East Java Mudflow: Methane Line Explodes

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013358 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/ESC/IEC DEPT PASS OPIC, EXIM, TDA DOE FOR CUTLER/PI-32 AND NAKANO/PI-42 COMMERCE FOR USDOC 4430 FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA #2685 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EINV EPET PGOV CACS ID SUBJECT: East Java Mudflow: Methane Line Explodes Causing Flooding and Blackouts Ref A: Jakarta 7839 Ref B: Jakarta 8250 Ref C: Jakarta 11110 Ref D: Jakarta 12733 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Pertamina's main East Java methane gas line ruptured near the PT. Lapindo Brantas (Lapindo) mud volcano site in Porong, Sidoarjo, East Java on November 22, causing power outages and permanently closing the Surabaya-Malang toll road. No American Citizens were among the 14 dead and 13 injured. East Java's power plants operated on emergency fuel supplies at reduced capacity and many local factories were closed until repairs were completed November 26. The explosion was caused by erosion of the earth underneath the pipe, resulting structural failure and gas release. GOI geologists and expat consultants warned Lapindo and Pertamina of the impending explosion, but there was insufficient time to move or decommission the pipe. In a November 29 meeting, National Mudflow Disaster Management Team (Timnas) scientists noted continually increasing volumes of mud flowing from the volcano. Timnas projects massive flooding in the Porong area over the next few months, destroying as many as 10,000 homes and the main East Java north-south rail line. Representatives from Santos, a minority partner in Lapindo, said that the relief well effort is likely to fail and all future planning should be based on the mud flowing permanently. (Note: Controlling interest in Lapindo is held by Minister of Social Welfare Aburizal Bakrie and his family.) The GOI is expected to "nationalize" the mud problem in the next few days, with the GOI taking over all areas of control from Lapindo, but it is not yet clear whether the GOI will continue to hold the Lapindo partners financially responsible for all of the damages. END SUMMARY. Gas Line Blows -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On November 22, the Pertamina's 28 inch East Java main methane line adjacent to the Lapindo well blowout and mudflow eruption in Porong, East Java (see Refs A-D) fractured and exploded, tearing open a dam wall and releasing large amounts of hot mud to the west of the well blowout inundating several hundred more homes and a factory. Twelve people died and two more are missing and presumed drowned in the scalding hot, thick mud. Most of the dead were police and army officers providing security at the site. Thirteen people were injured. None of the Americans working at the relief well site were affected. The explosion and ensuing mud release placed 7 feet of mud on a one kilometer section of the Surabaya-Malang toll road, permanently closing a major piece of East Java transportation infrastructure. The gas line automatic shut-off valve functioned and damage was limited to the immediate area of the explosion. The gas line was repaired and placed back in to service November 26. Power Disruptions, Factories Close Temporarily -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) The gas pipeline supplies 330 million cubic feet of gas per day to more than 265 of Surabaya's largest industrial users, including 1,000 Megawatts of State Power Company (PLN) power plants, Indonesia's largest fertilizer producer and the State Gas Company. PLN implemented its emergency plans, operating power plants on fuel oil at 20 to 40 percent reduced capacity. Many factories were unable to operate due to the loss of gas supply. Much of Metro Surabaya experienced temporary blackouts and water supply stoppages during the time the gas line was down. The City of Sidoarjo (population 500,000) experienced JAKARTA 00013358 002 OF 004 nearly 24 hours of blackout immediately after the explosion and intermittent power availability until the gas line resumed supply. Damage and economic loss estimates have not yet been released. ¶4. (SBU) The explosion was caused by subsidence at the well site due to underground erosion. The high pressure hot water has been dissolving the shale deposits under the pipe, undermining its support and causing it to fracture and release the volatile gas. As early as June, GOI geologists and expat consultants expressed concern that the weight of toll road repairs, piling dirt on top of East Java's main methane line, could cause a sudden collapse and rupture the line as the earth underneath subsides (Ref. B and D). The land around the mud volcano and under the mud lake has sunk over 15 feet in some locations and is sinking at an increasing rate. Most recently, the National Mudflow Disaster Management Team (Timnas) claims it warned Pertamina of an impending explosion due to structural failure in the gas line three weeks ago. Pertamina has a plan to relocate the pipe that will take possibly one year to execute. Pertamina says that it has no alternative other than to repair the pipe as needed and that future service interruptions are likely. Pertamina released a statement blaming Lapindo for the on-going problem. Increasing Mudflow Means Rainy Season Flooding -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) In a November 29 meeting with ConGen at the Surabaya Institute of Technology, four members of Timnas (scientists and engineers) and three representatives of Santos (Australia's third largest oil company and 18 percent owner of Lapindo) shared alarming projections of increasing mudflow rates and flooding during the rainy season. (Note: East Java's rainy season normally starts in October, but was late this year, starting only a few days ago. End Note.) The average flow rate has increased to 225,000 cubic meters per day (enough to fill RFK Stadium every six days). Measurement Date Flow (000 cm/day) -------------- -------------- May 29, 2006 5 June 15 25 July 17 50 September 30 125 November 27 225 January 15 300 (est.) The intense pressure of the million year old ocean water entering the well is eroding the uncased well walls, thus expanding the well size and the volumes of water that can escape from the 200 square kilometer underground reservoir. The scientists project the flow rate to continue increasing as the well deteriorates, possibly to 300,000 cubic meters per day by January. The mud volcano is now growing at approximately 1.5 feet per day and will overflow the dam walls soon after the rains make the dam walls too soft for the heavy equipment needed to add to their height. ¶6. (SBU) The Timnas scientists revealed startling computer projections forecasting massive flooding over the next few months to the west and east of the 1,000 acre mud lake. Flooding to the west will be particularly damaging with as many as 10,000 homes affected, displacing an estimated 55,000 more people. The main Surabaya-Malang rail line and the adjacent Porong Road are also projected to be rendered useless by the flooding. The flooding to the west would be caused from blockage of existing rain water runoff channels coming from the northwest by the 40 kilometers JAKARTA 00013358 003 OF 004 of dam walls built to contain the mud. The flooding to the east would be caused by mud overflowing the dam walls and dam wall failures. The scientists calculate a 70% probability that this "worst case" scenario will be realized, likely in January or February 2007. Relief Wells Failing - Quick Solution Unlikely -------------- - ¶7. (SBU) During the same meeting, the Santos representatives stated that the relief well effort, the last hope to stop the mudflow, is very likely to fail and that future planning should be focused on the mud flowing permanently. The two reasons they sited for their pessimism are the noted deterioration of the well walls at 9,800 feet below ground and the amount of earth shifting due to the subsidence. The relief well must hit a target the size of a manhole cover but the margin of error has increased to three football fields. They see the relief well program as a long shot at best. In addition, even if they are able to hit their target, one relief well is no longer likely to be able to pump enough material to plug the enlarged hole. They estimate three relief wells are now needed to create enough pressure volume. The Timnas members said that the second relief well, which started drilling one month ago, is now 1,000 feet down and is failing due to subsidence under the drilling rig. Basuki Hadimuljono, head of Timnas, has called a November 30 meeting to announce closure of the second relief well and its move to a safer location. There are now two additional relief well sites identified, but this setback means at least another four to five months before the relief wells could be ready. The well hole may be deteriorating so quickly now that three wells will not be enough to stop the flow. Preparations - Too Little Too Late -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Timnas is responding to this looming disaster. According to the Timnas engineers, they are frantically digging new rain water runoff channels to reroute potential flood waters to the Porong River before they reach Porong itself. Timnas is also strengthening and enlarging existing roadways in a circular route through Mojokerto around the impacted area. They anticipate the 1.5 hour trip from Surabaya to Malang will average 5-6 hours in good weather along this route. Timnas is also making improvements to the tiny port in Banyuwangi, East Java to handle larger container volumes, anticipating manufacturers in the Pasuruan, Malang and Probolinggo industrial estates will be physically or economically (increased transportation costs negating profit margins) cut off from the Tanjung Perak port in Surabaya. The Timnas members said they expect the Lapindo mud problem to be fully nationalized in the next few days, with the GOI taking over all areas of control from Lapindo. GOI Needs to Step In -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The GOI is finally acknowledging that they have a major economic and environmental problem in East Java. Although the Timnas members have not studied the potential economic impacts of the current and likely future transportation corridor closures, local East Java economists tell us that the impact has already been significant. Timnas members do understand that the social implications of 55,000 newly displaced people would be severe, with demonstrations likely blocking the few remaining transportation routes to draw the government's attention to their plight, closing off southern East Java from Surabaya. In a recent public meeting, the national legislature JAKARTA 00013358 004 OF 004 criticized Timnas head Basuki and the government's slow response to the mud problem. Basuki defended himself stating that Timnas was formed less than two months ago, four months after the blowout occurred. The amount of finger pointing associated with the Lapindo debacle is increasing as the scope and magnitude of the problem expands. ¶10. (SBU) Vice President Kalla, seeking to "reassure" mud flow victims (and end their protests we assume), announced publicly that all victims would be compensated for their losses. Kalla guaranteed that Lapindo and its partners would live up to their obligations and not flee the country, noting, "The Bakrie and Panigoro families are respected and have true nationalism." Kalla also stated that the two Indonesian families involved in Lapindo will pay to build a new turnpike as they are, "very rich and can easily afford the Rp 1.3 billion (USD 130,000) to replace the toll road". (Note: We are not sure what USD 130,000 will buy but we are pretty certain that, even in Indonesia, it will not buy a new toll road.) However, Lapindo and its partners have consistently shown their unwillingness to spend the money necessary to fix this problem quickly, while it was still manageable (Ref. D). Avowals of nationalist sentiment from Kalla aside, local residents are now vocal in their demands that the GOI "nationalize" the Lapindo blowout and hold the three partners financially responsible for all of the damages. To date, less than USD 30 million has been paid to the mud victims to compensate for the loss of their homes and businesses. Short of forcing the three partners to escrow sufficient funds to cover present and future damages, , it is unlikely that the GOI can guarantee compensation to the growing number of Lapindo disaster victims (including the local governments) without sticking Indonesian taxpayers with the bill. PASCOE