Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD22385
2006-12-09 04:13:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
FIGHTING GWOT: IMPROVING FMF, FMS, AND OTHER
how-toVZCZCXRO0911 PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #2385 3430413 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 090413Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5491 INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9720 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3897 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0887 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1794 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6559 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4749 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9824 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1030 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2243 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3754 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0779 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9002 RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1556 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 022385
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016
TAGS: AF MASS MOPS PK PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: FIGHTING GWOT: IMPROVING FMF, FMS, AND OTHER
MILITARY SUPPORT PROGRAMS TO PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 022385
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016
TAGS: AF MASS MOPS PK PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: FIGHTING GWOT: IMPROVING FMF, FMS, AND OTHER
MILITARY SUPPORT PROGRAMS TO PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) As we enter the sixth year of this long war, it is
increasingly clear that our Foreign Military Funding/Foreign
Military Sales (FMF/FMS) programs, unchanged since 9/11, are
not suited to the needs of GWOT allies like Pakistan.
Difficulties we have encountered with some security
assistance programs have become strategic problems for us and
for the Pakistani Military.
2. (S) We appreciate the recent high-level attention
devoted to ensuring delivery of 20 Excess Defense Article
Cobras that the U.S. agreed to transfer to Pakistan in
February 2004. However, the delays in the refurbishment
process have come at a significant cost. The Pakistani Army
needs enhanced rotary wing aircraft capacity to patrol its
border with Afghanistan and to destroy al Qaida and
anti-Coalition militia targets, and the problems with the
Cobra program have harmed their ability to do this.
Additionally, the delays have diminished Pakistan's
confidence in the FMS program, as have delays in delivering
six used C-130s for which the Pakistanis signed a Letter of
Agreement with LOCKHEED Martin in August, 2003.
3. (S) We encourage State and DoD to continue efforts to
develop more streamlined, responsive and flexible military
assistance programs that can fulfill urgent taskings related
to the War on Terror. From our vantage point, security
assistance programs should set appropriate priorities for
coalition partners and then provide necessary resources
quickly. Capacity-building programs should be rigorously
managed with "best practices" in mind. Additionally, the
defense trade control process, while clearly necessary, needs
to be more efficient. Six-month delays during the Cold War
were merely annoying; today, they can carry a heavy cost.
4. (S) We thank State and DoD for their continued
assistance as we try creatively and expeditiously to assist
Pakistan in defeating our common enemies.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016
TAGS: AF MASS MOPS PK PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: FIGHTING GWOT: IMPROVING FMF, FMS, AND OTHER
MILITARY SUPPORT PROGRAMS TO PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) As we enter the sixth year of this long war, it is
increasingly clear that our Foreign Military Funding/Foreign
Military Sales (FMF/FMS) programs, unchanged since 9/11, are
not suited to the needs of GWOT allies like Pakistan.
Difficulties we have encountered with some security
assistance programs have become strategic problems for us and
for the Pakistani Military.
2. (S) We appreciate the recent high-level attention
devoted to ensuring delivery of 20 Excess Defense Article
Cobras that the U.S. agreed to transfer to Pakistan in
February 2004. However, the delays in the refurbishment
process have come at a significant cost. The Pakistani Army
needs enhanced rotary wing aircraft capacity to patrol its
border with Afghanistan and to destroy al Qaida and
anti-Coalition militia targets, and the problems with the
Cobra program have harmed their ability to do this.
Additionally, the delays have diminished Pakistan's
confidence in the FMS program, as have delays in delivering
six used C-130s for which the Pakistanis signed a Letter of
Agreement with LOCKHEED Martin in August, 2003.
3. (S) We encourage State and DoD to continue efforts to
develop more streamlined, responsive and flexible military
assistance programs that can fulfill urgent taskings related
to the War on Terror. From our vantage point, security
assistance programs should set appropriate priorities for
coalition partners and then provide necessary resources
quickly. Capacity-building programs should be rigorously
managed with "best practices" in mind. Additionally, the
defense trade control process, while clearly necessary, needs
to be more efficient. Six-month delays during the Cold War
were merely annoying; today, they can carry a heavy cost.
4. (S) We thank State and DoD for their continued
assistance as we try creatively and expeditiously to assist
Pakistan in defeating our common enemies.
CROCKER