MFA SEEKS INFORMATION ON 1267 COMMITTEE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005070 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: EFIN ETTC PK PREL PTER KTFN SUBJECT: MFA SEEKS INFORMATION ON 1267 COMMITTEE DESIGNATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: On March 24, MFA Director Tasneem Aslam advised DCM that the GOP seeks "hard evidence" from the USG that could be used in domestic legal proceedings on the implemenation of terror financing sanctions against organizations designated by the UN 1267 Committee. Aslam claimed that the GOP has no/no information linking three organizations to terror activity or financing, and that it feared that it would be required by domestic courts to seek the organizations' delisting if it could not conclusively demonstrate that these organizations have engaged or supported terrorist activity. Aslam also asked that the U.S. identify the specific members -- "the worst cases" -- in these organzations, so that terror financing links could be severed by targeted criminal prosecution of those individuals directly involved, rather than by sanctions applied to institutions widely regarded as legitimate charities by the Pakistan public. End summary. ¶2. (S) On March 24, MFA Director General (UN and Policy Planing Directorate) Tasneem Aslam asked to meet Deputy Chief of Mission Peter W. Bodde to discuss the GOP's implementation of terror finance sanctions against organizations and individuals designated by the UN 1267 Committee. Assuring the DCM that the GOP "persistently applies" all 1267 sanctions, Aslam said that the government has particular concerns regarding three organizations: Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). (Note: Although Aslam referred several times to Jamaat-ud-Dawa as a 1267 Committee designee, she later corrected herself and noted that she was speaking in anticipation of a USG request in early April to amend the current Lashkar-e-Tayyba designation to include its charitable wing, JuD. End note.) Aslam raised two key issues: -- A request that the U.S. provide the GOP "hard evidence" that the GOP could use in domestic legal proceedings to defend its implementation of terror finance sanctions following a 1267 Committee designation; and -- A request that the U.S. identify specific individuals in these three organizations -- particularly JuD -- that it believes to be connected to terrorist activity, so that actions could be brought against these individuals rather than against the whole organization. ¶3. (S) Aslam explained the GOP request by citing the current case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in which the GOP appealed a Sindh High Court decision ordering the release of Al Rashid Trust funds that the GOP had frozen following the 1267 Committee designation. Aslam said that the GOP expects Al Akhtar Trust and JuD to eventually file similar court cases, which will shift the burden of proof of the organizations complicity with terrorist financing to the GOP. If the GOP loses the Al Rashid Trust and other future cases, it will have no choice but to formally request that the 1267 Committee de-list the designee. ¶4. (S) The GOP faces not only this legal burden, Aslam continued; the earthquake relief work done by JuD and Al Rashid Trust has earned them high public esteem. The GOP would be hard pressed to explain to the Pakistani people why it has imposed sanctions on these organizations unless it can publicly articulate the organizations' offenses...and back up its claims with verifiable evidence. The GOP has kept a tight rein on these militant organizations providing relief in the earthquake zone, preventing them from engaging in any fund-raising activity ¶5. (S) According to Aslam, the GOP received no/no information on the terror finance connections of Al Rashid Trust and Al Akhtar Trust at the time of their designation by the 1267 Committee, and it presently has no/no information linking either these two groups or JuD to terrorist activity. (Note: In addition to pressing Aslam on this assertion during the meeting, the DCM raised the issue again in a follow-up telephone call. Aslam remained firm that the GOP has no information tieing these three organizations to terrorist activity. End note.) ¶6. (S) Aslam then approached the designation issue from a different angle, beginning with an overview of the GOP's policy goal of persuading militant organizations to abandon the use of violence, followed by a program to "reintegrate" former militants back into society, as the GOP has done with detainees released from Guantanamo Bay. This effort is not well served by imposing terror financing sanctions on popular militant organizations (e.g., JuD),which are seen as serving ISLAMABAD 00005070 002 OF 003 local communities. Aslam requested that the U.S. identify to the GOP those individuals in JuD against whom it has evidence of terrorist connections and then share that evidence with the GOP for use in appropriate criminal proceedings. ¶7. (S) Throughout Aslam's presentation, DCM and poloff pressed for clarification of whether the GOP would continue to implement and enforce 1267 Committee sanctions, per Pakistan's international obligations. Aslam replied that the GOP must abide by the decisions of its domestic courts. When asked whether the GOP believed that a militant organization's participation in earthquake relief activities obviated terror finance offenses, Aslam replied that the GOP's present concern is one of due process for the designees: these organizations will use the legal protections available under Pakistani law to demand that the GOP defend it's implementation of terror finance sanctions. If the GOP cannot do that, the designees will have won both a judicial victory and the fight for public opinion. DCM telephoned Aslam after the meeting to underscore the U.S. position that Pakistan has an international obligation to implement and enforce all 1267 Committee sanctions against designated organizations, that the USG views these organizations as having taken advantage of the GOP's willingness to allow them to participate in earthquake relief operations to bolster their public image, expand their recruitment base and develop new sources of terrorist financing, and that the U.S. strongly urges that the GOP take all necessary action to end relief activities by sanctioned organizations. ¶8. (S) Comment: Post finds much of Aslam's presentation dubious, particularly her denial that the GOP has any information linking JuD (aka LeT, an organization that has been banned domestically in Pakistan since 2002) or the others to terror finance activity. Post requests that Department advise on the extent to which information on these organizations' terror finance links were/are available to the GOP through the 1267 Committee designation process. In the interim, Ambassador will raise U.S objections to the substance of Aslam's demarche when he next sees the Foreign Secretary. SIPDIS ¶9. (S) Text of the non-paper passed during Ms. Aslam's demarche are reproduced below: (Begin text.) Pakistan's commitment to fight terrorism, root and branch, needs no elaboration. We are fulfilling all our international obligations flowing from UNSC resolutions which recommend specific measures against Taliban and Al Qaida organizations particularly resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions to mprove the sanctions regime. The sanctions are imposed in accordance with domestic laws as the relevant resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter (Ref.SC Act of 1948). This, however, does not end the political and legal predicament the Government has to face while explaining the rationale behind imposing sanctions to domestic audience at least against some of the organizations such as Al Rashid Trust. Legal: because, in the absence of incontrovertible evidence, some people view sanctions as an attempt to give ascendency to executive over judiciary. Political: because, again unless proof is provided to public, they view sanctions as unjustified because of the participation of certain organizations such as Al Rashid and Jamat ud Dawa in good charity work. The case of Al Rashid Trust is pending in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. As the Government had appealed against the decision of the Sindh High Court to release the funds of the Trust, it would, in addition to certain other domestic legislations (UNSC Act 1948),need hard evidence against the Al Rashid Trust to plead its case. Use of UNSC Act alone may fulfill immediate legal requirement but seeking decision only on its basis may create legal and political complications mentioned earlier. We would, therefore, require credible evidence against Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Jamat-ud-Dawa for more ISLAMABAD 00005070 003 OF 003 effective actions against them. I would also like to explore the possibility of isolating, and, punishing only those criminal individuals (if they could be identified with evidence),who are using these organizations for terrorist activities instead of sanctioning whole organizations as per the current procedures of 1267 Committee. These organizations would be asked to purge themselves of all identified individuals (and sanction would be imposed on them),failing which the whole organization would be sanctioned. This would help us deal with political implications of the sanctions by maintaining transparency in the process. (End text.) CROCKER