PARTIES PREPARE THEIR ELECTORAL STRATEGIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 009890

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PK
SUBJECT: PARTIES PREPARE THEIR ELECTORAL STRATEGIES

REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 9704

B. (B) ISLAMABAD 9472

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Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Electoral strategies for Pakistan's major
parties are coalescing in advance of the likely late
2007/early 2008 national and provincial elections. At this
stage, most parties, save the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PML-N),have adopted a go-it-alone strategy. The ruling
Pakistan Muslim League (PML),while leaving the door open to
seat adjustments and post-electoral coalitions, appears to be
ruling out any form of pre-election agreement with other
parties, including its current coalition partners. While the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has made much of reconciliation
with the PML-N through the Charter for Democracy, its
in-country leaders have consistently ruled out electoral
alliances with that party and continue to stall on any
possible agreement with the PML. We understand from British
contacts that perceptions of declining international support
for Musharraf may be influencing exiled PPP leader Benazir
Bhutto's decision to go-slow on a pre-electoral overture to
the PML. Benazir is basing this erroneous view largely on
recent USG statements critical of Musharraf's
counter-terrorism performance, which she interprets as the
USG dumping Musharraf in her favor. Senior PML officials
share a similar interpretation. This has the potential to
derail efforts at pre-electoral rapprochement between the
parties and free and fair elections. End Summary.

Pakistan Muslim League


2. (S/NF) Senior PML officials have reiterated to post over
the last week that the party has taken a strategic decision
to contest the next elections without any alliances. The
party President and Secretary General (refs) have
specifically ruled out any pre-electoral deal with the PPP.
Seat adjustments with the PPP, JUI-F, and ANP in select
districts (principally in NWFP and Balochistan) are under
consideration. Broader alliances with members of the ruling
coalition, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM),Pakistan
Muslim League-Functional (PML-F),PPP-Sherpao, and
PPP-Patriots, are reportedly not. PML leaders expect the MQM
and PML-F to contest independently in Sindh but to rejoin any
post-election PML-led alliance. Seat adjustments with
PPP-Sherpao in NWFP are under consideration. PML leaders
expect that if PPP-Patriots refuse to join the PML fold, they
stand little chance of reelection.

Pakistan People's Party


3. (S/NF) The in-country leadership of the PPP also appears
to be adopting a unilateral election strategy -- its public
embrace of the Charter for Democracy notwithstanding. In
private discussions over the last several months, rhetoric
from senior leaders, including Chairman Makhdoom Amin Fahim,
has subtly shifted from pleas for USG assistance in brokering
an electoral understanding with the PML to requests simply
for a level playing field on which the party can challenge
Musharraf. Unlike their PML counterparts, PPP leaders are
not basing their strategy on realistic calculations of
electoral potential. Rather, they are relying on a vague,
and possibly inaccurate, perception of Musharraf's declining
domestic support. British diplomats suggest that this PPP
analysis has been reinforced by Benazir Bhutto's belief that
USG support for Musharraf has declined, obviating any need
for her to cut a deal. In such a scenario, PPP leaders
believe that the PML vote bank will collapse, ensuring them
an easy victory over their ostensible ally the weaker PML-N
-- a party with which PPP leaders have made clear they have
no intention of governing.

Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz


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4. (S/NF) The PML-N recognizes that it enters the next
elections in a weak position with many of its members having
defected to the PML and its traditional supporters divided.
Its leaders are wagering the party's future on the Charter
for Democracy and wide-ranging seat adjustments with the PPP.
The party hopes to form a de facto anti-Musharraf coalition
that will give it access to the PPP's broader support base
and prevent a head-to-head contest with its far stronger
traditional rival. Party leaders believe that if Nawaz
Sharif can burnish his "democratic" credentials, the PML-N
can capture enough of the anti-military, urban, middle-class
vote in Punjab to position itself as the preeminent
center-right party for future contests. Like the PPP, the
PML-N strategy presumes a weakening Musharraf and
international support. In recent meetings PML-N leaders
including Chairman Raja Zafar-ul-Haq have sought USG support
for a PPP-PML-N electoral understanding against Musharraf.
In this vein, the PML-N leaders have promised no coalition
with the JI, cited the anti-American sentiments of some PPP
leaders, and denigrated any PML role in future politics.

Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal


5. (S/NF) The MMA is already a coalition divided with its
strongest two parties pursuing independent and contradictory
electoral strategies. The JI has made clear its desire to
form a broad anti-Musharraf coalition with the PPP and PML-N
to "force" the President from office. JI believes that it
can position itself at the center of any such campaign,
thereby building its support base and placing future PPP and
PML-N governments in its debt. Unlike JI, which believes it
can capture an increased share of power, the JUI-F is solely
interested in keeping the power it has gained in NWFP and
Balochistan. PML, PPP, and PML-N leaders have all reported
Fazl-ur-Rehman's willingness to work with the election winner
for an acceptable price. With the two main parties pursuing
their own competing agendas, the relevance of the MMA as a
coalition will likely continue to fade, even if formally
retained for public relations reasons.

The Nationalists


6. (S/NF) The smaller nationalist parties (save the Baloch
which are entirely consumed with provincial strife) seem to
be positioning themselves for a hung parliament. Their
strategies focus on building working relationships with all
three main parties -- PML, PPP, and PML-N -- enabling them to
enter coalition with whosoever obtains a plurality. The ANP
has proven most adept so far at this strategy. While still
retaining close ties with the PML-N and PPP through the
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, ANP leader
Asfandyar Wali Khan has recently repaired relations with
Musharraf, opening possible avenues for cooperation. All
three main parties now see the ANP as a possible partner for
seat adjustments and post-electoral coalitions. The MQM
would like to be in a similar position. Deputy Convenor
Farooq Sattar has repeatedly stressed that the MQM will
contest the upcoming elections independently and not/not with
the PML. Sattar has attempted to adopt an independent line
from the GOP on key issues like provincial autonomy and
unsuccessfully to court the PML-N and PPP. Indeed, MQM has
sought USG assistance in repairing its relations with these
parties.

The International Role


7. (S/NF) The potential role of the international community,
particularly the United States, figures prominently in
parties' calculations. There is an increasing perception
among opposition politicians that the USG has decided to dump
Musharraf in favor of one of the former civilian prime
ministers. While much of this reflects wishful thinking in
light of USG commitments to free and fair elections, recent
statements critical of Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts

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coupled with Pakistan sensitivities to the U.S. civil nuclear
initiative have increased this view. Conversations with
in-country leaders of both parties and British reporting on
recent conversations with Benazir Bhutto suggest that this
perception is a large factor in refusals to conclude a deal
with Musharraf. More troubling still are indications that
senior PML officials have reached a similar conclusion. In a
recent conversation with PML Secretary General Mushahid
Hussain, poloffs were informed of concern within the PML that
the USG was abandoning Musharraf in favor of Benazir Bhutto.
He expressed relief when assured that this was not the case
and that the USG interest was in promoting fair elections,
not endorsing any individual or party.

Comment


8. (S/NF) To a degree it appears that parties are calculating
election strategies on the basis of inaccurately perceived
intentions of the international community. While we will
continue to dispel actively any suggestion of declining USG
support for the government or U.S. endorsement of Bhutto, we
must remember that all parties read more into their
interpretations of our behavior than our direct denials on
these matters. In this vein, any public suggestion of USG
dissatisfaction with Musharraf's role in the GWOT, an area in
which we have previously offered visible praise, will be
taken as a withdrawal of overall support. This will stymie
GOP efforts to conclude an understanding with like-minded
parties (PPP and ANP) prior to the election -- probably the
best formula for a moderate, stable government after 2007.
In a worst-case scenario, if Musharraf feels the
international community has abandoned him, he may withdraw
his endorsement of a free and fair election and allow massive
rigging circa 2002. This would not only be a massive
set-back for democratization, but would also deny Musharraf
the legitimacy and popular mandate his future government
needs to pursue aggressively controversial counter-terrorism
programs. End Comment
CROCKER