Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA13473
2006-12-13 11:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:
DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ASEAN SUPPORT FOR UNSC
how-toVZCZCXRO3892 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHJA #3473 3471130 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131130Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2448 INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0558 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7467 RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3761 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0218 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0398 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1225 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1208 RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013473
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM ID
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ASEAN SUPPORT FOR UNSC
RESOLUTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 197182
Classified By: Political Officer Daniel Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013473
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM ID
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ASEAN SUPPORT FOR UNSC
RESOLUTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 197182
Classified By: Political Officer Daniel Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
1. (C) We delivered reftel demarche to contacts in the
Directorate of International Security and Disarmament, which
handles UNSC issues, and to Gudadi B. Sasongko of the
Directorate for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) on December 13. We
left a copy of the draft resolution with each office.
Sasongko responded substantively to the demarche. In
connection with the demarche, we noted that Indonesian
Foreign Minister Wirajuda had stated publicly on December 10
that ASEAN no longer would concern itself with the fate of
human rights activist Aun San Suu Kyi and had left settlement
of her case to the United Nations. We suggested that
Wirajuda's statement would seem to welcome a UN Security
Council resolution on Burma.
2. (C) Responding to Wirajuda's statement, Sasongko said the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was frustrated
by the lack of progress on Burma, despite repeated efforts
and an approach which had tried to show "understanding."
Indonesia was particularly disappointed because of its
special relationship with Burma, and could not ignore the
lack of progress. Sasongko said he personally disagreed with
the ASEAN decision and believed ASEAN should continue to
press Burma for reform.
3. (C) Sasongko said his office would review the draft text
and consider whether Indonesia could support it. Indonesia
was more inclined to endorse a resolution which pushed Burma
in the direction of democracy, rather than one which
sanctioned or ostracized Burma. That did not mean the
resolution must be free of criticism, he stressed.
4. (C) Sasongko asserted that efforts by Indonesia, ASEAN
partners and the international community to induce change in
Burma were failing partly because many countries continued to
trade with Burma. Burma had satisfactory relations with
China, India and Russia, which maintained economic ties with
Burma. Thailand and Malaysia did so as well. This permitted
the military regime to survive and ignore calls for reform.
5. (C) Sasongko related Indonesian plans to use
military-to-military contacts to try to effect change among
the Burmese political leadership, since most of them were
military officers. During the visit of Indonesian President
Yudhoyono to Burma in March 2006, the two countries had
agreed to establish a joint commission for such exchanges.
The first meeting, scheduled to occur in 2006, had not
occurred because Burma had not been ready, and had been
postponed until 2007. Indonesia continued to hope that this
approach might bear fruit. Sasongko noted that the two
countries had conducted military-to-military exchanges in the
1980s.
6. (C) In regard to Indonesia's upcoming rotation onto the UN
Security Council, Sasongko said DEPLU had formed a task force
to review Indonesia's position on all UNSC issues.
Acknowledging that this probably would not lead to a dramatic
change in position, he said the Indonesian government was
conscious of the fact that Indonesia would now be speaking
not bilaterally but as a representative of the international
community.
PASCOE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM ID
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ASEAN SUPPORT FOR UNSC
RESOLUTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 197182
Classified By: Political Officer Daniel Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
1. (C) We delivered reftel demarche to contacts in the
Directorate of International Security and Disarmament, which
handles UNSC issues, and to Gudadi B. Sasongko of the
Directorate for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) on December 13. We
left a copy of the draft resolution with each office.
Sasongko responded substantively to the demarche. In
connection with the demarche, we noted that Indonesian
Foreign Minister Wirajuda had stated publicly on December 10
that ASEAN no longer would concern itself with the fate of
human rights activist Aun San Suu Kyi and had left settlement
of her case to the United Nations. We suggested that
Wirajuda's statement would seem to welcome a UN Security
Council resolution on Burma.
2. (C) Responding to Wirajuda's statement, Sasongko said the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was frustrated
by the lack of progress on Burma, despite repeated efforts
and an approach which had tried to show "understanding."
Indonesia was particularly disappointed because of its
special relationship with Burma, and could not ignore the
lack of progress. Sasongko said he personally disagreed with
the ASEAN decision and believed ASEAN should continue to
press Burma for reform.
3. (C) Sasongko said his office would review the draft text
and consider whether Indonesia could support it. Indonesia
was more inclined to endorse a resolution which pushed Burma
in the direction of democracy, rather than one which
sanctioned or ostracized Burma. That did not mean the
resolution must be free of criticism, he stressed.
4. (C) Sasongko asserted that efforts by Indonesia, ASEAN
partners and the international community to induce change in
Burma were failing partly because many countries continued to
trade with Burma. Burma had satisfactory relations with
China, India and Russia, which maintained economic ties with
Burma. Thailand and Malaysia did so as well. This permitted
the military regime to survive and ignore calls for reform.
5. (C) Sasongko related Indonesian plans to use
military-to-military contacts to try to effect change among
the Burmese political leadership, since most of them were
military officers. During the visit of Indonesian President
Yudhoyono to Burma in March 2006, the two countries had
agreed to establish a joint commission for such exchanges.
The first meeting, scheduled to occur in 2006, had not
occurred because Burma had not been ready, and had been
postponed until 2007. Indonesia continued to hope that this
approach might bear fruit. Sasongko noted that the two
countries had conducted military-to-military exchanges in the
1980s.
6. (C) In regard to Indonesia's upcoming rotation onto the UN
Security Council, Sasongko said DEPLU had formed a task force
to review Indonesia's position on all UNSC issues.
Acknowledging that this probably would not lead to a dramatic
change in position, he said the Indonesian government was
conscious of the fact that Indonesia would now be speaking
not bilaterally but as a representative of the international
community.
PASCOE