FOREIGN MINISTER KASURI ON ANTI-PAKISTAN RHETORIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022618

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016
TAGS: AF MOPS PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER KASURI ON ANTI-PAKISTAN RHETORIC
AND PAK-AFG JIRGAS


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) During a December 22 meeting following his return
from Iran, Foreign Minister Kasuri speculated on the motives
behind the verbal offensive that Afghan President Karzai and
other senior Government of Afghanistan (GOA) officials
launched against Pakistan only days after the Foreign
Minister's December 7-9 visit to Kabul. FM Kasuri is
inclined to believe that Karzai wishes to abandon his
proposal for large national jirga and is now creating a media
storm designed to drive Pakistan away from President
Musharraf's commitment to parallel jirgas.


2. (C) Genuinely puzzled by Karzai's motivation in attacking
Pakistan, Kasuri wondered whether Karzai himself has a clear
vision of what he wants. Indeed, after Karzai's December
anti-Pakistan press campaign, Kasuri has begun to wonder
whether Karzai has realized that the broad national jirga is
not such a good idea after all; perhaps Karzai's rhetorical
attacks on Pakistan are intended to drive Islamabad away from
the September 27 agreement to hold the jirgas, Kasuri mused.
If Karzai does want these jirgas, Kasuri argued, why would he
be attacking Pakistan rather than soliciting our support?
Kasuri returned to this theme several times in the course of
the conversation, asking whether Washington had analyzed
whether Karzai is actually seeking a way out from the jirga
commitment. Kasuri considered alternative explanations for
the barrage of anti-Pakistani rhetoric, suggesting that
perhaps the Iranians, Russians or Indians were goading Karzai
into this unseemly screed. (Note: Although Kasuri did not
name the USG as another possible source of anti-Pakistan
rhetoric, GOP officials have advised the Ambassador that many
senior Pakistan leaders subscribe to that theory. End note.)


3. (C) Describing the toll that the cross-border rhetoric
takes on Pakistani public opinion, FM Kasuri asked that the
U.S. tell Karzai to stop the public attacks. The Ambassador
replied that U.S. officials have already counseled President
Karzai to desist from further anti-Pakistan remarks.


4. (C) Kasuri told the Ambassador that he has instructed his
staff to prepare a memo for President Musharraf recommending
that the GOP accept Karzai's vision of a expansive national
jirga, if that is what it takes to keep Karzai happy. Of
course, Kasuri continued, if Karzai does not stop the
rhetoric, Musharraf will reject the MFA recommendation out of
hand. Kasuri underscored the bottom line: Karzai needs to
stop bashing Pakistan so that the GOP can help him succeed.


5. (C) Kasuri reviewed the GOP's understanding of what
exactly was agreed upon at the September 27 White House
Iftar, downplaying the different visions in Islamabad and
Kabul of the shape and dimensions of the Pak-Afghan jirga.
President Musharraf and his advisers are confident that
Presidents Bush and Karzai fully understood what Musharraf
envisioned during the September 27 discussion, noting that
President Bush had questioned Governor Orakzai as to what the
North Waziristan Agency jirga entailed; Secretary Rice had
done the same with Chief Minister Durrani. Kasuri said that
there is no reason to think that Karzai was confused about
what Musharraf meant when he agreed to replicate the jirga on
the other side of the border in order to solicit tribal
support against the Taliban. Although indicating a
willingness to go along with Karzai's current proposal for an
expansive, national event, Kashuri noted his reservations: a
national jirga may respond to Karzai's need to reaffirm broad
national support for his government, but will do little to

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address Pashtun concerns or solve security issues along the
border.



CROCKER