FM KASURI DESCRIBES VISIT TO DECEMBER VISIT TO IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022617



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NOFORN

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016

TAGS: AF, IR, PK, PREL

SUBJECT: FM KASURI DESCRIBES VISIT TO DECEMBER VISIT TO IRAN



Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) Summary: Fresh off his plane from Tehran, Foreign

Minister Kasuri briefed the Ambassador on December 22

regarding his conversations with President Ahmedinejad, FM

Muttaki, former President Rafsanjani, IPI pipeline negotiator

Larijani and others. Kasuri reported that, despite serious

misperceptions in Tehran's understanding of U.S. policy

regarding Iran's nuclear program, Iranian leaders want to

continue the dialogue with the U.S. and EU. Tehran shares

Pakistani and American concerns regarding the resurgence of

the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Sensitive to the

potential for Iraq's sectarian violence to seep throughout

the region, the Foreign Minister cautioned his Iranian

interlocutors not to fuel the Shi'a-Sunni violence in Iraq.

End summary.



The Nuclear Issue

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2. (C) Although the MFA had publicly described the Foreign

Minister's visit to Iran as centering on the

Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Kasuri told the Ambassador that

he discussed a number of other topics, such as nuclear

policy, Lebanon and Iraq. Over the past three years, Kasuri

recalled, he has made it his mission to persuade Tehran not

to provoke a conflict over Iran's nuclear program and thus

endangering regional -- and Pakistan's domestic -- security.



3. (C) When Kasuri specifically asked Larijani why the

nuclear issue has not been resolved, the Iranian complained

of "bad air" (i.e., bad vibes) coming from Washington. We

negotiated with them, Larijani said, only to have them refer

the matter to the Security Council. According to Larijani,

EU negotiator Javier Solana has been pleased with the

progress of the negotiations, but confided that the U.S. had

not. (Note: Kasuri asked the Ambassador why Solana had

speculated that the U.S. was holding out for a global

settlement, as reported by Larijani. The Ambassador replied

that it was Iran, not the U.S., that sought to leverage the

nuclear issue to force a global dialogue, one the U.S. sees

no utility in pursuing, given Iranian unhelpfulness in

Lebanon, Iraq, etc. End note.)



4. (C) Kasuri left Tehran believing that the Iranians want

to resolve the nuclear dispute through dialogue (although he

admitted that none would say this outright until he had

pushed the point),but that the Iranian leadership has

dangerously misread U.S. policy. We do not understand their

logic, Larijani complained: The U.S. wants our help on

Afghanistan and Iraq, but then treats us badly in the nuclear

talks. We've analyzed this, he continued: the U.S. can do

nothing to us, given its present difficulties. If they take

action against us, the IAEA inspectors will be kicked out and

the whole nuclear program will go underground. If they make

us suffer, we will make them suffer. Kasuri said that he

repeatedly urged the Iranians not/not to take precipitous

action based on mistaken interpretation of American

intentions or capabilities.



5. (C) Kasuri ported that his Iranian interlocutors were

closely following the public debate surrounding the Iraq

Study Group recommendations. Kasuri counseled the Iranians

that there is a multiplicity of opinions about Iran in the

U.S., but as the Administration has not ruled out the use of

force, Tehran should abandon any strategy based on

brinksmanship. The Ambassador suggested that that the

Iranians know exactly who speaks for the Administration and



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were simply trying to confuse the issue by citing unofficial

voices involved in the public debate.



Afghanistan

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6. (C) Tehran is also worried about the Taliban, Kasuri

said, noting that he has delivered the same talking points in

Tehran as he had in Kabul -- that Pakistan has no/no interest

in seeing the return of Taliban rule. The Iranians appeared

to appreciate the GOP position, praising President

Musharraf's "progressive" leadership. Without pressing for

Pakistan to "do more," Tehran encouraged greater cooperation

between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kasuri concluded

that he perceived no daylight between the Iranian and U.S.

positions on Afghanistan.



Iraq

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7. (C) On Iraq, Kasuri found that the Iranian blamed the

U.S. for the present Shi'a- Sunni schism, while proclaiming

that Tehran supported "progressive" forces -- both Shi'a and

Sunni -- in the Islamic world. Without assigning blame for

the Shi'a-Sunni split, Kasuri responded by warning that Iran

will not come out a winner if it fuels the sectarian

conflict. When the Iranians stressed their support for full

implementation of the Constitution in both Iraq as the first

step to stability, Kasuri (a pragmatic pol at heart)

countered by pressing Tehran to use its influence to press

for a more Sunni-friendly revenue sharing scheme.



Comment

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8. (C) In a closing remark, Kasuri observed that the

Iranians should enter negotiations with the U.S. with a

degree of gratitude, as the U.S. has eliminated enemy regimes

in Iran's two largest neighbors. That said, Kasuri remains

visibly troubled that Tehran does not fully appreciate the

risks it runs in testing U.S. patience on the nuclear program

or in fostering the Shi'a-Sunni conflict in Iraq.





CROCKER