S/CT AMB CRUMPTON ENCOURAGES ROBUST GOP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008829 SIPDIS SIPDIS KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016 TAGS: MASS MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: S/CT AMB CRUMPTON ENCOURAGES ROBUST GOP COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Introduction and summary: Visiting Islamabad on May 3-4, S/CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton and S/CT Senior Advisor Michael Hurley engaged political, diplomatic and military interlocutors on Pakistan's counterterrorim (CT) strategies and policies. Calling on National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, Foreign Secretary Mohammad Riaz Khan and Director - Military Operations BG Nasser Janjua, Crumpton commended his interlocutors on Pakistan's political commitment to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and queried them on the government's CT priorities. Tariq Aziz and BG Nasser described in detail the GOP's three-tiered strategy for denying Islamic extremists safe haven in the tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border. Tariq Aziz indicated his willingness to work with he Afghan counterpart to identify tribal leaders that could restore stability to the region, and reaffirmed the GOP's support for Afghanistan's political development. He shared his assessment that a military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran would seriously destabilize Pakistan and the region, and said that President Musharraf was grateful for President Bush's comments on Kashmir during his March 2005 visit to Islamabad. ForSec Riaz Khan also discussed GOP policies toward the FATA, but was stumped when AMB Crumpton asked about the Foreign Office's top priorities for advancing CT policy. BG Nasser presented a detailed briefing on the army's military operations in the tribal areas, agreeing with AMB Crumpton that the success of the GOP's counter-insurgency strategy rests as much on progress on political integration and economic and social development as on military victory. End summary and introduction. (Note: AMB Crumpton's meeting with Pakistan Interior Minister Sherpao will be reported septel. End note.) NSA Tariq Aziz -------------- ¶2. (C) AMB Crumpton underscored for Tariq Aziz the importance the U.S. attaches to the bilateral relationship, including cooperation on CT. Aziz stressed the importance of understanding the root causes of terrorism throughout the Moslem world and the need to combat it with both political and military actions. Aziz has advised the British, as they prepare to move into Afghanistan,s Helmand province, to revive tactics from their imperial past and work as much as possible through locally dominant proxies. The important thing, he explained, is to avoid taking unnecessary British casualties, which might create domestic pressure in the UK to pull troops out. Pakistan opposed to a premature withdrawal of UK or U.S. forces from Afghanistan; it is essential that the coalition succeed, but succeed sooner rather than later. ¶3. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),Aziz said a multifaceted FATA Development Plan was under development, but the government had not yet made a final determination on who should lead the effort. The leader should be a Pashtun familiar with the local environment, he added. Former Chief Secretary of the NWFP Sahibzada Imtiaz was a good bureaucrat, with a lot of experience and a reputation for honesty, but had not been definitively selected for the position ¶4. (C) When Aziz asked whether the U.S. was satisfied with Pakistan,s performance in the war on terror, Ambassador Crumpton assured him that there was no question as to Pakistan,s political commitment, adding that no country had captured or killed more Al Qaida operatives. Aziz noted that Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from terrorists, but that President Musharraf was convinced that fighting terrorists vigorously was in Pakistan,s own interest. ISLAMABAD 00008829 002 OF 003 Responding to AMB Crumpton, Aziz confirmed that Pakistan was getting necessary support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others, as the Gulf countries shared Pakistan,s concerns regarding the spread of Al Qaida. ¶5. (C) The challenge in Waziristan was exacerbated, Aziz said, by the assimilation of foreign elements into local tribal societies: it is not uncommon now for Waziri tribal elders to have grandchildren born to foreign militants, who remained in the area after the anti-Soviet jihad and married local women. These family ties created deep loyalties. Aziz hoped that Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National Party (ANP) and scion of a renowned Pushtoon nationalist family, could play a helpful role, explaining that the ANP had ties on both sides of the border. The ANP was "totally moderate" and "anti-Mullah"; because of its deeper ties in the region, it was better equipped than the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) to serve as a moderating influence. ¶6. (S) Aziz reported that Afghan National Security Advisor Zalmay Rassoul had called recently to say the two should "be in touch with each other." It was in Pakistan,s national interest that Afghanistan succeed, Aziz added. Pakistan could not accept the reinvigoration of the Taliban. Although the message "may not have filtered down," Aziz said that President Musharraf had opposed the Taliban even before 9/11. Unfortunately Northern Alliance elements in Afghanistan doubted Pakistan,s anti-Taliban credentials. Aziz agreed that he and Rassoul should meet to discuss these issues; he endorsed AMB Crumpton,s suggestion that the two could "compare notes" on tribal leaders on both sides of the border that could serve as common allies. Aziz said that he and Rassoul could perhaps identify influential leaders, give them responsibility to police their areas, supply them with weapons and hold them accountable. Cash was often a very effective inducement to cooperation, he observed, and if 30-40 percent of it was "pocketed" by these influential leaders, then it was a small price to pay and should be overlooked. Currently, neither the Afghans nor the Pakistanis had the full support of the local populations, and those that did support them were not properly armed and trained. ¶7. (C) Aziz expressed concern about the fallout in Pakistan from the "Iran situation," especially in view of Pakistani elections scheduled for 2007. Military action against Iran would pose and enormous political challenge for Musharraf, he said. It would be exploited by Mullahs, who would argue that Pakistan was next in line after Iran. However, sanctions against Iran would be "livable" he judged. Aziz promised to think about what role Pakistan could play in Iran, but he explained that the current leader of Iran had "gone mad" and it was unclear that he would listen to Musharraf, who was perceived as pro-western. ¶8. (C) Aziz said that President Bush,s visit had gone well -- contrary to popular perceptions -- and that Pakistan welcomed the President,s comments on Kashmir. He asserted that Pakistan wanted an "honorable exit" from Kashmir. "We don,t want territory; we want a resolution of the conflict." Aziz concluded by stressing, the importance of continuity and stability in the U.S. Pakistan relationship going beyond the war on terror. "We have a perception that when you are done, you,ll leave us high and dry," he said. It was in the U.S. interest to counter this perception because for decades to come Pakistan would remain strategically significant -- "either as a problem or as an asset." Foreign Secretary Muhammad Riaz Khan -------------- ¶9. (C) Introducing himself to ForSec Riaz Khan, AMB ISLAMABAD 00008829 003 OF 003 Crumpton expressed appreciation for excellent bilateral CT cooperation, which the USG would like to expand. Responding to AMB Crumpton's comment that his key concern is eliminating the safe haven along the Pak-Afghan border that is exploited by al Qaidaa and Taliban forces, the ForSec noted that this is also a key GOP concern. Reviewing the legacy of the anti-Soviet jihad and subsequent years of turmoil in Afghanistan, Riaz Khan called for greater cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul to stabilize the border area. Noting the three-tier strategy for the FATA advanced by President Musharraf, the ForSec urged the U.S, to move quickly on Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) to accelerate economic development along the border. Riaz Khan was at a loss for a quick response, however, when AMB Crumpton asked him to describe the MFA's priorities for advancing Pakistan's CT objectives; he said only that the Foreign Office plays a traditional role in facilitating bilateral dialogue and arrangements (e.g., extradition treaties) in support of broader GOP CT goals. Director - Military Operations BG Nasser Janjua -------------- -- ¶10. (C) BG Nasser Janjua presented a detailed briefing on the Pakistan Army's strategy and tactics for combating al Qaida, Taliban and other violent extremists in the FATA. (Note: Embassy will forward an electronic copy of BG Nasser's full presentation to S/CT. End note.) AMB Crumpton was particularly interested in Pak mil tactics for managing the broader counter-insurgency campaign; BG Nasser responded by describing the deep tribal loyalties and traditions that present a serious challenge to stabilizing the region, as the mere presence of 80,000 Pakostani troops on tribal lands is considered an affront to tribal sovereignty. This prolonged military presence, along with collateral civilian casualties search-and-destroy operations, are being exploited by al Qaida and Taliban forces, who engage in assassination campaigns against tribal leaders who cooperate with GOP authorities. Human intelligence collection is particularly difficult, BG Nasser noted, as potential sources are well aware of the potential for quick, lethal reprisal. BG Nasser said CENTCOM, with whom Pak mil works hand-in-glove, knows that the GOP has made a serious commitment to dislodge Islamic militants from the FATA. He was concerned that, during a recent visit to Washington, he sensed that this commitment was not recognized by civilian USG officials. AMB Crumpton noted that the State Department's 2005 Country Report on Terrorism highlights Pakistan's strong performance in the GWOT, and pledged that he would always be clear when speaking of the U.S.-Pakistani CT partnership. The meeting concluded with AMB Crumpton and BG Nasser agreeing that the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan should work to identify tribal leaders who could advance common counter-insurgency objectives. CROCKER