AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH NWFP GOV. ORAKZAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 019796 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PTER EAID PINR PK PREL SNAR AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH NWFP GOV. ORAKZAI REF: ISLAMABAD 19152 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Ambassador met with North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai on October 5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) Shehzad Arbab, Secretary to the Governor Azmat Orakzai, ODRP Chief MG Helmly, Islamabad DATT, and Peshawar PO (notetaker) were also present. Meetings with 11th Corps Commander LTG Hamid and Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) Arbab reported septels. ¶2. (C) Orakzai expressed determination to enforce the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) peace agreement but cautioned that there will be "hiccups" along the way. While no punishments have been handed down yet, the Governor noted that tribal elders and local officials have significant enforcement tools to draw on. Orakzai emphasized the need for "real time" intelligence to allow Pakistani forces to act quickly on the border, particularly with the start of patrolling between posts. The Governor welcomed ODRP plans to upgrade the Army and Frontier Corps' (FC) capabilities. ACS Arbab reported that a comprehensive FATA strategy should be completed by the end of October. Ambassador emphasized the importance of making a push to reduce poppy cultivation in the FATA and NWFP. End Summary. Enforcing the NWA Agreement -------------- ¶3. (C) Governor Orakzai opened the meeting by emphasizing the importance of the NWA peace agreement. The success or failure of the agreement, he said, affects not just Pakistan but the Coalition and the collective effort to combat terrorism. There may be "hiccups," the Governor cautioned. "What we have attempted to solve by military means we are now trying to solve politically; if we succeed, we will consider replicating the agreement elsewhere, starting in South Waziristan. ¶4. (C) Orakzai explained that he is reviewing mechanisms for taking action with the 15-member committee charged with monitoring/implementing the peace agreement. Ambassador asked what steps will be taken if violators of the agreement are apprehended and whether any punishments had been handed down. In particular, Ambassador expressed interest in the outcome of the case of ten militants who were caught crossing the border on September 19 and jailed in Miranshah. ¶5. (C) No punishments have been rendered thus far, the Governor responded. However, local tribal leaders, he said, have the authority to take action such as extradition, expulsion, and destruction of crops. The local tribe, Orakzai maintained, will be held accountable for violations of the agreement. If the tribe fails to punish violators, he continued, the Political Agent is empowered to enforce collective punishment under the Frontier Crimes Regulation. The force of collective punishment carried great weight, Orakzai commented, particularly since many tribes had interests in the settled areas that could be targeted. If these avenues failed, the Army and FC were still available as "ultimate" enforcers, he said. Patrolling the Border -------------- ISLAMABAD 00019796 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Pakistani forces have begun patrolling between posts as agreed at the August Tripartite Commission meeting. The Governor understood that similar patrols are taking place on the Afghan side of the border. Orakzai pressed for "real time" intelligence to give Pakistani forces the best advantage possible in pursuing cross-border movements. Improving Counter-Insurgency Capabilities -------------- ¶7. (C) MG Helmly briefed the Governor on an on-going ODRP assessment aimed at determining Pakistani counter-insurgency assistance needs. Upgrading Pakistan's capabilities, he explained, was being mapped out over a five-year period. MG Helmly noted that eight attack helicopters with night-time fighting capability had been fast-tracked for delivery in November and would be operational in January. ODRP was also looking at night vision equipment and communications gear for the FC. Finalizing a FATA Strategy -------------- ¶8. (C) Orakzai re-affirmed the need to augment the FC and asked about a timeline for funding, as well as support for the government's economic and social development plans. He expressed appreciation for U.S. assistance, commenting that USD 150 million would have a significant impact on the FATA. Ambassador underscored the importance of completing a comprehensive FATA plan, particularly for preparing requests to Congress. ACS Arbab said that the FATA Secretariat, with USAID assistance, expected to have a comprehensive strategy ready by late October. Reducing Poppy Cultivation -------------- ¶9. (C) Pakistan was within reach, Ambassador noted, of being removed from the list of "major illicit drug producing" countries. Poppy cultivation in Khyber Agency and Charsadda were the biggest obstacles to achieving that goal, he said. The Governor assured that reducing poppy cultivation in the tribal areas and the NWFP remains a top priority and that the success of the past five years is an indicator of the government's commitment. Orakzai acknowledged that Khyber Agency has a "law and order" problem. However, the situation was being addressed, he said, and several poppy growers had recently been arrested. Private Exhange on NWA Jirga -------------- ¶10. (C) In a private exchange before the larger meeting, the Ambassador noted that the information available to us indicated a sharp increase in militant activity in the border area in August with no decline in September. We were also concerned over reports that the militants who had been detained by tribesmen after the September 18/19 incident had been released to the Haqqanis. The Governor denied that this was the case, asserting that tribal leaders were deliberating the issue and deciding what course of action to take. He said the government was determined that the conditions of the agreement be respected. Either the tribes enforced it or the government would take action against the tribes. The Ambassador said that the conditions of the agreement as we understood them - no presence of foreigners, no cross-border militancy, no "talibanization" - were good, but what counted was implementation on the ground. We would be watching closely. The Governor reiterated that he was determined that the agreement would be respected. If it were not, force would be exercised. ISLAMABAD 00019796 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query, the Governor said he considered the initiative for tribal jirgas attended by Presidents Musharraf and Karzai on both sides of the Durrand Line a positive one, consistent with Pakistan's current effort to bring the tribes over to the government's side. He noted that there were a number of issues to be worked out, such as participation: on the Pakistan side, would it involve only the tribes areas or Pashtuns from all over the NWFP? How broad would participation be in Afghanistan? Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The spate of incidents in September in NWA (reftel) was troubling, but may have resulted in part from the gap between signing the peace deal and providing guidance to the monitoring committee. Orakzai, in his first week back on the job since he accompanied President Musharraf to Washington, seems keenly aware of the spotlight that is now on North Waziristan - and the accompanying pressure and urgency to make commitments and punishments stick. BODDE