A STRATEGY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 008148 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM EAID OIIP KPAO PK SUBJECT: A STRATEGY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 5364 ¶B. (B) ISLAMABAD 4595 ¶C. ISLAMABAD 4347 ISLAMABAD 00008148 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: With the appointment of a credible, permanent Chief Election Commissioner (CEC),Pakistan is moving in the necessary direction for free and fair elections in 2007. Post believes that the credibility of the 2007 contest has significant implications for long-term stability and democratization. A free and fair contest will set the stage to begin significant long-term investment in the strengthening of democratic institutions and the exit of the military from elected politics. Rigged elections will only serve to increase public ire at the current government, weaken its ability to pursue necessary policies, and undermine the credibility of the USG commitment to democracy in the region. For these reasons, post has elaborated a comprehensive assistance strategy matching technical assistance, diplomatic engagement, and public diplomacy programming directly to what we view as key election obstacles. Post appreciates Washington agencies' careful review of this strategy, provision of the identified programmatic resources, and engagement with key non-governmental agencies and other international donors. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The upcoming national elections are a critical benchmark in Pakistan's democratic development. They will mark the final transition back to full civilian rule following the 1999 coup and will lay the groundwork for the country's future political evolution. Opposition parties, civil society, and the central government are all placing significant emphasis on the need for these elections to be free and fair -- a marked departure from Pakistan's history of controlled democracy. Achieving elections that major parties accept as a genuine representation of the will of the Pakistani people will provide the new, likely progressive, government with a heretofore absent public mandate. This will enable it to tackle forthrightly the domestic and international challenges facing Pakistan, consolidate democratic institutions, and make progress towards civilian control over the military. Rigged elections will increase opposition to the Musharraf government, fuel public unrest �0A;and provincial insurgencies, and weaken the GOP's ability to undertake controversial policies. In a worst case scenario, united opposition protests over elections could topple the GOP, leading to a coalition arrangement in which Islamist parties would have greatly increased influence. While post believes that the GOP is committed to organizing a reasonably free and fair contest, international technical assistance, election monitoring, and continuous diplomatic engagement will be essential to overcome long-standing obstacles and ensure public confidence in the process. Electoral Set-Up ¶3. (C) The Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) credibility may be at an all-time low. Its last three ISLAMABAD 00008148 002.2 OF 005 attempts to organize national elections (2002 referendum, 2002 national elections, 2005 local elections) were failures. The recent appointment of a permanent CEC is a necessary but not a sufficient step to restore credibility. Pakistani law does not provide sufficient independence or authority to the ECP to carry out its mandate, and there is no tradition of regular consultation between the ECP and political parties. A number of outstanding issues need to be addressed relating to the overall electoral set-up such as whether or not a caretaker government will be appointed, the return of opposition party leaders, and delimitation of electoral districts. Regularized engagement between the CEC and the heads of all major political parties would create the necessary framework. To that end, post is proposing assistance for the formation of a consultative forum to which we would provide international expertise. The initial focus would be on revision of electoral laws and regulations to empower the ECP and address outstanding structural issues. The forum would then focus on development of a universally acceptable Electoral Code of Conduct and resolution of disputes during the nomination, campaign, and election process. ¶4. (C) Technical considerations also hamper the ECP's effectiveness. The ECP requires fully-staffed provincial and district offices that are empowered to pursue aggressively suspected election violations and adjudicate such violations in a timely and impartial manner. The previous reliance on judicial personnel is insufficient and creates a conflict of interest as the judiciary is expected to rule on its own personnel's decisions during election appeals. Adequate training of polling staff has also been a critical problem. Early identification and in-depth training on simplified electoral procedures needs to occur. Coupled with this, enhanced voter training, appropriate for a largely illiterate population, is required. Donor support will be necessary to address these concerns and leverage GOP resources. Public Confidence ¶5. (C) Rebuilding shattered public credibility will be key to ensuring significant voter participation. Consistent allegations of rigging have led to a perception that government personnel occasionally stuff ballot boxes or otherwise change electoral results. This is in addition to the more frequent allegations of pre-poll rigging, voter intimidation, and other forms of coercive support. Monitoring by local NGOs coupled with selective observation by international donors and NGOs has not ended these practices. Transparent ballot boxes and appropriate voting screens, as used in Afghanistan, would increase the difficulty in carrying out fraud and would help increase voter confidence. We also believe that a significant investment in nationwide international observation from nomination through appeal of results coupled with a parallel vote count in each district is essential to address these questions. To avoid competing programs and assessments, post strongly recommends a single joint observation mission in coordination with other donors. ISLAMABAD 00008148 003.2 OF 005 Voter Lists ¶6. (C) Pakistan's voter lists are in a state of complete disarray. Initial lists prepared in 2000 for the local bodies elections remain highly controversial with opposition parties charging that their supporters were deliberately omitted. The 2002 amendments to those lists are even more controversial such that they were not even utilized in the 2005 local bodies contests. The CEC in his initial meeting with the Ambassador made clear that entirely new lists were required. For this to be an effective exercise, the ECP will require extensive assistance in how to carry out a credible non-partisan process. Considerable training of registration personnel coupled with assistance in computerization of the new lists so that they can easily be updated is needed. Intelligence/Security Agencies ¶7. (S) The involvement of security agencies in elections has been pervasive. Intelligence agencies have supported candidates and parties for elections and have engaged in candidate and voter intimidation. Organized voting fraud supported by these agencies has changed results in certain districts. Significant donor pressure during the 2005 local elections was generally effective in keeping intelligence agencies out of the electoral process. A similar, unified intervention will be necessary for 2007. With the withdrawal of intelligence agencies in 2005, provincial governments utilized police to carry out many of the same fraudulent activities. Coordinated engagement with the national and provincial government on the police role in the electoral process will be important. We also believe that direct training in election security for police at the district level can help to avert future misbehavior and, at the same time, decrease violence at the polls. Political Parties ¶8. (C) Pakistan's political parties have no concept of issues-based campaigning. Their electoral campaigns tend to revolve around personalities and mud-slinging. Grass-roots involvement in the development of party platforms is non-existent and the selection of candidates is a highly-controversial, non-democratic exercise. Post believes that continued work is crucial if we are to build a better electoral system. The National Democratic Institute is currently working with the parties to develop younger leadership talent and to build democratic mechanisms. Its program will conclude in early 2007, and we do not/not believe that an extension is warranted given that parties will be exclusively focused on electioneering by that time. The International Republican Institute (IRI) is currently concluding a small pilot program on electoral polling and issues development funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). We believe that additional programming through 2007 is warranted. FATA ¶9. (C) Conduct of national elections in the Federally ISLAMABAD 00008148 004.2 OF 005 Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will continue to mark a significant challenge for the GOP. Aside from obvious security issues, the FATA has a very brief history of electoral politics, low voter turn-out rates particularly among women, and a bar on political party work (a bar routinely flouted by the Islamist parties that use the mullahs as their agents). Engagement at the senior levels of the GOP will be critical to lift the bar on political party activity to allow elections to be contested in a manner equal to other areas of the country. This will allow secular parties to compete, for the first time, on an equal footing with their Islamist rivals. In addition, voter education work, particularly among women, will be vital to ensure a higher turn-out and a better informed electorate. Existing Resources ¶10. (SBU) USAID has identified $16 million in FY 06 DG funds for election-related activities. A request for proposals has already gone out to IQC holders to utilize this existing funding for the following activities: -- Revision of voter roles -- Creation of a forum between political parties and the ECP to review election laws, regulations, and procedures, draft a joint Electoral Code of Conduct; and serve as a dispute resolution forum during the election process. -- Purchase transparent ballot boxes and voting screens for the ECP On the political party front, USAID's $1.7 million program on strengthening political parties through the National Democratic Institute will continue through February 2007. A portion of this program focuses on election-related issues. NED's $500,000 program through the International Republican Institute on polling and issues-based platform development will conclude in September 2006. IIP has agreed to finance two additional Speaker's programs in FY 2006. The first of these would organize public discussion on reforms to electoral laws and procedures. The second would work with political parties on organization of campaigns and selection of candidates. At this stage, no other donors have made definitive commitments on elections. Local British, Canadian, and EU missions have indicated a willingness to fund some training of ECP staff, while Nordic countries, Switzerland, and Canada are interested in funding voter education. Needed Funding ¶11. (SBU) Post believes that additional funding needs to be rapidly identified and made available for full implementation of our election support strategy. Post requires an additional $13 million in FY 07 funding to support training of ECP staff, establishment of district offices, and post-election analysis and follow-up. Only $3 million of that has been firmly identified by USAID. In addition, as indicated reftels, post requires approximately $20 million for nationwide international monitoring and a parallel vote tabulation; $1 million for voter education in the FATA; and ISLAMABAD 00008148 005.2 OF 005 $250,000 for training of district police officers in election security. We had originally requested that such funds be made available through DRL. We understand, however, that HRDF funds may not/not be sufficient. For this reason, post requests that new resources from a combination of sources (USAID, HRDF, and ESF) be identified for these activities. Additional IIP support for election-related speakers will also be required in FY 2007 on such topics as media coverage of election campaigns. We understand that IRI will be submitting an unsolicited proposal to USAID to continue work on polling and issues-based platform development with political parties. Post strongly supports this initiative and recommends funding. In addition to USG support, immediate engagement with like-minded donors to support voter education (Nordics, Benelux, Germany, and EU),a single, comprehensive international election monitoring mission (Canada, Britain, EU, Switzerland, Nordics, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, Benelux),training of ECP and polling staff (Britain, EU, Canada),and FATA voter education (Japan). Comment ¶12. (C) While there are significant obstacles, post remains convinced that a generally free and fair election can be achieved in Pakistan in 2007. To do so, however, we and other international donors must be prepared to commit significant resources early-on in the process in order to shift a non-permissive electoral environment. To date, every other major donor in Pakistan is well behind us on electoral planning, a state of affairs that should not be allowed to continue if we are to achieve the progress that we desire. Post will continue to press like-minded donors through the existing working group on elections, but we believe that absent engagement with capitals and Washington progress will be slow. Post welcomes Washington assistance in overcoming this obstacle and building the needed international coalition to support elections in Pakistan. BODDE