Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06ISLAMABAD6420 | 2006-04-14 15:07:00 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO3924 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #6420/01 1041507 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 141507Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5223 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5052 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8152 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0593 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 8434 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 6232 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006420 |
1. (S) Summary: President Musharraf reviewed with visiting
Senator Hagel his concerns over his relationship with the U.S., citing the U.S.-India Civil-Nuclear Initiative and perceived pressure for democratization. He also described the threat of Talibanization in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. He worried that the Civil Nuclear Initiative implicitly recognized India as a nuclear state and could reignite an arms race in South Asia. He urged that the U.S. support construction of a new fully safeguarded nuclear power plant for Pakistan, arguing that it would not give Pakistan any technology or fuel it did already have and that he would much rather get assistance from the U.S. than from other countries; this would help correct perceptions that a rift had developed between the two countries. Similarly, Musharraf expressed concern about a growing perception that there was a rift between him and the United States on democratization. He was moving the country steadily toward democracy, he said, but there was a perception that he was doing this only because he had been put in a corner. Musharraf reported that while the Al Qa'ida presence in the Tribal Areas was declining, "Talibanization" was increasing and spreading into neighboring districts of Pakistan. He reviewed a four-part strategy of military, political, administrative and development measures to counter the trend. Musharraf stressed that success would depend on complementary efforts on the Afghan side of the border and complained that India was sowing distrust by spreading misinformation in Afghanistan. End Summary. 2. (C) President Musharraf met with visiting Senator Chuck Hagel on April 13, using the opportunity to convey his views on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative, democracy and Pakistani steps to address the threat of "Talibanization" in the Tribal Areas. Senator Hagel opened the meeting by stressing the importance of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and the need to work together in confronting mutual challenges. The United States appreciated Pakistan's efforts in the border area, he said, and understood that the success of mutual efforts in the region rested on the strength of the bilateral relationship. Nuclear Power -------------------------- 3. (S) Musharraf reported that he had chaired a meeting of Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) the previous day and that perceptions of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative were not good. These negative perceptions reflected widely held views in the society as a whole. "We understand your geostrategic relationship with India," he said, but in Pakistan the deal was "vastly unpopular" for two reasons. First, it implicitly accepted India as a nuclear state while excluding Pakistan, so Pakistanis felt "singled out." Secondly, it would increase India's ability to proliferate because India's weaponization efforts had been constrained by a shortage of nuclear fuel, which would no longer exist under the Initiative. This was the unanimous perception of the members of the NCA. Pakistan would now be grappling with the prospect of a nuclear arms race with India because it would never allow its nuclear deterrent capability to be compromised. 4. (S) Musharraf added that he also did not understand why the United States could not let Pakistan have a 1000 MGW civil nuclear reactor. Pakistan did not need more fuel for the reactor, so it would not lead to proliferation. Moreover, it would not involve any technology that Pakistan did not already possess. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities were already far more advanced than India's. Pakistan would welcome any kind of safeguards regime over the plant, Musharraf continued. Finally, Pakistan had very real energy needs that would have to be addressed one way or another. Currently, China was providing a reactor, and Pakistan would need more. That was the reality and Pakistan would have to move forward, whether with the United States or not. 5. (S) Musharraf stressed that he would far rather move forward with the United States, but the Administration's current posture precluded that. He cherished his friendship with President Bush and he had said so both publicly and ISLAMABAD 00006420 002 OF 003 privately: "I say he is a friend. He is sincere and open. These are things you appreciate. And we are together in fighting terror." Unfortunately, the media created the impression that a rift had developed in the wake of the President's visit to Pakistan. This perception was a greater concern than actual nuclear capabilities. "We know our capabilities and our potential," Musharraf stressed, Pakistan would get the reactor anyway. So the only result of the current policy would be to deepen the perception that there were problems between the two countries. Despite Pakistan's willingness to submit to safeguards, everything would be given to India and Pakistan was being singled out. 6. (C) In response, Senator Hagel indicated that while he supported strengthening the U.S.-India relationship, he also agreed that the United States had not given enough attention to Pakistan. The U.S.-India relationship needed to be seen in the context of wider U.S. relationships in the region. It should not have the effect of intimidating or isolating Pakistan or China or other countries in the region. Bilateral initiatives should be framed in a regional context. Hagel said he expected Congress would ultimately pass the U.S.-India agreement, but many uncertainties remained. Hagel added that Congress would probably want to assess the IAEA protocol with India before passing the agreement. Democracy -------------------------- 7. (C) Musharraf worried that this perception of a rift between the United States and him was reinforced "when people come and overdo the issue of democracy." He acknowledged that his being in uniform was undemocratic, but added, "we have never had democracy in Pakistan." In contrast, he had "empowered people, women, minorities and the grass roots." He had freed the media and enabled the parliament to complete its full tenure and hold a second election for the first time in Pakistan's history. He was totally in favor of democracy, and a great deal had been achieved, so people should be careful about statements in the press. 8. (C) Musharraf cited an editorial that morning asserting that recent USG comments on democracy were evidence that the US was moving away from him. "Yes, I agree," he said, "we should have democracy" but he also deserved credit for what he had achieved in that direction. Pakistan would have "free and fair elections," but there was a perception that he was being forced into it. As in the case of broader U.S. relations with the region, the idea was taking hold that Pakistan was being singled out for pressure. India was being treated differently -- "as a partner." Ever since the President's visit, there was a growing perception that his own personal standing had declined. Talibanization -------------------------- 9. (S) Musharraf observed that in his view there had been a significant change in the Tribal Areas. Pakistani forces continued to go after Al Qa'ida elements "whenever we get word." "We strike fast," he said, adding that there had been a very successful strike the previous night. However, in his assessment, Al Qa'ida was greatly weakened and the Taliban was stepping into the vacuum. Now Talibanization was the issue, and it was a phenomenon on both sides of the Afghan border. It was characterized by "obscurantist views" including sanctions for barbers who shaved men's beards, and opposition to music and television. These Taliban elements were spreading through the Tribal Areas and into outside districts of Pakistan. 10. (C) Musharraf noted that one obstacle he faced was a religious government in the NWFP that turned a blind eye to Talibanization. Moreover, because the Chief Minister was with the opposition MMA, he had to work through the governor. He said he was "reasonably sure" the situation would be remedied in the next election because the MMA would be "wiped out." He was confident the government would ultimately succeed in countering Talibanization because only a small minority of the population shared the Taliban's extreme views (albeit a dominant minority). Pakistan was addressing the challenge of Talibanization with a four-pronged strategy, he ISLAMABAD 00006420 003 OF 003 explained: -- First, it was continuing military actions against terrorists and any Taliban clerics that were trying to run a government within a government, for example by requiring men to wear beards. -- Second, on the political side, Pakistan was opening up the Tribal Areas to "progressive political forces." Without putting anything in writing, he had given tacit permission to these political parties to "go in and do political work." --Third, he was working to correct the "administrative set-up." Currently the FATA Secretariat (which represents the Tribal Areas and reports to the Chief Minister of the Northwest Frontier Province) was "impotent." Moreover, the seven Political Agents (one for each Agency), who were supposed to be powerful and whose word used to be law, were not effective. The government wanted to get the best people for the job, whether out of the military or the bureaucracy, and equip them effective security forces (tribal levies). This would give Political Agents independent authority so they would not have to fall back on the army or Frontier Corps. Musharraf noted that one-time NWFP Chief Minister Sahibzada Imtiaz Ahmad was preparing a study on how to "reactivate" the Political Agents. -- Fourth, efforts were already underway to end the physical and economic isolation of the tribal areas by building infrastructure (including roads and irrigation systems), generating jobs and building schools. A "massive" construction effort was in the works; Pakistan had asked for $150 million per year in donor assistance, and would more than match that amount out of its own resources. U.S.-backed "Reconstruction Opportunity Zones" (ROZs) also had great potential to create jobs and economic opportunity. 11. (S) Musharraf said he hoped there would be equal efforts on the Afghan side of the border and complained that a perception had been created that Pakistan's government and its intelligence services were pursuing separate agendas. It was a perception he found "most annoying" and one that the Indian intelligence service was spreading in Afghanistan. Musharraf said he had documentary evidence that India was working through Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense and its intelligence service to undermine Afghan perceptions of Pakistan; he had shown the evidence to President Bush during the President's visit to Pakistan. India was also providing support and cash to "feudal tribals" who were making trouble in Balochistan. 12. (U) Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. CROCKER |