CRUCIAL 2007 JAKARTA GOVERNOR,S RACE TAKING SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 011376 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID SUBJECT: CRUCIAL 2007 JAKARTA GOVERNOR,S RACE TAKING SHAPE JAKARTA 00011376 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Approximately one year before Jakarta holds its first ever directly elected Governor's race, behind the scenes political maneuvering is already in full swing, reflecting the high stakes involved in what will be the most significant Indonesian election prior to the 2009 Legislative and Presidential campaigns. Although a strong field of contenders has already emerged, the major political parties have yet to formally align themselves with individual candidates and are in the process of evaluating their options. Though the election will undoubtedly turn on local, Jakarta-centric issues, the results will have national implications and set the stage for 2009. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),seemingly poised to capitalize on its strength in Jakarta and seize the country's most important governor's mansion, has struggled to identify a suitable candidate. Rather than play to win, reportedly PKS has instead opted to sell the party's nomination to the highest bidder: Adang Daradjutan, the Deputy Chief of the national police force. With PKS' curious, pre-emptive capitulation, the field is wide open and any one of a handful of candidates could easily win the race. End Summary. LOCAL ELECTION, NATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) As the seat of the nation's capital and its corridors of power, Jakarta is Indonesia's wealthiest and most politically influential province. One byproduct of this power is that the Jakarta Governorship is the most highly sought after in the country. Conventional wisdom suggests the Jakarta governorship is one of the few non-national elected offices that can be used as a launching pad for the presidency, and the media attention and financial resources already being directed at a race still one year away reflect its importance in the national psyche. Every day in Jakarta newspaper articles, local television programs and seminars with political wonks all focus on a race that lacks a date or official candidates. ¶3. (C) Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso is proof enough of the potential of the Governor's office to function as a breeding ground for future presidential candidates. Sutiyoso manages the unwieldy metropolis of Jakarta with a firm hand, cultivating a reputation as a strong and organized leader. Not everyone appreciates the Governor's direct and unyielding style, but he has gained respect in most corridors for his ability to achieve goals - such as the development of very controversial bus lanes - by any means necessary. In contrast with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who has been criticized for his deliberate, sometimes indecisive nature, Sutiyoso's term as Governor is viewed by some more favorably. It remains to be seen whether Sutisyoso will be able to cash in on this reputation and ascend to the Presidency or Vice Presidency, but he has certainly catapulted himself into consideration through his current performance. FEATHERING THE NEST -------------- ¶4. (C) In a country where using public office to line one's pockets is a national sport, the Jakarta Governor's mansion is the ultimate prize. The salary is almost paltry - only about $330 US a year - but the opportunities for graft are virtually unlimited and the job comes with a U.S. $1.4 million a year budget for office related expenses. In short, the price of paying off a political party to enter the race and then funding a campaign may be prohibitive, but the opportunities for making a healthy return on this investment are abundant. A winning candidate can expect to leave the Governor's mansion a very wealthy man, and this is also certainly a consideration for each candidate. THE MECHANICS -------------- ¶5. (C) The Jakarta Regional Electoral Commission (KPUD) should officially announce the schedule for the election in January. According to local election guidelines, the JAKARTA 00011376 002.2 OF 003 election would take place within six months of that date, most likely in July or August. Voters will elect the Governor directly in a one-day event provided the winning candidate garners at least 25 percent of the vote. If no candidate wins that percentage, there will be a runoff between the top two finishers. ¶6. (C) The only candidates eligible to run are those affiliated with parties, or coalitions of parties, which hold at least 15 percent of the seats on the Jakarta Regional Representative Council (DPRD),or a total of 11 seats. Only three parties meet the 11 seat threshold on their own: PKS, with 18 seats, the Democratic Party (PD),with 16, and the Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P),which holds 11 seats. Political powerhouse Golkar is relatively weak in Jakarta, with only seven seats, and opted to form a coalition with the National Mandate Party, the United Development Party, the National Awakening Party, and the Prosperous Peace Party in order to field a candidate. A variety of other plausible coalition scenarios could push the total number candidates in the field to five. SEVERAL MAJOR HATS ALREADY IN THE RING -------------- ¶7. (C) Fauzi Bowo is probably the best known of the current crop of candidates widely thought to be in contention. As the current Vice Governor of Jakarta, he enjoys some of the trappings of incumbency and stands to benefit from his association with Governor Sutiyoso, a popular figure in Jakarta. Bowo's smiling mug is also as nearly as ubiquitous in Jakarta as the traffic, the result of some 250,000 posters that have been strategically placed throughout the city as part of an anti-drug campaign led by Bowo. In addition, he is a native Betawi, the ethnic group indigenous to Jakarta. ¶8. (C) Agum Gumelar has strong name recognition after having teamed up with Hamzah Haz as a vice presidential candidate during the 2004 presidential elections. Before his failed VP run, Gumelar was the transportation minister under former President Megawati. Though Gumelar has not yet formally announced his candidacy, he has been making the rounds on the Jakarta speaking circuit and appears to be openly flirting with the possibility of running as the Democratic Party's candidate. ¶9. (C) Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, a member of the powerless Regional Representative Council (DPD),is a former environment minister and one-time Golkar Secretary General. In a meeting with Poloff, the decidedly low-key Sarwono demonstrated a surprising self-awareness in admitting younger voters find him "old and sleepy." Sarwono outlined a strategy to improve his name recognition with the under twenty-five set, who will represent the largest chunk of the vote, pointing to his frequent appearances on soccer shows, on the radio, and at local concerts to harness multi-media outlets in his favor. Sarwono also has an informative and reasonably well trafficked website (Sarwono.net) and a full-time campaign team working to increase his profile. Several contacts have dismissed his prospects, telling us he is too old and handicapped by having a Christian wife. Nevertheless, he has generated considerable buzz in the newspapers and we have not had a single conversation about the race that has not involved him in some way. Sarwono's biggest obstacle appears to be his limited finances and commensurately limited ability to line up party support. ¶10. (C) Adang Daradjutan is the Deputy Chief of the national police force and the presumed standard bearer for PKS. Despite the fact that he is somewhat lacking in name recognition, Adang creatively kicked off his campaign for the Governor's race by organizing a citywide soccer tournament with a name that hints at his candidacy: the 2006 Adang Daradjatun Cup. ¶11. (C) Faisal Basrie, a U.S. educated economist, also declared his candidacy. Basrie has received scant press attention and does not appear to have the star power of the other major candidates in the field, but nevertheless has attracted the attention of PDI-P and our contacts believe he has the inside track on their nomination. THE PKS FACTOR -------------- JAKARTA 00011376 003.2 OF 003 ¶12. (C) PKS' remarkably strong showing in 2004 raised expectations to the point that a letdown was almost inevitable, and perhaps this helps explain the party's curious decision to abandon a serious run at the governorship. With the most seats in the Jakarta DPRD, in theory PKS was very well positioned to win the race and serve notice to all the other parties that PKS is not a one hit wonder. In practice though, members of the leadership told us the party struggled to identify a candidate with the combination of star power and governing experience necessary to not only win the election, but govern effectively. With no obvious candidate to run, and enormous pressure and expectations building, our contacts tell us the party decided to effectively sit the election out by nominating a lightweight with only a small chance of winning. ¶13. (C) The decision to not run a serious candidate was not made because the party lacks electable figures. One PKS member with the name recognition required is Hidayat Nur Wahid. As Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and a former President of PKS, Hidayat is by far the biggest party star and would have been considered an overwhelming favorite had he entered. A winning Hidayat would have generated a tremendous amount of press coverage, increased his national profile, and immediately found himself on the short list of viable Presidential or Vice Presidential candidates for 2009. The problem, apparently, was that the potential risks involved with his candidacy - losing the election and damaging the party's momentum, or winning the election and showcasing on the biggest stage the party's inability to govern effectively - outweighed the potential rewards. We have also heard that Hidayat believed moving from MPR Chair to the governorship would have represented a step backwards in some respects. ¶14. (C) With Hidayat's candidacy off the table, PKS reportedly decided to use the election to make money. According to several party contacts, the leadership opted to sell PKS support to the highest bidder, with little to no regard for electability. The auction winner was Adang Daradjutan, who cobbled together the party tribute required to win the PKS endorsement (Note: The sum is rumored to be several million US dollars, but we do not have an exact read. End Note). ¶15. (C) In the end the PKS leadership decided to sell off the nomination and build up party coffers not only because of the risk of losing the election, but perhaps even more compellingly, because of the chance they might have won. PKS recognized its lack of leadership depth and determined that trying to run one of the world's largest and most dysfunctional cities could well have been a strategic long term mistake. Better to make some money and watch the other parties fight it out. Given the underwhelming performance of the party's three representatives in the President's cabinet, as well as the obvious dearth of managerial talent in the party ranks, this decision may well have been a very shrewd one. PASCOE