THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001358 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV TU SUBJECT: THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE: ISTANBUL VIEWPOINTS REF: A. ANKARA 7215 ¶B. ANKARA 6543 Classified by Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions with Istanbul intellectuals interested in the political and social aspects of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) reflect a vigorous ongoing debate regarding the ideology of the AKP and how it could shape Turkey in coming decades. These observers were eager to share their views of the AKP's agenda, and the potential implications for Turkish society. Predictions ranged from the alarmist -- fears of an Iran-style religious state or a domineering executive a la Russia's Putin -- to the fulfillment of middle class desires for democracy, as well as aspirations for an American-style state with freedom for all kinds of expression. These diverse opinions suggest that the Istanbul elite remain suspicious of a party with central Anatolian and Islamist roots and what appears to them to be an ambiguous agenda. This ambiguity can also be seen as a result of the 'big-tent' politics the AKP espouses to juggle competing internal factions. End Summary. -------------- --- The Context of the AKP Agenda: Big-Tent Politics -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Unlike most Turkish political parties which tend to be ideologically homogeneous, the AKP is an umbrella party that encompasses different ideological views and personalities (refs A and B). Within this coalition are a pious group, a nationalist group, and a pragmatic group, all of whose interests AKP leadership has to keep in balance. In addition, its roots are Anatolian and generally more pious than those parties with which the Istanbul elites traditionally have been more comfortable. To a certain extent, the AKP agenda is deliberately ambiguous to maintain a balance among the AKP's internal factions and to prevent ideological and personality fault-lines from creating a major split in the party. In this context, the ambiguity of the AKP agenda as described by the following discussions with Istanbul-based outsiders may reflect both this balancing act and a continuing level of discomfort with an AKP party structure and ideology that remains largely foreign to them - and which AKP has failed adequately to explain. -------------- -------------- Islam Lite: Religious Modernization and the American System -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Mustafa Akyol, a journalist at the widely-read, mainstream secularist Hurriyet newspaper, told us recently that many within the newspaper would not agree with his views, but that he felt there had been a change within the Islamic camp which now viewed democratic governance as compatible with Islam as long as it allowed the latter to be practiced freely. The change had not occurred due to pressure from the secular establishment, he noted. ¶5. (C) Akyol agreed with the characterization of this phenomenon by a professor at Ankara University as "Islam Lite." He noted that when he drives home next to a fashionably-dressed headscarved girl talking on her Nokia cellphone in her car, he sees that Turks do not want a Sharia-based legal system. As he put it, he feels that people want the government to "defend the headscarf as much as it defends the mini-skirt" and to protect the right to freedom of expression for all. "As long as it is not forced, how can one deny the right to wear a headscarf?" Akyol rhetorically asked. Akyol went on to criticize "secular fundamentalists" who are pre-emptively intolerant of expressions of Islam and who see the subject of Islam in Turkey as a zero-sum game. "If there is an Islamic, pro-Sharia party, please bring in the army," Akyol said, "but the army and secularists intervene before Turkey even has a chance to explore these issues." Akyol declared that the AKP is part of this Islamic modernization process and that despite difficulties, it won't move backwards to the Islam of "narrow-minded people." -------------- It's All About The Middle Class and Democracy -------------- ¶6. (C) We accompanied a Washington-based analyst to a wide-ranging discussion with Can Paker, chairman of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation think-tank (TESEV) and chairman of the Open Society Institute-Turkey. Presenting a different perspective, Paker explained that Turkish politics were based on a civil/military bureaucracy that instituted top-down change upon a homogeneous society. However, with the rise of a middle class, demand for greater democracy, individualism, and better conditions for private enterprise emerged. This, coupled with EU and US demands for greater political openness, meant that Turkey was on a fast track to democratization, according to Paker. Paker argued that democratization has not yet been fully realized in Turkey and the current political struggle is an attempt to diminish the power of the civil/military bureaucracy and its ability to "dictate to" political parties. The rise of the AKP in 2002, according to Paker, was fueled by a desire for greater democracy and an end to civil/military domination of the political scene. ¶7. (C) With this political framework in mind, Paker declared that the AKP's political future rests on continued democratization and that the party knows it must be progressive. He claimed that only a minority of the party desires traditional Islamic ways and that the party therefore cannot be an Islamic party. The party "must be secular," he declared. "There is no second agenda," religious or otherwise. Paker believes that the AKP desires democracy and is a reflection of the aspirations of the middle class, which in Paker's analysis, doesn't vote for religion or nationalism, but rather for the party that helps advance its interests. ¶8. (C) Paker went on to assert a position he's made previously to the Ambassador -- that the headscarf is not a religious expression, but rather a middle-class expression of the desire of women to enter the public sphere and carve out an active role in society. For him, women being active is a sociological sign of the middle-class in society (versus at home). When asked how to explain comments by an AKP MP who told us that the AKP,s self-identification as a "conservative democratic party" was merely code for "Islamist party," Paker's response was that the AKP member was "mistaken" and that "he will never be able to have an Islamic government because of the civil/military bureaucracy." Paker did say that Erdogan "probably started out as an Islamist, but saw the realities and changed." -------------- Iran in Turkey or the Russian Model? -------------- ¶9. (C) Of all our interlocutors, Kemal Koprulu and his colleagues at the Ari Movement (a center-right NGOQocusing on developing civil society with its roots in the center-right Motherland party - ANAP) were most critical of the AKP and the most suspicious of its agenda. Aside from criticizing Prime Minister Erdogan for being "self-centered, angry, and lacking accountability," the Ari Movement clearly views the AKP as having a threatening ideological agenda. Koprulu asserted that Erdogan's plan to establish 15 new universities with rectors selected by the ruling party, rather than the (arch-secularist, military controlled) Higher Education Board (known by its Turkish acronym "YOK"),would have led to ideological fights between pro-AKP rectors and the rest of the university system. The plan ultimately failed. (Note: It was vetoed and then declared unconstitutional. End Note.) In Koprulu's view, this was part of a broader AKP initiative to erode specific "subsystems" and rebuild them with their "own people," ultimately leading toward radical change overall. Another Ari Movement member suggested that a successful AKP agenda could mean the creation of an Iran-style Islamic government in Turkey. Koprulu told us that he did not necessarily share that opinion, but believes the AKP may indeed have a religious agenda. ¶10. (C) Koprulu's greatest concern was that the AKP may be seeking to mimic "the Russian Model" with a strong, dominating executive leader along the lines of Vladimir Putin. Noting that Erdogan "admires Putin", Koprulu said that perhaps the AKP wants to change Turkey into a presidential system so that it can hold power "from 2002 to 2032." Koprulu concluded his comments by proclaiming that no matter the AKP's true agenda, in 20-30 years "a secular republic like the one established by Ataturk will not exist." (Comment: We have heard similar arguments from other elites, who cite instead the French presidential model while ascribing similar motives. End Comment.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Ari Movement concerns notwithstanding, a recent survey suggests that fewer than 10% of Turks want a Sharia-based government, making the likelihood of a successful imposition of a religious state highly unlikely. Kemal Koprulu's "Russian Model," in which the AKP and PM Erdogan seek to create a dominating executive power a la Putin or as in France, remains widely discussed but clearly speculative. Moreover, Koprulu's views and the opinions of other members of the wealthy, secular elites must be tempered with the understanding that AKP politicians and voters are quite different from the Istanbul elite. The Anatolian and pro-Islam nature of the AKP must be unsettling for thesQ elites, and coupled with a deliberately ambiguous agenda, can easily be seen as threatening. Ambiguity in the AKP's agenda may very well not point to a sinister hidden ideology, but rather the difficulties inherent in holding together a big-tent political party with competing internal constituencies. ¶12. (C) The AKP's balancing act may take a turn for the worse, as Koprulu expects, or may succeed in the way Paker and Akyol view the party. In order to hold together and retain power, it must continue to perform its tricky juggling act to keep its internal factions from splitting the party up. SSOUDKIRK