FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022178 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2016 TAGS: AF IN PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 13-14 COMPOSITE DIALOGUE REF: NEW DELHI 7954 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a November 17 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan was positive about the tone of the November 13-14 Composite Dialogue talks, saying that the atmosphere was business-like with no "excessive restating of positions." The effort focused on exploring areas for progress. Khan said that the outcome was largely what he had anticipated, with some positive movement. Despite this modest progress, ForSec Khan said that it is increasingly difficult for GOP officials to persuade the Pakistani public that the Composite Dialogue process is solving any significant dispute between the two capitals. We need to solve some issue, Khan said, or we will not be able to convince the public that the process is worthwhile. Khan reported that he had a pleasant 40-minute meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Mukerjee, but that the conversation was little more than a set piece, with each side stating long-held positions. End summary. ¶2. (C) Counterterrorism (CT) Mechanism: Khan said that the GOP understood the domestic pressures facing their Indian counterparts on terrorism, and agreed that establishing a CT Mechanism is necessary to insulate the peace process. He said that he told ForSec Menon directly that Pakistan cannot prevent terror attacks in Pakistan and certainly cannot guarantee against terror attacks on Indian territory. Khan said that the Indian side passed some information regarding the 2005 bombing in New Delhi and 2006 Varanassi bombings, but that these consisted of the statements of detainees suspects who are not Pakistani national who have indirect links to Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT). The MFA has passed this information to the appropriate security services for investigation. Khan stressed to the Ambassador that the CT Mechanism must be forward-looking to prevent future terror events, similar to the partnership that Pakistan has developed with the UK. If the parties use the CT mechanism to blame each other, it will do nothing to improve security or bilateral relations. Both governments are facing serious CT challenges and must be serious about this cooperative endeavor. (Note: When the Ambassador asked whether the Indian delegation had a detailed sense of CT actions undertaken by the GOP in the past year, Khan said that he was not sure. I did not feel comfortable raising the issue, he said, as it would have led to a discussion of India's internal challenges from domestic extremism -- too sensitive a topic to address after the pause in the dialogue. End note.) ¶3. (C) Kashmir: ForSec Khan indicated that there had been some exchange on Kashmir, but that each side had been careful not to step on issues under review in back-channel discussions. Aside from exchanging stock positions (Pakistan pressing for demilitarization in Jammu & Kashmir, with India responding that violence in the region must first be reduced),the most significant point of agreement was a common recognition that each side must work to streamline bureaucratic hurdles that impair existing confidence-building measures (CBMs),such as the cross-LOC bus route. ¶4. (C) Sir Creek: ForSec Khan detected some Indian willingness to move forward on Sir Creek, a reflection of the looming deadline to submit maritime claims under the UN Law of the Sea Convention. If India is ready, Khan said, so is Pakistan, noting that a November 23-25 bilateral meeting of technical experts could reach a resolution. ¶5. (C) Siachen Glacier: Khan expressed some disappointment in the discussions on Siachen, wondering whether the Indian military's reluctance to withdraw from the Glacier is because ISLAMABAD 00022178 002 OF 002 it is comfortable in with its current situation or instead reflects genuine fears. If the latter, we can address it through a dialogue between the Army Chiefs of General Staff. Khan reviewed the two sides' positions -- that India wants to authenticate current positions, so it would have a demarcated map should Pakistan attempt to re-occupy posts following a withdrawal; that Pakistan has proposed a zone of disengagement which incorporates a statement of current positions and a schedule for withdrawal into the agreement. Khan says that the Indian Foreign Office is amenable, but that there is palpable opposition in the Indian defense establishment. Khan emphasized that Pakistan cannot accept demarcation of current positions as the first step of an agreement, as this would confer tacit acceptance of Indian-egress on disputed territory; current positions must be incorporated as part of a complete package and schedule for withdrawal. Khan said that ForSec Menon agreed to revisit this issue. Khan told the Ambassador that, dueling press headlines to the contrary, Siachen cannot be resolved in a day, as a series of CGS-level military meetings are needed to resolve technical issues related to demarcation and withdrawal. (Note: Khan has wanted to explore allowing international trekking and research expeditions to travel to the zone of engagement, a CBM that had caught his fancy, but had been discouraged from raising the concept as it is allegedly anathema to the Indian defense establishment. End note.) ¶6. (C) SAFTA and Trade: Khan said that detailed discussions on SAFTA could be discussed by Commerce Ministers at SAARC. Khan did share with the Indian delegation GOP concerns about non-tarrif barriers, which keep Pakistani products -- particularly textiles -- out of Indian markets. ¶7. (C) Comment: During his November 26-28 personal visit to New Delhi, Foreign Minister Kasuri hopes to build on improved atmosphere that the Foreign Secretary reported at the Composite Dialogue talks. Although the stated purpose of Kasuri's travel is to attend the wedding of the daughter of Union Minister Mani Shankar Ayer on November 27, Kasuri is reported to be joining Foreign Minister Mukerjee for lunch earlier that day for an informal review of bilateral relations and progress in the Composite Dialogue. This will be Kasuri's first meeting with Mukerjee since the latter assumed the External Affairs portfolio. The local press is already speculating that FM Mukerjee will visit Pakistan in mid-January, followed by the long-awaited visit by PM Manmohan Singh in late February or early March. CROCKER