YASIN MALIK TELLS KASHMIRI MILITANTS "GIVE PEACE A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 005767 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PREL PK PGOV PTER IN SUBJECT: YASIN MALIK TELLS KASHMIRI MILITANTS "GIVE PEACE A CHANCE" REF: ISLAMABAD 4386 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Introduction: Srinagar-based Kashmiri separatist leader Yasin Malik has told post that he has used his extended March-April 2006 visit to Pakistan to reach out to Kashmiri militant leaders, counseling them to lay down their arms and give the peace process a chance. In between highly-publicized addresses to the Pugwash Conference (March 7-8, Islamabad) (reftel),the World Social Forum (March 24-25, Karachi) and an International Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IIPCR) seminar of conflict resolution in Kashmir (April 3, Islamabad) and meetings with high-level Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials, Malik balanced his assessment that the time for armed struggle has ended with a call for India and Pakistan talk to the militants directly, giving them a role in the peace process. Malik's message, which coincided with rumors that the GOP is tightening the screws on the Kashmiri militants, may be gaining ground with key militancy leaders. End introduction. GOP Tightening the Purse Strings? -------------- ¶2. (S) Malik's early March arrival in Pakistan coincided with press reports and rumors circulating in Islamabad that the ISI had summoned the leaders of the Kashmiri militancy for a March 8 meeting in which the GOP thanked the militants for their struggle, but then told them to lay down their arms and give the bilateral peace process a chance. Several POL contacts confirmed that such a meeting occurred; the militant leaders responded to the orders to stand down and cuts in their GOP-subsidies by staging a ten-day protest, refusing to leave the safe house in which the March 8 meeting took place. Although the details varied, most accounts agreed on the basic message: that the time has come for the militants to stop the violence, to allow space for President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh to move forward with peace initiatives. ¶3. (S) Mohammed Rafiq Dar, Secretary General - Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF - Yasin Malik branch),offered the most detailed description of the meeting and its aftermath. Dar, who was shepherding Malik's visit to Pakistan, said that the confusion amongst the UJC leaders following the March 8 meeting created an opening for Malik to advocate a cease fire. For example, Dar said that Malik held several conversations with Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) leader Mohammed Yusuf Shah (aka "Salahuddin" or "Syed Salahuddin," a heavy-hitter in the UJC),who said that he found himself joining the strike simply out of comradeship, swept along as the other militants reacted impulsively to the GOP's message. HM: On Board, or Not? -------------- ¶4. (S) Malik and Dar told poloffs that subsequent conversations with the HM leader reinforcing the message to stop the violence and support the peace process led to Salaluddin's public statement, reported in the "Daily Times" on March 31, that "not only HM but the entire militant leadership would consider (a) truce if the Indian government acknowledges the disputed and tripartite nature of the Kashmir issue." Saying that the dialogue between New Delhi and the moderate All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leadership in recent months has so far failed, Salahuddin said that armed confrontation would automatically recede as serious dialogue process moves forward." (Note: The syntax of Salahuddin's remark suggesting that the militancy would naturally die off if only the militants were given a seat at the table indicates that it was lifted straight from Malik's talking points, which paraphrase Preseident Musharraf's own thinking. End note.) ¶5. (U) Two days later, the April 2 edition of the Daily Times reported on HM spokesperson deriding the peace process and the Kashmiri politicians (i.e., the APHC) who had joined ISLAMABAD 00005767 002 OF 002 it. The article quoted an HM press statement as saying that mujahideen would only encourage a dialogue process that focuses on Kashmiri self-determination. Interestingly, the article quoted complaints from an unnamed senior HM official that "for the past two or three years, they (the Pakistani government) have withdrawn all sorts of support from us and recently, we received messages that there should be no more cross border movement." ¶6. (S) Despite the back-sliding in the April 2 HM statement, during a brief exchange on the margins of the IIPCR seminar on April 3, Malik and Dar reaffirmed to poloff that Salahuddin is on board with the move toward a cease fire...and that he is in a position to help Malik bring other UJC leaders along. Comments -------------- ¶7. (S) As celebrated Kashmiris moderates like Malik and APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (who also stayed on for a week of public appearances and official meetings following the World Social Forum) have traveled across the LOC with some frequency in the past year, their dialogue with the Pakistani public has drawn out common threads: a call for all parties -- including the Kashmiri militants -- to renounce the use of violence; support for President Musharraf's initiatives for pursuing the peace process; and insistence that Kashmiri voices (including the militants) be included in the peace process. (Note: Malik advocated the "Nagaland model" as instructive in all of his conference presentations. End note.) Aside from these themes, however, what has been equally apparent to Pakistan observers is the failure of Kashmiri leaders to come to a consensus as to who speaks for Kashmir, who will get the seat at the table. For example, Malik's vision of a trilateral peace process is a far cry from ecumenical, including hard-core militants but excluding "pro-India" Kashmiris such as Omar Abdullah. ¶8. (S) Both Malik and Dar were eager to update poloffs on their campaign to promote the Kashmir peace process and build a constituency for Malik's vision of the way forward, with a trilateral dialogue that includes direct talks with Kashmir militants. They took pains to note that, when confronted with popular disappointment that the Kashmir dispute did not receive greater visibility during the recent POTUS visit, Malik defended President Bush's remarks calling for a resolution acceptable to all parties and endorsing the U.S. preference for "quiet diplomacy" as the right choice. Their openess with poloffs, and repeated endorsements of behind-the-scenes U.S. facilitation of the peace process, reflect in equal measure Malik's interest in building a constituency for his primacy amongst moderate Kashmiri leader and his efforts to persuade militants to give peace a chance. Malik and Dar have other reasons to cultivate USG support -- Malik plans to travel to New York in a few weeks for medical treatment; Dar continues to hope for a positive adjudication of his pending visa application so that he can accompany Malik on his trip. ¶9. (S) Malik's visit offered poloffs an unusual opportunity to assess GOP assurances of a clamp down on the Kashmiri militancy. Malik and Dar monitor the militants closely; their confirmation that Kashmiri militants are chafing under the GOP clamp down and that some militancy leaders are inclined to tow the line, is encouraging. The minimal public controversy surrounding Musharraf's Kashmir policy suggests that he has largely succeeded in changing the terms of reference. Whereas Pakistanis have historically seen the conflict as a matter of Pakistani's national claim to Kashmir, it is increasingly viewed here as a matter of Kashmiri rights. Recent visits by Malik, the Mirwaiz and even Omar Abdullah (who praised Musharraf's initiaves following the President's meeting with Pugwash participants) are reinforcing this new perspective. CROCKER