Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD3804
2006-03-08 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

CARTOONS FAIL TO UNITE OPPOSITION

Tags:  PGOV KISL KDEM PK 
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RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0019
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3514
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0541
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1295
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 4713
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5906
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7710
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0692
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0649
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 2987
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 9908
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7866
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 3355
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5689
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003804 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2021
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM PK
SUBJECT: CARTOONS FAIL TO UNITE OPPOSITION

REF: ISLAMABAD 3022 AND PREVIOUS

ISLAMABAD 00003804 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003804 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2021 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM PK SUBJECT: CARTOONS FAIL TO UNITE OPPOSITION REF: ISLAMABAD 3022 AND PREVIOUS ISLAMABAD 00003804 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: For a brief moment, Pakistan's political opposition appeared poised to transform popular anger over the Danish cartoon issue into protests against the Musharraf government. In the end, however, self-interest and government inducements have combined to split the divergent parties within the political opposition, diffuse the issue, and eliminate any potential threat to the sitting government. The more moderate (and larger) secular and Islamist opposition parties, the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) refused to participate in the street tactics being advocated by their counterparts. Absent their participation, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan Muslim Leaque - Nawaz (PML-N) protest strategy appears unlikely to be losing momentum. End Summary. ¶2. (C) With anger over the Danish cartoons running high, JI sought to direct this anger against the Musharraf government. Through proxies and in concert with the local leadership of the PML-N, it was responsible for early (and sometimes violent) protests in which demands for Musharraf's immediate resignation were part and parcel of the uprising. JI convinced a skeptical PPP and JUI-F to participate in combined and individual party protests in Islamabad and Peshawar (the latter turning violent) and to frame the issue as a movement against their common enemy Musharraf. At the high point of such protests, JI leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed publicly promised that a street movement would oust Musharraf by March 23, Pakistan National Day. JI ruling council member Shahid Pervez told poloff that the party's strategy was to create a security situation such that the military would have to intervene, oust Musharraf, and install a popular caretaker government led by the political parties in advance of the 2007 elections. Large-scale, nationwide demonstrations to coincide with the President Bush's visit were the focal point of this strategy. ¶3. (C) The violence in Peshawar appears to have been the first breaking point within the opposition alliance. According to JUI-F Foreign Relations Committee Chair former Ambassador Mohammad Jalalud-Din, the JUI-F, which controls the NWFP provincial government and was an active proponent of the protests, appears to have been caught off-guard by the scale of the violence and the central government's and public's strong reaction against it. This, he claims, caused the JUI-F to reassess its strategy of supporting JI's street tactics. Jalalud-Din admitted that JUI-F's primary goal was to retain the government in NWFP and that subtle threats by the GOP had accompanied their urging of a JUI-F change in tactics. In addition, Jalalud-Din expressed doubt that a "security crisis" would result in military intervention to impose a civilian government. Martial law, in his view, was the more likely outcome. ¶4. (C) According to PPPP Chairman Makhdoom Amin Fahim, his party was never comfortable with the JI (and PML-N) protest strategy. He stressed that the PPPP had purposely avoided participation in the Lahore demonstrations and had given only tacit support to the Islamabad demonstrations. The party had organized its own protests in response to growing public condemnation of the cartoons and a need to burnish its "Islamic" credentials. Fahim admitted, however, that the PPPP did not believe protests were the best way to achieve democratic change. The PPPP ultimately broke with the JI on this issue after Benazir Bhutto personally instructed the party not to participate in protests against President Bush (septel). Fahim claimed that the party would instead attempt negotiations with the GOP on a national unity government and/or necessary changes to ensure free and fair elections in ¶2007. ¶5. (C) Comment: The Danish cartoon issue illustrates the ISLAMABAD 00003804 002.2 OF 002 difficulties that the opposition faces in building a true anti-Musharraf coalition. The smaller parties, JI and PML-N, believe that their interests lie in "embarassing" the Musharraf regime. With little stake in the current structure and minimal possibility of a deal with the GOP, neither is concerned about negative government reaction to their tactics. In contrast, the JUI-F (which holds the government in NWFP and is a coaltion partner in Balochistan) and the PPPP (which continues to believe that a deal with Musharraf is possible) are wary of undertaking any action that puts them too far at odds with Musharraf. For these reasons, we believe that a united opposition anti-Musharraf coalition will continue to exist in name only for the foreseeable future, posing minimal threat to the sitting government. CROCKER

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