PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF EXPRESSES CONCERN TO SENATOR HAGEL ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006420



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016

TAGS: MNUC, PTER, PGOV, PREL, PK, AF, IN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF EXPRESSES CONCERN TO SENATOR

HAGEL ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.



Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (S) Summary: President Musharraf reviewed with visiting

Senator Hagel his concerns over his relationship with the

U.S., citing the U.S.-India Civil-Nuclear Initiative and

perceived pressure for democratization. He also described

the threat of Talibanization in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. He

worried that the Civil Nuclear Initiative implicitly

recognized India as a nuclear state and could reignite an

arms race in South Asia. He urged that the U.S. support

construction of a new fully safeguarded nuclear power plant

for Pakistan, arguing that it would not give Pakistan any

technology or fuel it did already have and that he would much

rather get assistance from the U.S. than from other

countries; this would help correct perceptions that a rift

had developed between the two countries. Similarly,

Musharraf expressed concern about a growing perception that

there was a rift between him and the United States on

democratization. He was moving the country steadily toward

democracy, he said, but there was a perception that he was

doing this only because he had been put in a corner.

Musharraf reported that while the Al Qa'ida presence in the

Tribal Areas was declining, "Talibanization" was increasing

and spreading into neighboring districts of Pakistan. He

reviewed a four-part strategy of military, political,

administrative and development measures to counter the trend.

Musharraf stressed that success would depend on

complementary efforts on the Afghan side of the border and

complained that India was sowing distrust by spreading

misinformation in Afghanistan. End Summary.



2. (C) President Musharraf met with visiting Senator Chuck

Hagel on April 13, using the opportunity to convey his views

on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative, democracy and

Pakistani steps to address the threat of "Talibanization" in

the Tribal Areas. Senator Hagel opened the meeting by

stressing the importance of the U.S. relationship with

Pakistan and the need to work together in confronting mutual

challenges. The United States appreciated Pakistan's

efforts in the border area, he said, and understood that the

success of mutual efforts in the region rested on the

strength of the bilateral relationship.



Nuclear Power

--------------



3. (S) Musharraf reported that he had chaired a meeting of

Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) the previous day

and that perceptions of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear

initiative were not good. These negative perceptions

reflected widely held views in the society as a whole. "We

understand your geostrategic relationship with India," he

said, but in Pakistan the deal was "vastly unpopular" for two

reasons. First, it implicitly accepted India as a nuclear

state while excluding Pakistan, so Pakistanis felt "singled

out." Secondly, it would increase India's ability to

proliferate because India's weaponization efforts had been

constrained by a shortage of nuclear fuel, which would no

longer exist under the Initiative. This was the unanimous

perception of the members of the NCA. Pakistan would now be

grappling with the prospect of a nuclear arms race with India

because it would never allow its nuclear deterrent capability

to be compromised.



4. (S) Musharraf added that he also did not understand why

the United States could not let Pakistan have a 1000 MGW

civil nuclear reactor. Pakistan did not need more fuel for

the reactor, so it would not lead to proliferation.

Moreover, it would not involve any technology that Pakistan

did not already possess. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities

were already far more advanced than India's. Pakistan would

welcome any kind of safeguards regime over the plant,

Musharraf continued. Finally, Pakistan had very real energy

needs that would have to be addressed one way or another.

Currently, China was providing a reactor, and Pakistan would

need more. That was the reality and Pakistan would have to

move forward, whether with the United States or not.



5. (S) Musharraf stressed that he would far rather move

forward with the United States, but the Administration's

current posture precluded that. He cherished his friendship

with President Bush and he had said so both publicly and



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privately: "I say he is a friend. He is sincere and open.

These are things you appreciate. And we are together in

fighting terror." Unfortunately, the media created the

impression that a rift had developed in the wake of the

President's visit to Pakistan. This perception was a greater

concern than actual nuclear capabilities. "We know our

capabilities and our potential," Musharraf stressed, Pakistan

would get the reactor anyway. So the only result of the

current policy would be to deepen the perception that there

were problems between the two countries. Despite Pakistan's

willingness to submit to safeguards, everything would be

given to India and Pakistan was being singled out.



6. (C) In response, Senator Hagel indicated that while he

supported strengthening the U.S.-India relationship, he also

agreed that the United States had not given enough attention

to Pakistan. The U.S.-India relationship needed to be seen

in the context of wider U.S. relationships in the region. It

should not have the effect of intimidating or isolating

Pakistan or China or other countries in the region.

Bilateral initiatives should be framed in a regional context.

Hagel said he expected Congress would ultimately pass the

U.S.-India agreement, but many uncertainties remained. Hagel

added that Congress would probably want to assess the IAEA

protocol with India before passing the agreement.



Democracy

--------------



7. (C) Musharraf worried that this perception of a rift

between the United States and him was reinforced "when people

come and overdo the issue of democracy." He acknowledged

that his being in uniform was undemocratic, but added, "we

have never had democracy in Pakistan." In contrast, he had

"empowered people, women, minorities and the grass roots."

He had freed the media and enabled the parliament to complete

its full tenure and hold a second election for the first time

in Pakistan's history. He was totally in favor of democracy,

and a great deal had been achieved, so people should be

careful about statements in the press.



8. (C) Musharraf cited an editorial that morning asserting

that recent USG comments on democracy were evidence that the

US was moving away from him. "Yes, I agree," he said, "we

should have democracy" but he also deserved credit for what

he had achieved in that direction. Pakistan would have "free

and fair elections," but there was a perception that he was

being forced into it. As in the case of broader U.S.

relations with the region, the idea was taking hold that

Pakistan was being singled out for pressure. India was being

treated differently -- "as a partner." Ever since the

President's visit, there was a growing perception that his

own personal standing had declined.



Talibanization

--------------



9. (S) Musharraf observed that in his view there had been a

significant change in the Tribal Areas. Pakistani forces

continued to go after Al Qa'ida elements "whenever we get

word." "We strike fast," he said, adding that there had been

a very successful strike the previous night. However, in his

assessment, Al Qa'ida was greatly weakened and the Taliban

was stepping into the vacuum. Now Talibanization was the

issue, and it was a phenomenon on both sides of the Afghan

border. It was characterized by "obscurantist views"

including sanctions for barbers who shaved men's beards, and

opposition to music and television. These Taliban elements

were spreading through the Tribal Areas and into outside

districts of Pakistan.



10. (C) Musharraf noted that one obstacle he faced was a

religious government in the NWFP that turned a blind eye to

Talibanization. Moreover, because the Chief Minister was

with the opposition MMA, he had to work through the governor.

He said he was "reasonably sure" the situation would be

remedied in the next election because the MMA would be "wiped

out." He was confident the government would ultimately

succeed in countering Talibanization because only a small

minority of the population shared the Taliban's extreme views

(albeit a dominant minority). Pakistan was addressing the

challenge of Talibanization with a four-pronged strategy, he



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explained:



-- First, it was continuing military actions against

terrorists and any Taliban clerics that were trying to run a

government within a government, for example by requiring men

to wear beards.



-- Second, on the political side, Pakistan was opening up the

Tribal Areas to "progressive political forces." Without

putting anything in writing, he had given tacit permission to

these political parties to "go in and do political work."



--Third, he was working to correct the "administrative

set-up." Currently the FATA Secretariat (which represents

the Tribal Areas and reports to the Chief Minister of the

Northwest Frontier Province) was "impotent." Moreover, the

seven Political Agents (one for each Agency),who were

supposed to be powerful and whose word used to be law, were

not effective. The government wanted to get the best people

for the job, whether out of the military or the bureaucracy,

and equip them effective security forces (tribal levies).

This would give Political Agents independent authority so

they would not have to fall back on the army or Frontier

Corps. Musharraf noted that one-time NWFP Chief Minister

Sahibzada Imtiaz Ahmad was preparing a study on how to

"reactivate" the Political Agents.



-- Fourth, efforts were already underway to end the physical

and economic isolation of the tribal areas by building

infrastructure (including roads and irrigation systems),

generating jobs and building schools. A "massive"

construction effort was in the works; Pakistan had asked for

$150 million per year in donor assistance, and would more

than match that amount out of its own resources. U.S.-backed

"Reconstruction Opportunity Zones" (ROZs) also had great

potential to create jobs and economic opportunity.



11. (S) Musharraf said he hoped there would be equal efforts

on the Afghan side of the border and complained that a

perception had been created that Pakistan's government and

its intelligence services were pursuing separate agendas. It

was a perception he found "most annoying" and one that the

Indian intelligence service was spreading in Afghanistan.

Musharraf said he had documentary evidence that India was

working through Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense and its

intelligence service to undermine Afghan perceptions of

Pakistan; he had shown the evidence to President Bush during

the President's visit to Pakistan. India was also providing

support and cash to "feudal tribals" who were making trouble

in Balochistan.



12. (U) Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this

cable.

CROCKER