INDONESIA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013497 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG, PDAS WARLICK, IO/UNP, AND EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM AORC UNSC ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Indonesia's election to the UNSC demonstrates President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) desire to raise his country's international profile. We have recently seen the emergence of a more flexible, multi-faceted style of Indonesian diplomacy, particularly where SBY's personal initiatives and interests come into play. SBY's personal focus on improving bilateral ties with key powers should help us deal with Indonesia on the UNSC. Leading Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) personnel, however, trained in New York and Geneva, remain steeped in traditional (and unhelpful) views of the Non-Aligned Movement. We have urged the GOI to base its foreign policy on its interests as a large democratic nation, leaving the NAM behind. We will have to make clear that GOI positions on the UNSC will receive high level attention in Washington and could have repercussions on our bilateral relationship. ¶2. (C) To promote constructive Indonesian behavior on the UNSC we will need to reach out to senior levels of the GOI on critical votes; make it clear that Indonesia is important to us as an influential emerging democracy, not as the voice of the NAM or the OIC; and encourage the GOI to seek practical solutions rather than rhetorical responses to crises in areas like the Middle East. We anticipate some level of Indonesian cooperation on North Korea, Burma, and, depending on the specific issue, Iraq and Lebanon. The most difficult issues will be Israel, Palestine, and the Peace Process. The biggest question mark is the Iranian nuclear issue, where Indonesia has said some of the right things, but resisted concrete action. End Summary. Steeped in the Values of the NAM -------------- ¶3. (C) Indonesian foreign policy is steeped in its identity as founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. Generations of Indonesian diplomats have been indoctrinated in the following foreign affairs orthodoxy: -- The NAM: Since 1948, Indonesia has carefully pursued a policy of non-aligning with either superpower - whether there were two superpowers or only one. Indonesia still resists the appearance of aligning with U.S., at times in visible contradiction to its own interests or domestic policies. This policy orientation was deepened when the GOI helped found the NAM as host of the 1955 Bandung Conference. The GOI organized a major 50th anniversary commemoration last year, attended by some 70 world leaders. Many Indonesian policymakers still see a relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement in a post-Cold War context that is difficult to justify. -- OIC/Muslim solidarity: Indonesia is eager to assert solidarity with other Muslim countries for domestic as well as foreign policy reasons, although Indonesia is not a leader within the Organization of the Islamic Conference itself. -- A lingering "Asian values" mentality on human rights: The GOI usually opposes what it considers confrontational Western approaches on human rights, although there has been some change with regard to Burma. Sensitivity here remains strong since Jakarta has been a well-justified target of criticism on human rights issues, especially for abuses in East Timor. Indonesia's policy of "no naming and shaming" based on this history has caused it to associate itself with the most reprehensible regimes in many UN votes. ¶4. (C) Notwithstanding this legacy, SBY is the most outward-looking Indonesian President to date. With both military and civilian education in the U.S. as well as personal experience in peacekeeping missions, he is confident in his dealings with us and is growing in office. His decision to participate in UNIFIL illustrated his desire to be part of a solution, not just criticize from the sidelines. ¶5. (C) The GOI is also cultivating more robust bilateral JAKARTA 00013497 002 OF 004 relationships with its regional neighbors and other major powers. Human rights are not off-limits as a discussion topic, and the GOI has supported inter-faith dialogues between Indonesian and foreign religious leaders. The GOI has shown considerable creativity and boldness in promoting the ASEAN Political and Security Community and the ASEAN Charter, both of which break with the organization's past indifference to domestic political values. The GOI was at the forefront of ASEAN's successful push to include India, New Zealand, and Australia in the East Asia Summit. In short, we may be witnessing the emergence of a more creative and constructive Indonesian diplomacy - driven from the top down. The Domestic Component -------------- ¶6. (C) That having been said, SBY must contend with domestic political constraints. U.S. policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestinians and many aspects of the war on terrorism are deeply unpopular in Indonesia. The reality is that much of the Indonesian public, press and Parliament believe the U.S. is biased against Muslims in the foreign policy arena, even when they welcome bilateral cooperation. SBY and his government must be careful with appearances when they deal with us and this domestic sentiment will color unhelpfully their Security Council decision-making. SBY will not want to add to the many headaches from either the nationalist or Islamist opposition camps, both of which will make hay out of any perceived pandering to US demands. Indonesia on The UNSC: A Challenge For U.S. Diplomacy -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Indonesia's upcoming tenure on the UN Security Council presents a challenge for U.S. diplomacy. The GOI's Security Council agenda is sketchy, but senior officials have nonetheless made a few priorities public. One is to get the UNSC more involved in Israel-Palestine Peace Process. Another is to "bridge the gap" between the Security Council and the General Assembly, although it is not clear what this means. The Indonesians also appear to believe they have a mandate to be the voice of the OIC and the NAM on the Security Council. ¶8. (C) Indonesia's approach to diplomacy is to avoid disharmony and to build consensus via compromise. On the Security Council, this tendency will sometimes take the form of unwelcome efforts to water down our resolutions on matters of fundamental importance to us. However, Indonesia is also highly averse to standing in the way of an emerging consensus, and is unlikely to block any resolution supported by all members of the P-5. This means that Indonesia will not play the role of a spoiler on the Security Council. ¶9. (C) In the UNGA and the Human Rights Council, Indonesia has strictly followed, except with respect to Israel, a policy of opposing country-specific resolutions. In the UNSC, the GOI will not be able to avoid addressing resolutions on individual countries, but in these cases will probably resist sanctions. Indonesia Faces the Issues -------------- ¶10. (C) North Korea: Indonesia may be helpful to us on Korean peninsula issues. The GOI recognizes that the DPRK is a threat to regional security, and acknowledges that UNSC Resolution 1718 is legally binding on all UN member states. Last summer, the GOI issued a strong statement condemning the DPRK's missile test and canceled a planned visit by SBY to Pyongyang. The GOI is a strong supporter of the Six-Party Talks, but in the past has pursued its own diplomatic initiatives as a complementary effort. We should work with Japan to push the GOI for strong UNSC action on North Korea. ¶11. (C) Burma: The GOI acknowledges that the situation in Burma is unacceptable, and has been exasperated by the stubbornness and erratic behavior of the SPDC. The Indonesians are concerned that the junta is bringing ASEAN into disrepute, and were relieved when Burma relinquished its JAKARTA 00013497 003 OF 004 turn as the organization's chairman. Foreign Minister Wirajuda recently hinted publicly that Indonesia is no longer willing to protect the SPDC against international actions. However, Indonesia prefers to address the problem bilaterally and in an ASEAN context. The GOI has consistently pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with Rangoon, believing that the SPDC can learn from Indonesia's own transition from military-dominated autocracy to democracy. The GOI would probably support UNSC resolutions expressing concern over conditions in Burma and support for the SYG's special representative, but would abstain on or oppose explicit punitive action. ¶12. (C) Iraq: We may be able to work with Indonesia on Iraq. In recent weeks, SBY and Foreign Minister Wirajuda have set forth the vague outlines of a plan for Iraq. They have called for an international conference; a reconciliation process among sectarian groups in Iraq; an international reconstruction and rehabilitation program; and introduction of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force made up of forces from Muslim states. While these ideas are unclear in key aspects, we believe they show Indonesia's leaders sincerely want to be helpful and are willing to consider contributing troops if conditions are right. Indonesia is showing signs of taking Iraq seriously, and this may translate into a constructive attitude on the Security Council. ¶13. (C) Lebanon: Indonesia's contribution of 850 peacekeepers to UNIFIL should lead them to realistic positions on Lebanon in the UNSC. We should not expect, however, Indonesian support for actions against Syria or Iran without strong P-5 consensus. ¶14. (C) Middle East: Indonesia would like to be taken seriously as a player on Middle East Peace Process issues. As with Iraq, this is an area where SBY would like to see Indonesia as part of the solution rather than a critic on the sidelines - but he will face tremendous domestic pressure on any relevant resolution. Indonesia has called for a revival of the "Road Map" in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and has dispatched an envoy to the region. The GOI is a strong proponent of a two-state solution but does not recognize Israel, despite cultivating some official contacts in New York and elsewhere. We should dissuade the Indonesians from simply espousing a generic OIC line and encourage them to focus on practical outcomes. Over time, this engagement might begin to make a dent in Jakarta's current knee-jerk policy in this area. ¶15. (C) Iran: As we saw when Jakarta abstained in the February 2006 IAEA Board of Governors vote, we cannot take Indonesia for granted on the Iran nuclear issue. While the GOI has called for Iran to live up to its NPT obligations, it has resisted acknowledging that Iran's nuclear program is for other than peaceful purposes, and has consistently opposed "coercive" approaches to the problem. The Indonesians persist in suspecting - despite widespread assurances to the contrary - that the international community's actions on Iran's nuclear program somehow have implications for their own plans to develop civilian nuclear energy. ¶16. (C) Iran is admired by many Indonesian Muslims, and President Ahmadinejad received a warm welcome during his visit to Jakarta last May, although his hard line took SBY by surprise. This public sympathy imposes significant political constraints on Indonesia's Security Council options. Indonesia may well introduce compromise language on Iran resolutions and will resist siding in the Security Council with the U.S. against a fellow Muslim country, unless faced by a strong P-5 consensus. Engaging Indonesia on The UNSC -------------- ¶17. (C) In our dialogue with the GOI on Security Council issues, we should consistently invoke Indonesia's status and influence as the largest democracy in East Asia and the largest majority-Muslim democracy in the world. We should clearly signal that these factors are our basis for engaging Indonesia, not its role as self-appointed voice of the NAM, OIC, or any other bloc. We should appeal to the GOI to JAKARTA 00013497 004 OF 004 demonstrate its new commitment to democracy and improved observance of human rights in its foreign policy decisions. In short, it is time for Indonesia's foreign policy to catch up with the positive evolution we have seen in its domestic institutions. Indonesia is now a democratic giant, not a NAM dwarf. ¶18. (C) Since impulses for change in Indonesian foreign policy tend to originate with President Yudhoyono and his staff, the U.S. must be ready to reach out to this level on critical UNSC votes. A senior Department official should be designated as interlocutor on Security Council matters with Indonesian National Security Advisor Dino Patti Djalal. Calls from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Wirajuda would help -- at least causing him to think twice before acquiescing to unhelpful positions developed by his staff or falling back on unhelpful instincts. On votes of the very highest importance, the President should consider calling SBY directly. ¶19. (C) As a Security Council member, Indonesia will undoubtedly be the source of some disappointments and frustrations. But in recent years, Indonesia's domestic political system has changed in positive ways that many observers - including Indonesians - had long deemed impossible. There is no reason this change cannot occur in its foreign policy as well. The best way to promote such evolution is by patiently and respectfully challenging Indonesia to live up to its new values. We hope that over the longer term, this will result in a more flexible and constructive Indonesian approach to foreign affairs both in the UNSC and elsewhere. PASCOE