A/S BOUCHER DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005903 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 TAGS: PREL IN AF PK IR SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH PAKISTANI FM KASURI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY KHAN Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b. ¶1. (C) Summary. SCA Assistant Secretary Boucher reviewed a range of regional issues in separate April 4 discussions with Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri and Foreign Secretary Khan. Kasuri and Khan were optimistic on relations with India, taking heart from PM Singh's recent speech in Amritsar and the prospect of progress on Siachen and Sir Creek in advance of a possible visit by Singh in coming months. Khan emphasized the need for progress on the core issue of Kashmir. Kasuri and Khan underscored that Pakistan wanted stability in Afghanistan, but expressed frustration that Pakistan is criticized abroad for not doing enough against the Taliban while at home it is viewed as serving as an American stooge. On Iran, A/S Boucher underscored the need for the international community to stand together in pushing Iran to abide by its commitments. Khan agreed that Pakistan should do more to build relations with Central Asian states. A/S Secretary Boucher's discussions of the Strategic Dialogue and of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Initiative are reported in septels. End Summary. India/Kashmir -------------- ¶2. (C) Kasuri underscored that he was a believer in the Indo-Pak peace process, which Pakistan was pursuing out of self-interest. Settling Kashmir would remove a significant factor underlying Islamic extremism in the region and would help Pakistan achieve its objective of becoming a moderate, democratic Moslem state. ¶3. (C) There had already been significant progress on a number of fronts, Kasuri said, and there was "an even chance" the parties could resolve the longstanding disputes over Siachen and Sir Creek. Kasuri welcomed Indian PM Manmohan Singh's recent speech in Amritsar, especially his call for "practical and pragmatic" solutions -- words that Musharraf had also used. He noted that Musharraf was now interacting with a range of Kashmiri representatives -- including pro-Indian ones -- and that these Kashmiri voices were now putting pressure on India. He expected that PM Singh might visit Pakistan in coming months, possibly to finalize deals on Siachen and Sir Creek. ¶4. (C) A/S Boucher explained that as the U.S. looks to promote broad regional markets in central Asia, it views India as a destination. Kasuri responded that this was "no problem" -- Pakistan had crossed that bridge in the context of discussions over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Boucher also noted that the U.S. is seeking observer status in SAARC. ¶5. (C) A/S Boucher noted U.S. support for a strategic restraint regime between Pakistan and India. Kasuri agreed, saying that Pakistan had sought to include missiles in the talks, and remained ready for that. Pakistan favored strategic restraint, he said. ¶6. (C) A/S Boucher stressed that, the U.S. wanted to be helpful on Kashmir. President Bush had mentioned Kashmir in the U.S. prior to his visit as well as in India and in Pakistan. This was the moment to move forward: President Musharraf had advanced ideas, India was looking for "practical and pragmatic" approaches; Prime Minister Singh was interested in a soft border. ¶7. (C) Echoing Kasuri, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan said there had been significant progress with India in the Composite Dialogue, but not enough movement on the key issues, especially Kashmir. Trade with India was opening up as "negative lists" continued to shrink; however, even with lowered tariffs, Pakistan's most competitive exports had low profit margins and were priced out of the Indian market. ¶8. (C) Khan confirmed that there were differences with India over transit trade with Afghanistan. India wanted a land route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but it was an issue that needed to be looked at in an "overall perspective" ISLAMABAD 00005903 002 OF 003 taking into account the lack of progress on "the issues" (i.e., primarily Kashmir). Pakistan did allow one-way transit trade from Afghanistan to India, and on a case by case basis it had allowed some Indian humanitarian goods to transit to Afghanistan. ¶9. (C) Khan was encouraged by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's mention of "consultative mechanisms" in his Amritsar speech, but said there was limited progress on the ground. Pakistan had hoped for more freedom of movement across the Line of Control, and continued to hope for progress towards demilitarization of the area. It was important for the Kashmiris to see real change. Pakistan had hoped India would consider redeploying out of Kashmiri population centers; if it didn't work, Indian forces could always return. If India wanted symmetry, Pakistan would "thin out" troops and close camps on its side of the Line of Control. ¶10. (C) Khan said the ball was in India's court on Siachen. In his view, the dispute would be resolved if India could agree to a demilitarized zone on the glacier. The next step on Sir Creek was to conduct a joint survey once there was agreement on the extent of the area to be surveyed. Afghanistan -------------- ¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Kasuri complained that Pakistan was being criticized on all sides. The Afghans and the western press accused Pakistan of playing a "double game" and not really going after the Taliban. Pakistanis meanwhile accused their leaders of being U.S. stooges, taking and inflicting casualties needlessly. Kasuri asked that the United States make clear that in its assessment Pakistan is not playing a double game. ¶12. (C) A/S Boucher observed that while it might not be possible to satisfy the New York Times, both the Administration and Congress understood what Pakistan was doing and were strongly committed to the relationship. It was important that people in both countries understand that the U.S. and Pakistan were cooperating in a broad range of areas. The Administration had already been clear that no country has captured more Al Qaida or lost more people doing so than Pakistan. The public needed to understand that dangerous people were moving back and forth across the border, posing a threat to all parties, and that the solution was to help both countries work cooperatively to extend their control in the border region. In addition to words, however, both countries must take tangible steps to work together in the Tripartite Commission and other fora to advance common objectives, including customs administration, economic development and counter-narcotics. ¶13. (C) Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan stressed that Pakistan wanted stability in Afghanistan, but that the fragmentation among ethnic groups and regions created significant challenges. Afghan Pashtuns were "ruffled," though it helped that Karzai was Pashtun himself. Much was at stake for Pakistan, he explained, because while Afghanistan might have 10-13 million Pashtuns, Pakistan had 32 million, including many Afghan refugees. ¶14. (C) Speaking frankly, Riaz Khan said that Pakistan was tired of being told "do more, do more" to stabilize the region. It had already lost hundreds of troops. "What more do you want us to do? Strafe villages?" The tribal areas would not change overnight, he added, because extremism was a mindset. Pakistan was also eager to work with Afghanistan in combating narcotics, Khan said, suggesting that legalizing some poppy cultivation might help. A/S Boucher expressed caution about the legalization option, given Afghanistan's limited institutional capacity to execute a strictly limited program, but said he was encouraged that for the first time Afghanistan was implementing all the elements of its counternarcotics strategy, including eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihoods. ¶15. (C) As he had with Foreign Minister Kasuri, A/S Boucher ISLAMABAD 00005903 003 OF 003 noted that Afghanistan was interested in establishing a strategic level dialogue with Pakistan to address common problems in the border region -- as had Kasuri, Khan agreed. Central Asia -------------- ¶16. (C) Khan reported that he had been one of Pakistan's first Ambassadors in Central Asia, serving in Kazakhstan in ¶1992. At the time, turbulence in Afghanistan had been a physical barrier to relations and a political barrier, after Pakistan was "credited" with supporting the Taliban and other Islamic groups that were viewed with misgivings in Central Asia. There was clearly potential to expand relations given that Pakistan offered access to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan no longer had many students from Central Asia, Khan said, especially now that foreign madrassa students were being expelled. Khan agreed with A/S Boucher that Pakistan should consider offering scholarships to Central Asian students, and that there was much Pakistan could offer in terms of exposure to business, journalism, public policy, economic reform and a sense of democracy. Iran -------------- ¶17. (C) A/S Boucher told Khan that it was important for Iran to get the message that there is unity in the international community. Following the Security Council statement, Iran had 30 days to "rectify the problem;" it would be constructive if Pakistan could use any opportunity to underscore that message. Khan responded that Pakistan had been reminding Iran of its obligations, but Iran insisted that it was not weaponizing. A/S Boucher repeated that Iran had 30 days. Iran's behavior was "highly offensive" across the board, he added. It was violating its commitments, funding terrorists, opposing the Middle East peace process and interfering in Iraq. Iran needed to hear that it was time for them to honor commitments they had voluntarily taken on themselves. ¶18. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this message. CROCKER