East Java: Increasing Mudflow Threatens

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 011110 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/ESC/IEC DEPT PASS OPIC, EXIM, TDA DOE FOR CUTLER/PI-32 AND NAKANO/PI-42 COMMERCE FOR USDOC 4430 FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA # 2121 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EINV EPET PGOV ID SUBJECT: East Java: Increasing Mudflow Threatens Infrastructure and More Homes Ref A: JAKARTA 7839, Ref B: JAKARTA 8250 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The flow of mud from the fractured well owned by PT. Lapindo Brantas (Lapindo),a Bakrie Group controlled entity, in Porong, East Java continues to increase, reaching volumes as high as 500,000 cubic meters per day in early August, and has flooded more than 450 acres, destroying thousands of homes and dozens of businesses and displacing 10-12,000 local residents. President Yudhoyono visited the site in early August to personally assess the situation and urge action by Lapindo. ConGen Surabaya estimates economic losses to East Java at USD 1 billion and rising. Bank Indonesia (BI) Surabaya confirms an increase in non-performing loans in the province during June and July due to a 35-40% business downturn. The Central and local governments' response has been limited to pressuring Lapindo to solve the problem quickly. Local leaders are at a loss at what to do next other than pin the blame squarely on Lapindo management and try to avoid financial assistance to the victims. This case is being watched closely not only in East Java but throughout Indonesia and in the extractive industry community, both in terms of its economic impact and in Indonesia's legal response to this clearly man-made disaster. END SUMMARY Current Situation -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Porong, East Java gas well drilling accident caused by PT Lapindo Brantas (Lapindo) in May and reported in Refs A and B continues to produce increasing amounts of noxious mud, threatening the province's major transportation corridors and water supply. The fractured well is located only 40 yards from the main north-south toll road carrying much of the goods and produce from southern East Java to the transportation and manufacturing hub of Surabaya. The well site is enclosed in a triangle by the toll road to the north and east, the main rail line from Surabaya to Malang and southern East Java one half mile to the north and west and the Porong River one mile to the south. The estimated 7 million cubic meters of mud already emitted has filled a 450-acre area fortified by loose earth walls to a depth varying from 32 feet at the mouth of the eruption to 10-12 feet at the low point one half mile away. More than 1,700 homes, 30 businesses and a school have been destroyed. 10-12,000 Porong residents are currently displaced, 8-9,000 of which are living in stalls in the Pasar Baru marketplace near the mud lake. Thousands more homes and businesses are threatened as the mud flow continues and the rainy season approaches. Fractured Well Still Flowing Uncontrollably -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Lapindo's efforts to stop the mudflow have so far been unsuccessful. The mud flowed at rates increasing from 5,000 to 100,000 cubic meters per day until August 1 when the flow rate suddenly exploded to over 500,000 cubic meters per day. On August 16 the flow subsided to its previous flow rate and now randomly varies in flow from 40,000 cubic meters per day to 600,000 cubic meters per day, defying explanation or prediction by the experts on site. On August 26 the well site experienced a series of explosions shooting mud over 130 feet in the air, showering the area with boiling hot mud and hospitalizing two men working at the site, one eventually died from his injuries. ¶4. (SBU) Lapindo attempted to install a snubbing unit in July but that effort failed to stop the mud flow. A Western well expert brought in to combat the mud told JAKARTA 00011110 002 OF 006 econ/pol off Williams on August 23 that the well hole had been so enlarged and deformed by the high pressure mudflow that there was no reason to continue. Lapindo then attempted to stem the mud using a side tracking well but in mid-August abandoned that effort as well and is now focused on drilling a relief well. In mid August, during the period of highest mudflow rate, the relief well site was inundated with an avalanche of mud, causing the evacuation of the drillers and drilling equipment. A new relief well site is now established and Lapindo has hired the U.S. firm Century Drilling (although they are still awaiting the delivery of the drilling rig). The Western expert predicts a best case scenario of 10 to 12 weeks of drilling to reach the fractured well at a point deep enough to divert the flow and cap it. Lapindo also hired Haliburton as a geotechnical consultant in early August and received seismic fault mapping information indicating that the well can be stopped. (Note: Haliburton has also provided civil engineering support for the containment dam construction, contributing much needed expertise to strengthen and manage the dam walls.) ¶5. (SBU) The Western Expert now estimates the total cost to kill the well and control the mud will be USD 200-300 million. Lapindo carried only USD 25 million of insurance on the project and has already spent USD 50-60 million. Lapindo is now insolvent and relying on capital contributions from its partners to fund ongoing well kill and mud control operations. (Note: The Western expert has prudently advised all U.S. contractors and consultants to require payment in advance for any services rendered.) Mud, Mud Everywhere -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Lapindo's program to control the existing mud has met little more success than the program to stop the mudflow. Loose earth walls have been constructed to contain the mud by employing 400 dump trucks and 30 bulldozers to construct dams to contain the mud lake at its current size. There have been numerous collapses of the earth walls releasing mud and repeatedly closing the toll road, prompting Lapindo to begin a program to raise the toll road by 10 feet in affected sections. In early August, another collapsed dam flooded another village and temporarily closed the main rail line. With the rainy season approaching, Lapindo management is running out of options to control mud in the 450 acre site and has requested permission to "use" (i.e. flood) an adjacent 500 acres of village and rice paddy, destroying an additional 6-800 homes and displacing 4- 5,000 more residents. The expanded containment area will bring the mud within 50 yards of the Porong River, a major water supply for East Java. ¶7. (SBU) Local residents who have been selected to have their homes flooded with mud are complaining bitterly about the lack of action by local government, in particular the Sidoarjo Regent, at supporting there case and protecting their homes. Faced with a version of Solomon's dilemma, the Regent has reluctantly agreed to the plan to sacrifice several villages in order to contain a wider catastrophe. Much of the residents' frustration stems from Lapindo's inability to move any of the mud away from the site. Although Lapindo has applied for permission to construct a 19-km pipeline to carry water separated from the mud and treated to the ocean (Lapindo has completed 4 kilometers of the pipeline and plans to test two treatment systems imported from Australia),a senior PT. Bumi Resources executive admitted to econ/pol off on August 22 that the project is a red herring. At best, the undersized pipeline could remove 10-20 percent of the daily flow, JAKARTA 00011110 003 OF 006 barely making a dent in the mud build-up. He said Lapindo wants the public to believe they are trying everything imaginable to improve the situation. The residual sludge leftover once the water is removed will have higher concentrations of phenols, making it more difficult to dispose of in an environmentally acceptable manner. Sidoarjo shrimp farmers and Madura Island fishermen are protesting the pipeline project. SBY Visit Creates a Stir in The Mud -------------- ¶8. (SBU) President Yudhoyono visited the well site on August 11. According to the Western expert, once the President's planned visit was confirmed, a level of urgency set in at Lapindo that had not existed previously. PT. Energi Mega Persada (EMP),the managing partner of Lapindo, had been trying to manage the well kill and mud control operations on tight budgets with a primary focus on cost control, using mainly Indonesian contractors and consultants related to Bakrie controlled entities. Once the President confirmed his visit, they began spending lavishly, hiring large numbers of ex-pat contractors and consultants, including Haliburton and Century. During the President's tour of the well site and the mud flow, all of the ex-pat consultants were brought forward to meet the President and the Western expert gave the President an impromptu briefing on the well and kill operation status. According to the Western Expert, the President asked one question, "Can this be stopped?" The Western expert answered, "Yes, definitely, but I do not know how long it will take." ¶9. (SBU) According to the high-level official in PT. Bumi Resources, another Bakrie-related company, the President noted that the government's own study on the situation concluded that if both the rail line and the toll road were closed for six consecutive weeks, the East Java economy would collapse, thousands of businesses would close (at least temporarily),and possibly hundreds of thousands of East Javanese laid off their jobs. During this meeting, the President set Lapindo's priorities for mud containment efforts as defending: 1) human life; 2) the Surabaya-Malang rail line; 3) the toll road; 4) the environment (read Porong River); and 5) homes, businesses and personal property. The strategy of expanding the containment area much closer to the Porong River to relieve pressure on the dam walls near the railroad and toll road directly reflects the President's priorities. But will they be prosecuted? -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Another apparent result of the President's visit is the slowing of the criminal cases against several executives from Lapindo, EMP and the Bakrie related drilling company that botched the well. At an August 16 gathering of top East Java provincial political, police and military officials at the East Java Parliament offices to listen to the State of the Union address, the "Lapindo disaster" was the sole topic of discussion. The East Java police chief noted that they had sufficient evidence to make arrests of corporate executives involved with the well due to gross negligence and willful misconduct directly leading to the accident. (Note: No one asked the obvious question if any investigations were being done higher up the chain of command in the Bakrie organization.) Another long-time ConGen contact told us that the East Java police were ordered to hold off on any arrests related to Lapindo for the time being by the "highest levels of the central government." He was frustrated that arrests had not been made and noted that the need to identify publicly the culpability of JAKARTA 00011110 004 OF 006 Lapindo's management in this debacle, fearing that Lapindo executives would be able to wiggle out of their financial responsibilities to the East Javanese who lost their homes, land and businesses. He echoed local officials fear that the public will lay this disaster at the government's feet and fault them for lack of financial recompense. (Note: The provincial government has expended large amounts this year for several natural disasters, including the massive mudslides in Jember, which also received USAID funds.) Government's Anemic Response -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Provincial and local government officials claim they are financially unable to provide any kind of meaningful assistance to their displaced residents, other than police and military security to keep out looters and outside provocateurs from organizing dissent among those displaced. Their position is the disaster is Lapindo's fault and the company needs to step up and take care of the affected people. In late July, Lapindo offered immediate one time compensation to the displaced residents of approximately US $350 for housing, moving expenses, and food. Many of the residents refused the compensation offer as woefully inadequate; several short-lived protests followed. Although there are frequent high-level delegations sent from Jakarta to inspect the site and admonish Lapindo for the lack of progress, there has been no financial or other assistance to the displaced residents or local authorities. The message to Lapindo from Jakarta has been it's the company's problem and they had better fix it and fast, "or else." Several contacts have told us that "or else" would be arrests and prosecution of Lapindo executives. NGO's Kept Away From Displaced Residents -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Local NGOs are struggling to deliver emergency services and supplies to displaced residents due to tight security in the inundated villages and the Pasar Baru IDP camp in Porong. The coordinator of Damar Alit, an NGO managed by Nadhalatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim social organization in Indonesia, reported that soldiers guarding Pasar Baru prevented NU workers from delivering needed supplies of food and water. Local officials affirm that the tight security is to maintain order, prevent looting and outside provocateurs from creating disturbances. NU involved itself in a controversy surrounding the mud when it initially offered to organize a class action lawsuit for residents against Lapindo and its partners. NU has since backed away from that offer and local residents have accused them of accepting US $110,000 from Aburizal Bakrie, Minister of Social Welfare and another US $110,000 from the President during his visit to Porong. Bakrie claimed the funds were donated to NU to help pay for a conference for Muslim Scholars and the President said his money was a personal donation for use to aid displaced residents. Living conditions for local residents in the Pasar Baru market are very basic with only 110 toilets for the 8-9,000 residents. People complain of a lack of privacy and are very worried living conditions will deteriorate quickly once the rainy season begins in the next month or so. Economic Impact -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The economic impacts of the mud disaster are mounting; we conservatively estimate USD 1 billion of damages to date, not including social costs or opportunity costs. Ground water contamination has started forcing residents from homes not inundated with JAKARTA 00011110 005 OF 006 mud but served by local wells that are now filling with the hot, brackish ground water which is entering local aquifers. There are reports of large numbers fish dying as far as 3 miles from the well site in the 25,000 acres of fish farms in Sidoarjo Regency due to contaminated water. Water tests for contaminates at the fish farms have been inconclusive. There are reports the European Union (EU) has pulled Sidoarjo- farmed shrimp's "organic" designation, Indonesia's only such designation for exported shrimp, and is threatening to decertify all shrimp exports from the regency due to contamination. Bank Indonesia Surabaya announced they observed a 1% increase in non-performing loans in June and July to 7.5% in East Java province due to a 35-40% downturn in business and rapidly declining real estate values in Sidoarjo regency and areas south of the well site. Two golf resorts south of the well site report a 60-70% decline in business. One course laid-off half of its 650 employees and the other laid off 300 of its 550 employees. Local governments protested the lay offs until they were told the other option was to close completely until the toll road is more consistently open. Other business contacts south of the well site also report losses due to transportation issues and unavailability of raw materials and are contemplating lay offs in the near future if the mud situation does not improve. Most businesses hold no hope of recovering anything from Lapindo given its political connection to the Bakrie family. Residents Remain Patient, Looking For Big Payout? -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) There has been surprisingly little local unrest, with only a few small protests by the displaced local residents. Believing Minister of Social Welfare Aburizal Bakrie's statements that Lapindo will make good on losses, displaced residents remain convinced that there will be a big payoff by Lapindo for their homes, land and businesses once the mud is stopped. Given the paltry offer for shelter and food by the company made in July, we see no history of corporate generosity on which to base their hopes. What Does the Future Hold? -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Much of the outcome of the "mud monster" still depends on when the flow can be stopped and how fast it flows until then (and no one involved with the effort would give us odds.) Lapindo seems to have finally put a competent team together to kill the well and control the mud but is still depending on luck to keep from doing major damage to one or more of East Java's major infrastructure pieces. Lengthy closures of the rail line and toll road would be devastating to local businesses, cutting supply lines, delaying orders and slowing transportation of agricultural products. Massive lay-offs would certainly increase tensions and anger in the area of the disaster, making large scale demonstrations and political fallout more likely. ¶16. (SBU) One of the consultants hired by Lapindo created computer models of the effects of flow rates and time before the well is killed. In the best case scenario, the flow subsides to an average 25,000 cubic meters per day, the mud flow is stopped in 3 months, the new containment area holds, and a total of 22,000 residents are displaced. In the worst case scenario, the flow rate averages 250,000 cubic meters per day, the well is killed in six months, the mud forces its way in and over the Porong River, inundating villages between the containment area and the river and more rice paddy land south of the river, causing uncontrolled flooding of the Porong river during the JAKARTA 00011110 006 OF 006 rainy season due to the thickness of the mud and 55,000 residents are displaced. The Western expert remains convinced they can hold off the mud, maintain the relief well site and stop the mud flow, with a caveat, "If we have to move the relief well again, the delays would make matters much worse." He added, "If the relief well fails, my crew and I will be on the next plane out of Indonesia." PASCOE