S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 010399 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/P, EAP/FO, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON EAID CVIS ID SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN FM WIRAJUDA AND MOD SUDARSONO Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with S/P Director Stephen Krasner on August 11, Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda emphasized Indonesia's desire to expand and deepen bilateral cooperation with the United States on political, security, economic and other fronts. Wirajuda appealed for U.S. assistance and exchanges, particularly in education, and for a streamlined visa clearance process, particularly students. He reiterated Indonesia's interest in cooperation toward the objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), urged the continued active presence of the United States in Southeast Asia as an essential counterweight to China and India and sketched Indonesia's plans for developing the East Asian Summit (EAS). He stressed Indonesia's desire to play a constructive role in supporting the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, to provide moderate leadership within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and to contribute to the projected UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. ¶2. (C) In Director Krasner's meeting with Indonesian Defense Minister Sudarsono, Sudarsono said Indonesian military priorities were to improve integration among forces, establish civilian control over military procurement, develop airlift, draw more non-Javanese into the officer corps and develop civilian expertise in security matters. Indonesia needed 10-15 years to achieve its proper role in Southeast Asian security, he said, and the biggest threats to Indonesian security were non-military. This message has been cleared by S/P. End Summary. MEETING WITH FM WIRAJUDA ¶3. (C) Noting that the U.S.-Indonesia relationship was developing rapidly, Wirajuda detailed a long list of areas of current and potential cooperation. Indonesia and the United States shared many basic values of democracy, freedom, human rights, pluralism and tolerance. These shared values provided a basis for a continued improvement in relations. The United States was a world power, while Indonesia's influence was far more limited. While this disparity was a source of different approaches on some issues, both countries should keep in mind their shared values and work together to find solutions. �00A;¶4. (C) Krasner responded that the United States wanted Indonesia to succeed in its reforms and development. Both countries were large, multi-ethnic democracies, which created shared interests and common challenges. Indonesia was the linchpin of Southeast Asia: if Indonesia failed, Southeast Asia as a whole would fail. ECONOMIC COOPERATION ¶5. (C) Indonesia would benefit from U.S.-ASEAN economic cooperation, Wirajuda suggested. Trade and investment were important drivers of economic growth in the region. Cooperation with the United States in education was also critical for Indonesia's success in particular. Indonesia welcomed U.S. assistance in improving the quality of Indonesian education. Development of the Sesame Street project for Indonesia was proceeding well, and the programming would appear next summer. ¶6. (C) On the energy front, Wirajuda said an Indonesian team had visited Brazil the previous week with an eye to developing the Indonesian market in biofuels based on palm oil and casava, for domestic consumption as well as export. Indonesia was also working with South Korea on nuclear energy, and wanted to cooperate with the United States in this area as well. ¶7. (C) Krasner replied that it was important to deepen the bilateral economic dialogue and make it work in a concrete way, in sharing technology, attracting foreign investment and trade. Much progress had already been made. POLITICAL COOPERATION ¶8. (C) Wirajuda stated Indonesia's readiness for additional consultations on political-military issues, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other mechanisms to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Indonesia JAKARTA 00010399 002 OF 003 was eager to begin discussions on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and looked forward to planned discussions on this in the near future. ¶9. (C) Wirajuda said the East Asian Summit (EAS) was attractive to Indonesia as a regional forum for political coordination. With its current membership of 16 countries it had achieved an internal balance, which should be given time to stabilize while further modalities were discussed. Once institutional structures became stronger, countries such as the United States, China and Russia could also be added as observers, providing an external balance as well. The overall process should be inclusive, with membership limited to East Asian states, Australia and New Zealand. Wirajuda noted that this strategy had been agreed at the ASEAN meeting in Bali in April. ¶10. (C) On North Korea, Indonesia had continued to encourage a return to the Six-Party Talks. Indonesia had appreciated being included in the Korea-related consultations on the margins of the ARF meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Wirajuda also noted that he had met Iran's foreign minister on the sidelines of the ARF. Iraq, where the wave of bombs and killings continued, appeared to be on the verge of a civil war. Likeminded countries should discuss solutions for Iraq and mobilize a "concentration of forces" to bring about an end to the conflict. Wirajuda remarked that the U.S. military presence in Iraq might be part of the problem. MIDDLE EAST ¶11. (C) On the Middle East, Wirajuda said that the longer the "stalemate" persisted in Lebanon, the more intense the public reactions around the world and in Indonesia. The protraction of the conflict was "radicalizing" the Indonesian public, and this worked against bilateral cooperation with the United States. President Yudhoyono had proposed a "troika" of non-Arab countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and possibly one other within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to provide leadership within the organization on the Middle East. Indonesia was preparing to participate in that force, Wirajuda noted, but only on the basis of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. Solving the problem in Lebanon, he stressed, could help prevent Islamic radicalism in the region and elsewhere. ¶12. (C) Krasner replied that the United States was sensitive to the civilian deaths in Lebanon. A fundamental cause of the conflict was that the Siniora government had been unable to exercise sovereignty over its entire territory. It was essential to achieve a sustainable solution, so the recent situation would not reoccur. Israel must be able to trust in the elements of that solution for it to work. Hizbollah must be contained in the near term and disarmed in the longer term. NORTH KOREA ¶13. (C) On North Korea, Krasner noted the 5 plus 5 exchange on North Korea at the ARF had been interesting and might be worth repeating. Wirajuda noted that the symbolism of the exchange was positive, letting the public know that countries were working on the issue. For Indonesia, a resumption of the Six-Party Talks was important. Indonesia had regretted having to cancel president Yudhoyono's visit to North Korea, and had been disappointed that China had been able to exercise so little leverage on North Korea. But the United States was the key to a solution because of its economic sanctions against the country. Krasner responded that the sanctions argument was only an excuse, and pointed out that sanctions had been imposed to curb North Korea's illegal trade in arms, its money laundering and other criminal activities. Negotiating on sanctions was out of the question, and would not induce North Korea to cooperate. North Korea had obtained much of what it wanted for the negotiations to proceed, but had then allowed the process to unravel. Direct negotiations with North Korea had been tried and had failed. Even China was now upset with North Korea, and South Korea was extremely concerned about the missile threat. Still, it was up to China to press North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SUDARSONO JAKARTA 00010399 003 OF 003 ¶14. (C) Defense Minister Prof. Juwono Sudarsono said the MOD was making progress on integrating military doctrine, reducing rivalry between the defense forces, pulling more civilians into defense planning and establishing civilian control over military procurement. Indonesia was focusing on developing airlift rather than a strike force, while its military budget remained limited. The Navy, which had been neglected in the past, was now receiving one third of defense funding. Indonesia would need ten to 15 years to recover its proper role in Southeast Asian security. Indonesia was preparing a combined peacekeeping force of 850 for Lebanon, should the UN stand up such a force. (Note: Indonesian projections of the force size have since increased to 1000 persons.) ¶15. (C) One of the biggest challenges facing Indonesia for the future, Sudarsono said, was the rise of non-military threats to security. Another was economic justice, meaning an equitable balance between the center and periphery of the country's provinces and the creation of a sense of belonging among outlying regions. The officer corps, he explained, consisted overwhelmingly of Javanese. The military was trying to redress this balance through more aggressive recruitment, but cultural factors impeded the ability of outsiders to cope with the rigors of training. ¶16. (C) Indonesia was in the process of producing civilian expertise in the military area, including positions in the Ministry of Defense. A whole generation had been lost during the Suharto years, and civil society was still trying to overcome the gap. Political parties had moved slowly to develop popular bases and organizational structures, and had yet to realize their proper role in the political process under democracy. PASCOE