S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 010535 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/P, NEA, EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID SCUL ID SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Moderate Islamic leaders told S/P director Stephen Krasner on August 11 that mainstream Muslim organizations in Indonesia were committed to the Indonesian constitution and Indonesia's new democratic order, but many false perceptions needed to be overcome in the public mind. Muslims needed to develop a more nuanced and practical response to globalization in order to make a positive contribution. They stressed that the protracted violence in southern Lebanon was negatively affecting all Indonesians and threatened to drown out moderate voices. While Shariah law in places such as Aceh had reached "ridiculous" proportions, such practices would not be acceptable in most other parts of Indonesia. They also appealed for increased student and leader exchanges with the United States. End summary. ¶2. (U) Director Krasner met with Marwah Daud Ibrahim, chairwoman of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI); Syafi'i Anwar, executive director of the International Center for Islam and Peace (ICIP); and Bachtier Effendi, chairman of both the Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics (LSPEU) and the political council of Muhammadiyah; and H.M. Rozy Munir, head of foreign relations for Nadlatul Ulama (NU). ¶3. (C) Munir said Muslims tended to support political agendas framed in terms of justice. For some, overcoming old biases that militated against the acceptance of pluralism within society remains a struggle. On the other hand, Islam had shown its ability to adapt to local Indonesian cultures and customs and therefore already exhibited an inherent sense of toleration. The leaders also made a strong pitch for broadening educational and leadership exchanges with the United States. ¶4. (C) Anwar said all societies were grappling with globalization, and the challenge was to respond in a way that was ethical and in the interests of human society. Most Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, if they were honest, would admit that Islam currently was not providing superior intellectual leadership in responding to the challenge. Simplistic judgments based on doctrinal literalism might draw a political following but did not advance the interests of civil society. Reality was more complex. Television talk shows, for instance, which were currently a target of criticism from fundamentalists, had both a good and a bad impact. Liberalism was widely misunderstood in Indonesia to mean the rampant assertion of individual freedom at the expense of other values. Pluralism was similarly suspect in the eyes of many. There were many popular perceptions that were not based on the Koran. There was nothing in the Koran which precluded the development of a democratic, pluralistic society and respect for human rights. The majority of the public was still largely unfamiliar with democratic ways, which were still very new. ¶5. (C) Effendi noted that the advent of Islam in Indonesia, like Malaysia and South Asia, was largely through peaceful means: a religion introduced by trade rather than by the sword. Nor did mainstream Muslims in Indonesia see political options in terms of either a secular or a theocratic political order, but rather a blend of both elements. On the one hand, efforts to build an exclusively secular order had failed under President Suharto, as they had in Pakistan. On the other hand, shariah law was already present in Indonesian state law, on a voluntary basis. An example was the use of shariah marriage law for Muslims, which was optional in Indonesia. There was a limit to how much shariah law Indonesia could tolerate. Shariah law was acceptable as long as it remained in the private realm. ¶6. (C) Continuing, Effendi said that extreme applications of shariah law, such as the use of flogging in Aceh, had reached "ridiculous" proportions, were contrary to the mainstream's wishes and set a bad example. But the fault also lay with former presidents Habibie and Gus Dur, who allowed shariah law to be introduced in the first place. It would be difficult to move away from shariah law now, however, without changing the constitution. But the danger that shariah law would reach such proportions elsewhere was remote, as the emotional attachment to religion was weaker in the rest of the country than in Aceh. ¶7. (C) One could not generalize about Islam in Indonesia, Effendi said. There was a gap between Islamic intellectuals and the Muslim in the street, but this could change with JAKARTA 00010535 002 OF 002 public education campaigns. However, how this played out depended in part on the international situation, he noted. Indonesian Muslims by and large either were unfamiliar with or overlooked the efforts by the United States and European allies to protect Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo, Effendi said. Many intellectuals understood the significance of Western actions there, but for the average Muslim, southeastern Europe was not a major front of Islam. ¶8. (C) Ibrahim emphasized the importance of focusing on practical work that Islamic organizations could do at the grass-roots level, such as helping students in rural areas, leading discussion groups to educate the public on issues, and so forth. In the course of such discussions one could rebut facile sloganeering with a sober assessment of the practical consequences. One could explain, for instance, that a boycott against U.S. goods ultimately meant working without a computer. Seconded by the other interlocutors, she also made a strong pitch for increasing student and leader exchanges to the United States to provide a more informed basis for judging it and its role in the world. PASCOE