AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 019795 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREL MOPS PTER AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS COMMANDER Classified By: Charge d'Affiares Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander (Peshawar) LTG Mohammad Hamid Khan on October 5. ODRP Chief MG Helmly, Islamabad DATT, and Peshawar PO (notetaker) were also present. Meetings with NWFP Governor Orakzai and FATA Additional Chief Secretary Arbab reported septels. ¶2. (C) The 11th Corps Commander told Ambassador that the Army is concentrating its forces on the border with the Frontier Corps (FC) taking responsibility for North Waziristan Agency (NWA) interior posts. This would place additional 4000 regular army troops along the border. Hamid warned, however, that instability in the tribal areas ultimately required a political solution. The General recommended establishing a communication link between posts on either side of the border via wireless radio. He also suggested a flag meeting between posts covering the Chitral/Kunar area. Hamid expressed great concern about the growing number of attacks around Kandahar. President Karzai, he said, should engage more closely and regularly with local Pathan leaders. End Summary. Assessing the Border and the NWA Agreement -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador opened the meeting by noting strong U.S. support for President Musharraf, particularly as a partner in stabilizing the border areas with Afghanistan. All parties, he said, had a stake in the success of the NWA peace agreement. The U.S. side, Ambassador continued, was ready to provide an assessment of problem areas along the border and to discuss how to improve communications. What we have seen thus far is a continuation of militant activity trough September at the same level as August, which was very high. Ambassador asked for the General's perspective one month into the NWA peace deal. ¶4. (C) The NWA agreement, Hamid replied, had helped the military concentrate its forces on the border. The General attributed the upswing in activity on the border to two causes. First, autumn is traditionally a period when "operations" escalate before winter conditions impede movement. Second, U.S. forces were on the border and presented an attractive target. The General carefully stated that he was not denying the possibility of cross-border filtration from Pakistan. Instead, he continued, it was simply important to recognize that "miscreants" from both sides of the border were gravitating toward U.S. forces. The Pakistani army, Hamid said, had stepped up border patrolling along NWA, South Waziristan Agency (SWA),and Chitral. There had been an agreement with Bagram, he pointed out, for synchronized patrolling, but the Pakistani side needed timing information to be effective. ¶5. (C) Reviewing the NWA situation in the run up to the September agreement, Hamid described January to June in 2006 as "very intense." Mounting casualties among militants, the General remarked, had contributed to bringing tribal leaders to the table. Hamid viewed the commitments from NWA tribal leaders in the September agreement as "genuine." He understood that if the deal fails greater pressure will fall on Pakistani forces to take action. Hamid warned, however, that instability in the tribal areas could not be solved solely through military measures. The army, the General maintained, could only contribute to setting the scene for what was truly required -- a political solution. ISLAMABAD 00019795 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) With the army concentrating on the border, Ambassador asked about security inside NWA. Hamid responded that the FC was continuing to man NWA interior posts. The option of additional FC troops for interior duty was under consideration, he added. Shoring Up Counter-Insurgency Capabilities -------------- ¶7. (C) MG Helmly briefed on ODRP's ongoing assessment of Pakistani counter-insurgency needs. He asked how the U.S. military could improve information exchange and night-time operations. Hamid noted that while border posts are able to communicate with Bagram, there is no communication link with posts on the Afghan side of the border. The General proposed using wireless sets as a solution. MG Helmly noted that the fielding of Harris radios was now complete on the Paksitan side, which should improve communications. Responding to MG Helmly's concern over large groups of fighters moving across the border from Chitral, Hamid recommended a flag meeting between posts in the Chitral/Kunar area. Addressing Rising Violence in Afghanistan -------------- ¶8. (C) MG Helmly noted that the next Tripartite Commission meeting in late October would take a broad look at the rising violence in Afghanistan. Hamid acknowledged that incidents on the border were cause for concern but viewed them primarily as a distraction. The attacks around Kandahar, he continued, were more to the point of the Taliban's larger goal -- re-establishing a permanent foothold in Afghanistan. Hamid argued that President Karzai should expand his political influence with Pathans by holding more regular loya jirgas with local leaders. (Comment: Hamid did not express an opinion on the proposal for cross-border loya jirgas. NWFP Governor Orakzai has told us separately that he will be the point man on this proposal. End Comment.) BODDE