ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S NOVEMBER 6 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 021946 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2016 TAGS: AF EAID ECON ENRG ETRD MNUC PARM PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S NOVEMBER 6 MEETING WITH PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY KHAN REF: STATE 182262 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 6, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan. The two discussed the upcoming strategic dialogue, including the status of dialogues on energy, education, and science and technology. Boucher previewed the U.S. study on Regional Opportunity Zones and assured our support for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas development plan and for the Frontier Corps. Khan expressed his expectations for the upcoming composite dialogue discussions with India and his thoughts on the jirga process agreed to by Presidents Karzai and Musharraf. Finally, Boucher noted again our disappointment in Paksitan's recent meeting with the Nuclear Suppliers Group; Khan was unrepentant. End Summary ¶2. (U) On November 6, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher called on Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan of Pakistan. U.S. participants SIPDIS included Ambassador Crocker, SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden, and notetaker. Pakistan participants included Additional Secretary (Americas) Shahid Kamal and Director General (Americas) Sohail Mahmood. ¶3. (C) A/S Boucher and Foreign Secretary Khan opened with a tour d'horizon of key issues, most of which are part of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. Khan stressed that, while the strategic dialogue had generated many good ideas, implementation should now be the priority. --Economic Dialogue: Khan was concerned that, if Pakistan signed the Bilateral Investment Treaty, the treaty's terms would "ipso facto" become applicable to the 40 other nations with whom they had treaties containing Most Favored Nations clauses. He noted that including the Bilateral Investment Treaty in a free trade agreement would be more politically palatable in Pakistan. Boucher replied that the U.S. had the opposite problem: an investment treaty would be relatively uncontroversial, a Free Trade Agreement more complicated. He added that the draft Pakistan treaty used standard language and that creating special language for Pakistan was not possible. --Regional Opportunity Zones: Kahn said he was looking forward to receiving a briefing on the study of the zones. Boucher replied that the study was substantially finished and was being circulated to various agencies in Washington. The report would look at a broad range of products that could be produced in the zones and at likely locations for the industrial areas. Defining the economic regulations surrounding the zones would be an important step. --Assistance to Frontier Corps and Levies (tribal police): Khan said Pakistan was hoping to raise $300 million to hire and equip more Levies and Frontier Corps troops. Improving capacity in these forces was important for both the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and for Balochistan. Khan noted that enlarging the two groups, besides enhancing security, would provide immediate economic benefits to the areas, as employment and income would increase. Boucher replied that the U.S. military was working with Pakistan military to assess Frontier Corps capacities and challenges and would develop a plan based on that study. He added U.S. officials desired to help the corps improve its capabilities. --Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development: Khan noted that the GOP was looking at a Federally Administered Tribal Areas development plan that would cost about USD 150 million per year for five years. He described Federally Administered Tribal Areas residents as "living in a time ISLAMABAD 00021946 002 OF 004 warp" that made them susceptible to many negative influences. Boosting development and living standards in the area was the only way to provide an alternative to those influences. Boucher said the U.S. was working with Pakistan on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas development plan and was assembling a funding package. While he still could not provide specific monetary figures, he noted he was looking for a variety of funding sources. He added he was encouraging other countries to assist with the effort and was "talking it up" on his travels. Ambassador Crocker commended the previous week's Federally Administered Tribal Areas conference as an effective way of "getting the word out." He said it had been particularly impressive that representatives from all the tribal agencies had attended. --Science and Technology: Khan noted that training and scholarships were key. He said that Pakistan had announced a plan to build a series of new universities to enhance education around the country. He anticipated about 1/3 of the higher education budget would be devoted to these new universities, while 2/3 would go toward improving existing higher education centers. Boucher agreed education must be a prime area of cooperation. The U.S. was investing $100 million per year in Pakistan's education system and the Pakistan Fulbright program was the largest in the world. That said, the U.S. wanted to concentrate on existing exchange programs rather than begin new ones. Boucher also noted the importance of not taking money from primary and secondary schools in order to build new universities. --Energy: Pakistan was interested in obtaining clean coal technology as well as renewable energy technology. Boucher noted that the Energy Efficiency and Fossil Fuel bilateral groups would be meeting soon and could discuss these issues. --Other topics: Boucher noted the Embassy had delivered a draft Status of Forces Agreement text earlier in the day and that the U.S. looked forward to working toward an approved agreement for Pakistan. -------------- Pak-Afghan Relations -------------- ¶3. (C) Khan reported that Pakistan was still developing goals for the parallel jirgas agreed to at the September 27 trilateral meeting of President Bush, President Musharraf and President Karzai. He stressed that the jirgas should be effective, "not just a spectacles." The question facing jirga planners was how to use the meetings to reduce violence in Afghanistan. To do that, the jirgas needed to involve "people who mattered locally." Khan said he would begin working on these questions in about a week, when the Foreign Ministry began preparing for Foreign Minister Spanta's visit to Islamabad in early December. Boucher responded that, in addition to the to foreign ministers' meeting to discuss the jirgas, Pashtun organizers also needed to meet to plan the way forward. The sooner Governor Orakzai began working with his Afghan counterpart, the better. ¶4. (C) Khan said that President Musharraf was moving forward on his plan to fence the border and close refugee camps. The President believed both actions would improve security in Afghanistan. Khan also stressed the need for "real time" intelligence sharing with Afghanistan. "We have cooperated when given the chance," he noted. Boucher noted that the U.S. military was not convinced a border fence would be all that effective, given the particulars of the Pak-Afghan border. ¶5. (C) Khan assessed that problems in Afghanistan revolved around failure to achieve reconciliation between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns since the end of the civil war. He said the ISLAMABAD 00021946 003 OF 004 reconstruction effort's failure to help many Afghans also encouraged violence and lawlessness. Corruption, gun running, the narcotics trade, and the government's failure to reign in warlords made Afghans pessimistic about their futures. People would not support a government that was not helping them, and there were limits to what Pakistan could do to solve Afghanistan's problems. ¶6. (C) Boucher noted that some problems facing Pakistan and Afghanistan were similar. Both countries were attempting to extend government influence to the border. The U.S. was working with the Karzai government to bring benefits of government, such as police, justice, and development, to Afghanistan's border areas. We would continue working with Pakistan to counter Taliban influence in its border areas. -------------- Pak-India -------------- ¶7. (C) Foreign Secretary Khan was visiting India later in the week to work on resuming the Composite Dialogue. He said both countries needed to acknowledge they had terrorism problems and needed to share intelligence. He said the accusations of Pakistani intelligence involvement in the Mumbai bombing had sparked resentment in Pakistan, but that Pakistan was still pushing forward on sharing intelligence and had engaged in preliminary talks with India on the matter. ¶8. (C) Khan reported he was working on scheduling a date for a visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan. He said India was insisting in firm deliverables first, where as Pakistan believed that committing to a meeting was the important first step. Pakistan was also working on resolving the Siachen Glacier dispute. Boucher asked why India was resisting withdrawal. Khan believed India did not wish to set a precedent of being willing to roll back from areas under their control. He added that those in Pakistan who were pressing to regain forward momentum on talks with India were criticized as unrealistically optimistic, since "India hasn't resolved any boundary problems with any neighbors. Bangladesh has 56 rivers in dispute." Nevertheless, Khan was sure elements in the Indian establishment favored engagement with Pakistan and that those same Indians believed that progress on demilitarization would bring great benefits "down the line." Khan added that the process of confidence building would soon not be enough -- real progress was needed. "Progress is the best kind of confidence builder," he noted. Boucher recommended that Pakistan raise issues it could reasonably expect the other side to act on. He added that the U.S. was encouraging India to work toward progress on Siachen and Kashmir. ¶9. (C) Khan reviewed the list of cross-border trade concerns. He said formal trade between India and Pakistan over the last two years had increased fromUSD 200 million to 800 million annually, mostly to the benefit of India. India's composite tariffs, which disproportionately affected low-priced goods, limited Pakistan's competitiveness. India's container regulations were also hurting Pakistan's export levels. Khan then admitted that, while India was allowed to export to Afghanistan via Karachi port, Pakistan was not allowing overland trade from India into Afghanistan. ¶10. (C) Boucher explained that the U.S. thought opportunities for cross-border trade throughout South and Central Asia were significant. Exporting hydro-electricity from Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan was one example of trade ties that could benefit many countries. In order to increase regional trade, though, many countries needed to rationalize regulations on phyto-sanitary standards, drivers' licenses, and customs procedures. Khan ISLAMABAD 00021946 004 OF 004 added that, in Afghanistan, security on transport routes was key. He said the global community needed to utilize the entire South Asian market in a way to encourage stability in Afghanistan. -------------- Civil Nuclear Issues -------------- ¶11. (C) Khan reported he had received Under Secretary Burns' letter concerning the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna and would respond. Boucher said that the U.S. needed Pakistan's help on the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, and that Pakistan's demands for a criteria based system were hurting our efforts. Khan explained that his statements to the Nuclear Suppliers Group has stressed Pakistan's interest in access to nuclear power technology under any and all types of safeguards. Pakistan's requests were not meant to attack the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement but were designed with the interests of Pakistan in mind. Pakistan wanted a criteria-based decision making process for access to nuclear power generation. Boucher replied that Khan was aware of the U.S. position, as explained in the letter from Under Secretary Burns (Reftel). ¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with SCA - Caitlin Hayden. CROCKER