INDONESIA BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013218 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL TBIO AMED AMGT KFLU KTIA ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD BILATERAL NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT REF: JAKARTA 13143 Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.5 (b, d). INDONESIA AGREES TO PURSUE BILATERAL NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT ¶1. (C) Summary: Formal discussions between the Indonesian and U.S. governments on the future status of the Naval Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta began on November 9. The Indonesians, fresh from high-level interagency discussions, came in with a set of six concerns which were mostly unacceptable to the U.S. side. These included making the TNI Navy rather than the Ministry of Health NAMRU-2's counterpart, a system of unworkable supervisory committees, and diplomatic status for only two American personnel. These positions were rejected out of hand by the U.S. side, which then initiated extensive discussions of just what NAMRU-2 is and how it and the international scientific community functions. The Indonesians spent very little effort defending their position and began rather quickly to look for areas of agreement and in the end asserted they believed we could reach closure on a final text quite quickly. We agreed to a few rounds of technical level discussions to resolve outstanding issues. The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),which led the negotiations, appears to be under strong pressure from President Yudhoyono to complete the agreement and appeared prepared to drop many of their demands as negotiations move forward. Para 8 contains a request for assistance. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Pascoe held initial discussions with the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) on November 9 concerning the status of NAMRU-2 in Jakarta. The discussion centered on points of disagreement between the Indonesian and U.S. draft texts for a Memorandum of Understanding, which had been exchanged months ago. The Indonesian team, led by Director General for European and American Affairs Eddi Hariyadhi, included representatives from other DEPLU offices, the Department of Defense (DEPHAN), the Department of Health (DEPKES) and the National Intelligence Agency (BIN). At Hariyadhi's side was Presidential Adviser Dino Patti Djalal, who has worked consistently to resolve the issue quickly. ¶3. (C) The discussions identified several substantive differences which will require further work on a technical level before they can be resolved. Indirect support for U.S. positions on some issues was forthcoming from Dr. Soendoro Triono, Director General of the National Institute of Health Research and Development (LITBANGKES) at the Indonesian Department of Health. Djalal and Hariyadhi expressed confidence that the differences could be overcome and an agreement achieved in the near future. We pushed back hard, however, on several substantive issues where the GOI sought to impose unnecessary and cumbersome bureaucratic controls which could interfere with NAMRU-2's scientific work and ultimately undermine its quality and ability to continue drawing funding. ¶4. (C) Hariyadhi identified six main Indonesian concerns. Three of these represented questions of terminology or perception and appear to be readily resolvable with additional clarifications. First, the Indonesians wanted to restrict the scope of NAMRU-2's work to infections diseases and new and reemerging diseases, rather than what they saw as a more open-ended formulation in the U.S. draft. Subsequent discussions did not address this point so the reason for their concern is not yet clear. Second, they wanted the agreement to include explicit provisions for the transfer of technology to Indonesian partners. Third, the Indonesians found the term "funding sponsors" to be vague and open to interpretation. ¶5. (C) We responded that technology transfer was a natural consequence of cooperation and that the type of technology NAMRU-2 could transfer was in the form of practical scientific expertise on the research that it conducted. NAMRU-2 was not a donor agency or a capacity-building organization which could build laboratories and distribute equipment. Rather, it was a scientific mission whose main asset was its intellectual capital. Individual scientists' ability to secure funding from sponsors for specific projects was the primary determinant of the direction of NAMRU-2's research. We pointed out that we had several capacity-building efforts currently underway (including assisting security and design of a BSL-3 lab for the Ministry of Health),but that these were not funded by NAMRU-2. ¶6. (C) Three GOI concerns appeared to reflect more substantive differences about the degree of institutional control to which NAMRU-2 should be subjected; ensuring transparency of its work to GOI agencies; and the status of NAMRU-2 personnel. The first involved the language on the joint coordinating committee to supervise NAMRU-2's work. The GOI version portrayed the body as a steering rather than an advisory committee, emphasized its coordination of research as opposed to administrative and programmatic aspects, attached NAMRU-2 to the Ministry of Defense as well as to the Ministry of Health and appointed an Indonesian official as the sole chairman of the body, rather than allowing for a co-chairman from each side. Additionally, the GOI proposed to have the joint committee establish a subordinate "Joint Scientific Working Group," which had no counterpart in the U.S. draft, consisting of appointed members of the scientific committees of the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and NAMRU-2, which would "review and assess" research proposals. The U.S. side felt this would allow the working group and, through it, the coordinating committee, to set the research agenda. ¶7. (C) These provisions for a joint scientific review group and for a central management structure which would effectively subordinate NAMRU-2 to the TNI are particularly problematic and were vigorously rejected. The GOI did not demonstrate a need for these bureaucratic mechanisms, and we suspect they reflected Indonesian intelligence community concerns about the nature of NAMRU-2's work as well as a general failure to understand professional procedures already in place. We argued that these supervisory bodies represented unnecessary encumbrances which would impair the integrity and quality of the scientific work and could, in effect, kill the goose that lays the golden egg. We stressed again the role funding played in selection of projects and the determination of NAMRU's research agenda. The contractual obligations supporting such funding had to be fulfilled to maintain institution's reputation and ensure continued funding. ¶8. (C) Assistance Request: The Indonesian draft contains language explicitly requiring compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, ostensibly because of their concern that Indonesian scientists could be drawn into clandestine weapons research conducted at NAMRU-2 as an arm of the U.S. military. This point was pressed at some length by the BIN representative at the table. We argued that this provision was irrelevant, if not offensive, and should not be mentioned in such an agreement. We would appreciate the Department's confirmation of our interpretation. ¶9. (C) A final issue concerned the status of NAMRU-2 personnel. The Indonesian side argued against granting diplomatic status to NAMRU-2's staff and dependents. The Ambassador responded that diplomatic status for the two leaders would be acceptable provided A&T status was granted to the rest of the staff, but he emphasized that all NAMRU-2 officials had to be considered part of the Mission and receive appropriate protection. (The Indonesian oral presentation referred to diplomatic status but their text calls for A&T status for two personnel and no status for the rest. We saw no reason to point that out.) ¶10. (C) The discussion ended with agreement to hold several subsequent meetings at a technical level to iron out the six issues identified above and any other significant differences, before returning to a plenary session to review and approve the results. Clearly, many points in the Indonesian draft are the product of a basic misunderstanding of NAMRU-2's role and mission and meant to mollify wild accusations coming from the Indonesian intelligence services. As the discussion proceeded, the Indonesian side appeared to mellow considerably. Many of the comments from their side were obviously in support of the U.S. positions and designed to move away from what they knew to be an unacceptable Indonesian draft agreement. ¶11. (C) The Indonesian side, obviously feeling pressure from the President's office, said it was ready to begin more detailed discussions immediately, but we noted it was more realistic to wait until after President Bush's visit and the Thanksgiving break. We plan to engage them on the technical level to see how far they have moved in that time and do not believe further guidance (aside from that requested in para 8 above) or textual changes are necessary at this time. PASCOE