ACEH: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAM VICTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 013513

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ID
SUBJECT: ACEH: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAM VICTORY

REF: JAKARTA 10572

Classified By: CDA JOHN A. HEFFERN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The surprise win of the Free Aceh Movement's
(GAM) Irwandi Yusuf in Aceh's gubernatorial election is clear
evidence that the province's first direct local elections
were genuine and that the peace process is beginning to
mature. Irwandi's win is likely to accelerate GAM's
transition into a formal political party and breathe life
into the GAM reintegration process. At the same time, the
wide gap between GAM and Jakarta on contentious issues such
as Acehnese autonomy and accountability for human rights
violations remains and has the potential to strain Aceh's
relations with Jakarta, while Irwandi's disapproval of
shariah law could reassure secularists. The way in which
these questions are handled will determine the prospects for
lasting peace in Aceh as well as Jakarta's estimation of the
value this model of conflict resolution had for Papua or
elsewhere. The effects of this election could therefore
ripple across broader U.S. interests in Indonesia. End
Summary.

MANDATE FOR CHANGE


2. (U) Although the election results are still preliminary,
GAM's Irwandi Yusuf appears to have won a solid victory in
Aceh's first direct local election for governor. The holding
of local elections in the province was a key milestone in
implementing the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between GAM and the Government of Indonesia. Irwandi's
surprise win in these elections is clear evidence that they
were genuine. It also appears that GAM has won in at least
five of 19 districts and that new faces are expected in
another eight districts. That fewer than a third of
incumbents were returned constitutes strong evidence that the
Acehnese were voting for change. Official results of the
elections will be announced in early January.


3. (C) Because of his status within GAM, Irwandi's victory
may advance the peace process by returning control over the
movement to Aceh and easing its transition from independence
movement to political party. It is also expected to
accelerate and deepen the reintegration process. At the same
time, his strongly held views on contentious issues such
central government authority versus Aceh's autonomy and
accountability for human rights violations committed during
the decades of conflict have the potential of straining
relations with Jakarta.

TRANSFORMING GAM


4. (C) GAM has historically been controlled by a group of
exiles in Sweden. Although this group successfully
negotiated the Helsinki MOU, they have subsequently refused
to consider transforming the movement in ways which will
advance the peace process, namely by embracing the creation
of a political party. While not yet complete, the election
is returning control of the movement from Sweden to Aceh and
transferring it from self-appointed exiles to a
democratically elected leader. According to Irwandi, he will
form a political party as soon regulations are amended to
permit it. Once he does, the transfer of power will be
complete.

ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS


5. (C) One impediment to the peace process has been a lack of
trust between ex-combatants and the Aceh Reintegration Agency
(BRA) charged with implementing reintegration policy. This
lack of trust delayed payments to ex-combatants and has
hindered the development of programs to compensate victims of
conflict. As governor, Irwandi will appoint and supervise
the leadership of the BRA and will have the authority to use
the province's financial and administrative muscle to
accelerate reintegration and peace building programs. Humam
Hamid, one of Irwandi's competitors for Governor, told us
after the election that Irwandi's presence in the government
and his credibility among GAM members should smooth the
process of GAM reintegration.


6. (C) Irwandi is expected to aggressively promote
reintegration of former GAM combatants and use the resources
of the province to assist ex-combatants. It is almost
certain that he will also pursue amendments to the Law on the
Governing of Aceh (LOGA),including portions dealing with
accountability for human rights violations, to bring it into

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full compliance with the MOU. An aggressive approach to
implementing the Helsinki MOU and modifying the LOGA are
likely to strain Aceh's relationship with Jakarta.

POINTS OF CONTENTION


7. (C) The Helsinki MOU promised broad autonomy to Aceh.
Indonesia has codified the autonomy in law, but Irwandi and
GAM do not believe that the law goes far enough (reftel).
Issues in contention include prosecution for past human
rights violations, powers of the central government, control
of natural resources, and the role of the military. Each of
those issues is extremely sensitive and, if mishandled, could
damage relations between Jakarta and Aceh and ultimately
Jakarta's perception of the peace process.


8. (C) A related issue, though not directly tied to the MOU
or the LOGA, is the role of Islam and shariah law. The GAM
was never a proponent of shariah law, and the national
government's introduction of it was an attempt to undercut
independence sentiment. None of the candidates made it major
a campaign issue, but Irwandi has indicated in private
conversations with us that he intends to roll it back
significantly. He will have to do this without alienating
conservatives, but such a move could help to reassure
secularists and nationalists.

COMMENT


9. (C) How well Aceh and Jakarta are able to work together in
the coming year will help determine the prospects for
continuing peace in Aceh. They will also determine the
extent to which Jakarta will consider the Aceh peace process
a success. The central government's initial response was
uniformly positive, if cautious, promising to work with the
winner for Aceh's recovery and reintegration. Because
Jakarta's assessment of the success of this peace model will
in part determine its willingness to employ a similar
approach elsewhere in the archipelago, these developments
could affect our broader interests in Indonesia.
HEFFERN