ISTANBUL'S KURDISH INTELLECTUALS: THE TIME IS NOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002013 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER TU SUBJECT: ISTANBUL'S KURDISH INTELLECTUALS: THE TIME IS NOW REF: A. A. ANKARA 1899 ¶B. B. ANKARA 5735 ¶C. C. ANKARA 5922 Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL DEBORAH K. JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) Summary. Istanbul's Kurdish intellectuals opine the evolving political situation in Turkey and the region sets a favorable stage for agreement to end the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. According to these intellectuals, Turkey's Kurds -- accepted as equals during Turkey's war of independence, but thereafter relegated to second class status, with poor job opportunities and impoverished living conditions especially in Turkey's southeast -- are pressing the PKK for a settlement of the long-running conflict with the Turkish state. The "disorderly situation" in neighboring countries, the high levels of international attention paid to the broader Middle East and Kurdish longing for genuine progress on dreams for recognition and equality will enable a compromise settlement, they believe, although the absence of direct commmunication with the PKK and mechanisms to remove institutionalized bias against Kurds will remain critical barriers. Dr. Mensur Akgun, TESEV Foreign Policy Director, reflected much of this sentiment, saying Turkey knows something must be done to solve the Kurdish problem, particularly in light of the unsettled situation in Iraq and the growing influence of Iran. End summary. HOPE IN THE U.S., SOMEWHAT LESS IN THE EU -------------- ¶2. (S) We met recently with a handful of DEMOS members, an Istanbul-based group of 40-50 Kurdish professionals from medicine, law and the media who chartered themselves in 1996 as a forum for discussing Kurdish issues and conflict resolution. DEMOS, which stands for the Democratic Reconciliation and Solution to the Kurdish Question, wants a political solution to the longstanding conflict. Though their remarks often reflect commonly held beliefs, members are well informed by their close ties to family and friends in Turkey's southeast. They cling to hope in the U.S.'s greater Middle East project to "wipe out dictators." They see benefit from an EU process that blunts "radical" elements in Turkey while promoting greater democracy and moderating its military stance. These Kurds, steeped in the "deep state" mindset, posit that though Chief of the General Staff Buyukanit is outspoken compared to his predecessor on perceived dangers to the Turkish state, the military is effectively blocked from coup-making because top commanders are all close to the United States, which according to this outlook, has some controlling interest. Now, they believe, more than at any time in the past 40 years, finding agreement is critical to allow Kurds more freedom of expression and opportunity. (According to Mustafa Ayzit, Istanbul attorney and 2005 International Visitor grantee, the necessity of winning Turkey's patriotic war for independence led temporarily to greater rights and recognition for Kurds in Turkey that were reversed in 1923, followed by Kurdish revolts culminating in 1937 with heavy loss of life.) Now, even though the military has decreed no direct Turkish Government dialogue with the PKK, whether front or back channel, DEMOS members believe some in the government realize contact of some kind is necessary. THEIR BEST CASE SCENARIO -------------- ¶3. (C) Noting that the Kurdish issue is now internationalized with U.S., Iraqi, Iranian and EU participation, these interlocutors read significance into apparently superficial statements, such as those by former Turkish Interior Minister Mehmet Agar turned Dogru Yol Partesi (DYP) politician when he said -- to the military's consternation -- that it was better to have Kurdish politicians in the cities than Kurdish fighters in the mountains, and when Iraqi President Talabani speaks of amnesty. DEMOS members hope for agreement on a one-year trial period during which the U.S. will insure Turkey does not make an incursion into northern Iraq to fight the PKK while Turkey sends numbers of PKK fighters abroad, leaving their weapons behind. With this, they suggest, the Turkish press could declare a "PKK surrender." While raising Turkey's image in northern Iraq, the agreement would increase support from the EU and United States for Turkey and lead to an eventual permanent peace and better political, social, and economic conditions for Kurds; everyone would win. ¶4. (C) While declaring lack of "sympathy" or ties to the PKK, DEMOS members suggest they know the PKK is discussing this scenario as a viable "surrender plan." If the U.S. were to ISTANBUL 00002013 002 OF 002 come up with a similar plan, Turkish Kurds would love it, along with quite a few Turks. The PKK currently does not challenge Turkey's territorial integrity, DEMOS claims, but they will require certain political advances for Kurds. They suggest that though the Turkish government may be undemocratic in some respects, such as in finding a solution to the Kurdish problem, it nevertheless does a fine job rallying support for any plan it devises, especially through "control" of the media. According to their hopeful scenario, Kurds are now a significant regional player and international powers (read the U.S. and possibly EU) will make helpful input along the way to see that Kurds receive some portion of what they seek regarding improved social and economic conditions within Turkey. FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRESS -------------- ¶5. (C) Many pressure points will lead to progress, they assert, among them the anticipated referendum on the future of Kirkuk and the formation of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Thoughtful Kurds tend to see a wider U.S. plan in the naming of retired General Ralston to work for elimination of the PKK. Citing the Semdinli incident (ref A),Kurds doubt the Turkish military's genuine commitment to a just solution to the Kurdish issue. Yet, DEMOS members brook no doubt the Turkish General Staff is closely following developments in northern Iraq and Iran. They believe neither the military nor the PKK can afford to ignore developments that pressure both sides to seek a long-term solution while one is still attainable; in their view, Turkish government benefits from grass roots opinion that pressures the PKK through its hunger for peace. ¶6. (C) Supporting some key DEMOS assertions, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation's (TESEV) Foreign Policy Program Director Dr. Mensur Akgun, close to the Turkish MFA according to TESEV founder Can Paker, made the following points to the Ambassador on October 30. Akgun said that Turkey is "haunted" by Northern Iraq and that the government realizes it has to do something to solve the Kurdish issue. The U.S., he said, is a very big actor and if the U.S. could deliver on "some of your promises" regarding the PKK, then Turkey could take bold actions. With respect to the region, Akgun said Northern Iraq, with U.S. troop concentration, could become a buffer zone of stability, without which it would be impossible to solve the Kurdish problem. But, Turkey also needed to take account of Iran in its security calculations, depending on developments in Northern Iraq. Not only Iran's nuclear ambitions, but its growing influence could overwhelm security cooperation agreements. All of this had links to the PKK, according to Akgun. AND IF THIS FAILS -------------- ¶7. (C) On the other hand, DEMOS members fear, should Turkey choose (with or without the U.S.) to take a military approach, it will lead to both political and violent chaos in Turkey. They draw hope from Prime Minister Erdogan's moderate approach to the military's recent tough speeches (see reftels B, C),a response they say favors dialogue that could result in moderation on both sides. While not certain even the AKP-led government has genuine interest or the political muscle necessary to fight for progress on the Kurdish issue, DEMOS members wonder if this government may have done all it can to advance progress for the Kurds, especially since "Islamists are not very democratic." ¶8. (C) Comment. DEMOS members think the time is right for a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. They believe Kurdish longing for peace and better living conditions, combined with regional pressures on Turkey, might result in real progress toward an agreement. Biases and history precluding settlement to this point will not be forgotten and the traditional state apparatus and military would have to be convinced that a mutually beneficial accommodation is in their best interest. The Kurds of DEMOS may be overly optimistic, but forces are in play that may contribute to progress toward a solution. End comment. JONES