. The GOI had made
this clear to the Iranians, he added. Alatas said he
believed the GOI was not yet convinced that Iran was intent
on developing nuclear weapons, and said that U.S. policy sent
mixed signals on the nuclear issue. Alatas said that the
U.S.-India agreement on development of nuclear technology
seemed to indicate a U.S. double standard, and he wondered
"what it is really all about." He pointed out the contrast
between our reactions to Iran's and the DPRK's nuclear
programs. PDAS Warlick countered that Iran had a long
history of concealing its program, and that if the Iranians
had merely wanted a civilian nuclear program, they could have
accepted Russia's offer to cooperate. Alatas said he could
not explain the Iranians' nuclear program, but commented that
they were playing their diplomatic hand shrewdly.

Sanctions
--------------


9. (C) On the issue of the application of sanctions, Alatas
said the GOI would look at situations on a case-by-case
basis. U.S. sanctions against Burma had had no effect, he
said, whereas U.S. measures targeting banks used by the DPRK
seemed to have been effective.

Peacekeeping
--------------


10. (C) PDAS Warlick expressed appreciation for Indonesia's
contribution to UNIFIL and asked for Alatas' views on
Indonesia's possible participation in future peacekeeping
operations. Alatas said the GOI would be willing to consider
such participation, but cautioned that this would be limited
to actual UN peacekeeping operations and should not be
construed as willingness to contribute troops to ad hoc
"coalitions of the willing."


11. (U) PDAS Warlick did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
HEFFERN