PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH BORDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 021879 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: AF EAID ECON ETRD IN MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH BORDER AREAS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: In a November 7 meeting at his Army HQ office, President Musharraf told Asstsant Secretary Boucher that he would propose selective mining of the border with Afghanistan. Saying that it is too early to judge whether the North Waziristan jirga agreement is a success, the President reaffirmed the government's determination to restore stability, halt creeping "talibanization" and cut-off cross-border support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. Although supportive of the concept of coordinated jirgas with Afghanistan, he expressed frustration with President Karzai's advocacy for a broad-based national gathering rather than proceeding with event narrowly focused on the Pashtun tribal lands along the Pak-Afghan border. Musharraf also noted personal irritation that Karzai has not been proactive in repatriating fugitive Balochi militant leader who the Government of Pakistan asserts has safe haven in Kandahar. The President believes that Pakistan and India have come to agreement on texts resolving the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek disputes, but that the Indian side is not willing to move forward. Looking toward the mid-November Composite Dialogue talks in New Delhi, the President indicated that Pakistan expects the new counterterrorism mechanism to serve both Indian and Pakistani needs. President Musharraf pressed for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and was surprised to hear that negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty have stalled. End summary. FATA and Border Strategy -------------- ¶2. (S) When asked for his assessment of the situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the President opened by saying that it is still too soon to judge whether the North Waziristan Agency jirga agreement is working. We know that cross-border insurgency continues, he offered as an example, and that "talibanization" is continuing in the agency. Despite challenges in implementing the agreement, Musharraf said that the North West Frontier Province Governor and his political agents must persevere, backing up the government's insistence that all sides live up to their obligations with force if necessary. Power must be restored to the civil and tribal authorities (the political agents and maliks); the Governor has the Frontier Corps and levies at his disposal to ensure that this happens. We need to give it more time, he concluded. ¶3. (S) The President characterized the October 30 air strike against a madrassa-cum-militant training camp as a good and necessary operation, even if it has prompted public outcry and media criticism. The President sighed that the media consistently misses the point that a serious terrorist threat has been neutalized. Assistant Secretary Boucher commended the Bajaur operation as a strong signal that Pakistan is willing to take military action against militant camps, a lesson that will not be lost on Taliban and other extremist elements elsewhere in Pakistan. Musharraf agreed, saying that Governor Orakzai emphasized the point by sending a post-strike message to militants underscoring that the government will strike training camps and support facilities whenever they are discovered. The President also took heart from the declaration of Bajaur tribal leaders in the days before the strike that they too wanted to enter into a North Waziristan-type agreement; it shows that many tribal members are tired of the instability and trouble that these militants have brought to their regions, Musharraf concluded. ¶4. (S) The President said that, at his meeting with the Army Corps commandes later in the day, he intended to raise the prospect of mining areas along the border to interdict cross-border traffic by anti-Coalition militants. This is a sensitive issue, as it would interfere with traditional tribal easement rights, but one that the President indicated ISLAMABAD 00021879 002 OF 003 was necessary. Selective mining would help to channel cross-border traffic to lawful monitored crossing points. Both Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Crocker stressed the need to ensure that minefields were properly monitored to prevent resourceful enemy agents from digging up the mines and deploying them against Pakistani, Afghan and Coalition forces. ¶5. (C) Boucher briefed the President on developments in Washington since his September meetings with President Bush and other Administration leaders. The State Department and other agencies have been working to identify funding to support the government's strategy for the tribal areas; although final numbers are not yet available, Boucher assured the President that our support would be substantial. Describing the findings of a feasibility study on Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, Boucher noted that a variety of potential products had been identified. President Musharraf asked about the potential for developing new industries in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and acknowledged that the legislative adjustments to tarriff rates give the zones concept a mid-term time horizon. Jirgas and Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) President Musharraf said that the jirgas proposed at the September 27 trilateral dinner with Presidents Bush and Karzai are a good idea, but that Karzai is diluting their value by trying to pull everybody into the tent. Why should Punjabis, Sindhis and Pahshiris be involved in a traditional Pashtun gathering intended to resolve security threats in the border regions, Musharraf asked. Musharraf described his vision for these jirgas as instruments to bring peace to the people in the border areas, by soliciting tribal support against extremism and militancy. We need these cooperative tribal leaders to guide us as we combat the Taliban and their doctrines, he said. Boucher assured Musharraf that President Karzai shared the same core goals, but proposed expanded participation in order to give the tribal leaders the support of the rest of Afghan nation. Confirming that the President has tasked Governor Orakzai to coordinate a Pakistan jirga, Boucher encouraged am early coordination meeting between Orakzai and his to-be-named Afghan counterpart soon, before Foreign Minister Kasuri and Foreign Minister Spanta meet in December. He also reiterated Secretary Rice's offer of U.S. support, saying that Washington would look to Kabul and Islamabad for guidance on how the U.S. could best be helpful. ¶7. (S) Musharraf then shifted the discussion to what he described as a particular irritant in his relations with President Karzai. Musharraf said that, some weeks ago, he has sent and Inter-Sevices Intelligence brigadier to Kabul with specific information on the location of Baloch militant Brahamdagh Bugti, who has absconded to Kandahar and is now in Kabul; similar information had simultaneously been conveyed through diplomatic channels. (Note: Brahamdagh is the grandson of Balochi sardar Nawb Akbar Bugtu , who was killed by the Pakistani military in August. End note.) In a telephone call two weeks later, President Karzai professed ignorance of the Pakistani request to repatriate Bugti. Musharraf said that he told Karzai that either the Afghan intelligence chief was withholding information from the President or Karzai simply did not have the will to act on the Pakistani information. As Musharraf warmed to his topic, he alluded to Indian support to the rebellious Bugti tribe, blaming both the Bugtis and Indian intelligence agencies for a recent series of fatal bombings in Quetta and telling Boucher that he has sigint to prove Indian complicity. Musharraf accused India of deploying intelligence resources from its Afghan consulates and reconstruction projects. India needs to be told to stop these activities immediately, Musharraf said, or else Pakistan will be forced to take counter-measures. (Note: ISLAMABAD 00021879 003 OF 003 Musharraf said that the Director General - Inter-Services Intelligence will raise this issues in his Washington meetings this week, End note.) Boucher noted that the U.S. felt that India has a role to play in Afghanistan's reconstruction, but that its activities in Afghanistan must be limited to reconstruction and humanitarian relief. India -------------- ¶8. (C) President Musharraf said that Pakistan would raise its concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan and Balochistan when the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries meet in New Delhi next week for the Composite Dialogue. Commenting on the counterterrorism mechanism that he and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had endorsed in September, Musharraf said that Pakistan is sincere in its offer to assist India's investigation of the July Mumbai train bombing. The counterrorism mechanism, however, must be a two-way street; India must also be receptive to Pakistani concerns. Reviewing the emerging picture of the Mumbai bombing, which appears to be the responsibility of a domestic Indian extremist entity and the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyba. Observing that Musharraf had banned Laskhar-e-Tayyba in 2002, Boucher suggested that the counterterrorism mechanism start from this point of commonality, as Lashkar is clearly a threat to both countries. ¶9. (S) Boucher sought the President's views on a Siachen deal. We could sign a deal tomorrow, Musharraf said, and I have said as much to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Musharraf asserted that a deal on Sir Creek was also within grasp, saying that he had personally proposed an arrangement that would declare the affected coastal areas a common zone for joint exploitation by both countries. Saying that he understands that Prime Minister Singh wants to accept Pakistan's invitation to visit, Musharraf said that it is important that a significant deliverable accompany the visit. Economic Relationship -------------- ¶10. (C) In the course of the discussion on the tribal areas, President Musharraf digressed to request that the U.S. initiate negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. Stating that Pakistan must balance a growing trade deficit by increasing exports in order to maintain its high growth rate, the President pressed hard for liberalizing trade relations with the U.S. (Note: Musharraf said that he had been told that the U.S. was negotiating a free trade agreement with Malaysia, suggesting that negotiations were also possible for Pakistan, End note.) Ambassador Crocker noted that, from the U.S. perspective, the appropriate order of business is to conclude negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty before embarking on negotiations on a free trade agreement. Unfortunately, the Ambassador continued, the bilateral investment treaty negotiations have stalled, as the Pakistan side wishes to revisit issues that American negotiators thought resolved long ago. President Musharraf was surprised to learn that the investment treaty talks had bogged down and promised to look into the situation. ¶11. (U) SCA/Caitlin Hayden has cleared this cable. CROCKER