PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (3): ELECTORATE AND PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 019123 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK PREL SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (3): ELECTORATE AND PARTIES BOTH IN FLUX REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 19122 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary and introduction. Pakistani voters have historically alternated between anti-incumbent backlashes and populist ground swells in which voters simply join the bandwagon of expected winners. Which behavior prevails in the coming elections will depend on the ratio of anti-government sentiment to public perceptions that certain candidates/parties have unstoppable momentum. Poll results suggest that the public is displeased with the government's performance, but unconvinced that the major opposition parties offer a viable alternative. Given the volatility of Pakistan's coalition politics, it is too early to judge whether the government can maintain that edge between now and the elections. International incidents, a deal between the GOP and one (or more) of the opposition parties, or the return of the country's exiled political leaders could each shift the balance of public sentiment for or against any of the mainstream parties...whether currently in power or not. In the end, the electorate's deeply-ingrained feudal loyalties, appetite for populist demagoguery and disinterest in issues-based campaigns may carry more weight in determining the make-up of Pakistan's next government than the politician's best-laid plans. ¶2. (C) This cable, the third in a series of cables mapping the political terrain as Pakistan approaches nationwide elections in 2007, assesses the historic behavior and current attitudes of Pakistani voters, as well as the muddy waters surrounding mainstream political parties and leaders. Subsequent installements in this series will focus on whether President/General Musharraf will shed his uniform, Musharraf's coalition options and recommendations on how the U.S. can best promote credible and open elections. End summary and introduction. Throw the Bums Out or Jump on the Bandwagon? -------------- ¶3. (C) Pakistanis are intensely politicized, alternating between a negative anti-incumbent impulses and a more pragmatic willingness to back whomever they judge to be the likely winning team. Aitzaz Ahsan, an articulate Pakistan People's Party (PPP) insider currently out of favor with PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, explains the former in terms of the economic and social gap between those who govern and those who are governed. He observes that, from election to election, ordinary Pakistanis routinely cope with run-of-the-mill government abuse: heavy-handed police, unresponsive utility representatives, corrupt judges, understaffed government hospitals and more. Elections, according to Ahsan, provide an outlet for release, allowing the Pakistani people to throw the rascals out. If the government has been particularly abusive, elections can be a period of unruly catharsis, as was the case following Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto's tenure as Prime Minister. Ahsan points out that no civilian government in Pakistan's history has ever been re-elected. If voters have a strong sense of alienation and pent-up frustration and feel the governing party (and President Musharraf) is vulnerable, public sentiment could turn against the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML),to the benefit of the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). ¶4. (C) Analysts have also detected a bandwagon effect: voters test the winds and vote for the candidate(s) they feel ISLAMABAD 00019123 002 OF 004 has the best shot of success. If voters feel the government already has the election sewn up or, more likely, that the opposition is weak and could do no better, they may save themselves the bother of Election Day analysis and simply vote for the ruling PML. Too Early for Anyone to Have an Edge -------------- ¶5. (C) At this stage, however, none of the parties is in a position to alter the status quo and shift public opinion significantly in its favor. The major secular opposition parties have been unable to articulate an agenda that addresses the genuine concerns of ordinary Pakistanis; each faces an uphill battle in overcoming their well-founded reputation for corruption and autocratic ruling styles. Out of power for 7-10 years, the PPP and PML-N are weak and will continue to atrophy unless their exiled leaders return to rally their base; neither has demonstrated the ability or willingness to nurture vibrant new leaders. Unrelenting cries for the exiles' return may simply prove the adages that absence make the heart grow fonder, while intimacy breeds contempt: both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are known commodities to Pakistan voters. Neither generates the ardent support they once enjoyed. Indeed, if either returned to Pakistan, he/she would have to account for his/her dismal record of governance, but without the buffer that distance now provides. ¶6. (C) For their part, Musharraf and the PML government must grapple with the twin evils of inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by a weak party organization that lacks genuine grass-roots support. Many who admire Musharraf and his goals despise the current leadership of his party, the Chaudhary family, viewing it as corrupt, power-hungry, and opposed to genuine reform. Amongst Pakistan's elite, post rarely encounters vocal supporters of Musharraf or the PML government. The Prime Minister and other officials are currently dodging accusations of corruption following a series of questionable privatization deals and stock market scandals. Another irritant is the perception of growing institutional corruption by the military and military-affiliated industrial conglomerates, which is increasingly encroaching on the civilian economy, crowding out employment and commercial opportunities. Polling data highlights regional cleavages that the PML leaders have yet to address: the party has virtually no support in the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan. A Divided (or Befuddled) Electorate -------------- ¶7. (C) Unless either the PML or the secular opposition parties can dramatically alter these negative perceptions over the next year, none can claim a lock on electoral support in 2007/8. Polls confirm the anecdotal evidence of a divided electorate, unenthused about any party or individual. A recent International Republican Insitute (IRI) survey, which used internationally accepted statistical sampling to conduct a nationwide poll between May and June, illustrates a crazy quilt pattern of public opinion: for example, while sixty percent of respondents claimed to approve of Musharraf's performance, only 28 percent identified Musharraf as the most suitable leader to handle Pakistan's problems; the President was followed closely by Benazir Bhutto at 23 percent, and Nawaz Sharif at 16 percent. When asked about democratization and current GOP policies, some 35 percent of voters consistently provided answers favorable to President Musharraf. Prime Minister Aziz had a job approval rating of ISLAMABAD 00019123 003 OF 004 54 percent, but only 15 percent consider him the best candidate for Prime Minister. Eighteen percent opted Benazir Bhutto, 13 percent for Nawaz Sharif, and 5 percent for Musharraf. ¶8. (C) The personal popularity of Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz does not translate into strong support for the PML government: only 37 percent stated that the current coalition had done a good job and deserved reelection. When asked which party would best handle Pakistan's problems, 28 percent supported the PML, 22 percent the PPP and 16 percent the PML-N. The parties' favorability ratings were even closer: 23 percent favoring PML, 22 percent the PPP and 16 percent the PML-N. These results broadly track with previous findings that confirm Musharraf as Pakistan's most favored political leader (followed by Benazir),but within a closely-divided electorate. A private UK poll conducted in January 2006 found that out of a field of eleven, 24 percent favored Musharraf, 16 percent favored Benazir and 11 percent favored Nawaz. (Note: Surveys consistently show the Islamist parties cumulatively polling in the mid-single digits. End note.) Rx: TCL for Voters, A Shot of Adrenaline for the Parties -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) PPP/Aitzaz Ahsan notes that Pakistani politicians cannot assume that polling results will accurately predict actual voter behavior, as voting in many regions -- both rural and urban -- often requires arduous commitment by civic-minded Pakistanis and commensurate support from political parties. For example, Ahsan recalled that in 1988, the PPP base was so passionate in its support for Benazir that the party did not need external inducements to get its voters to the polls. In contrast, Ahsan says, the party must now arrange transportation and compensation for voters' opportunity costs (e.g., lost wages, food in place of home-cooked meals, etc.). The PML faces the same challenges, but carries the institutional advantages that fall to the incumbent. ¶10. (C) Absent significant change -- in electoral tactics by the parties, new electoral coalitions, an outside shock to the system, or outright electoral fraud -- no party is currently positioned to achieve an outright majority in the upcoming poll. National sentiment is now divided between the three large secular parties, but with significant numbers of voters supporting smaller regional groupings. The advantages of incumbency and Musharraf's generally favorable approval rating may help the PML achieve a plurality (a feat it did not achieve even in the heavily rigged 2002 elections),but brash PML predictions of a landslide victory are unfounded. With the elections not likely for another twelve months, there is ample time for the party's mushy polling number to solidify...or soften further; the only certainty is that its future as the ruling party is far from assured. Similarly, the PPP and PML-N face an uphill battle in energizing their voters and overcoming the parties' strongly perceived negatives; their present strategy of waiting for public sentiment to shift against Musharraf will only lead to their failure. Populism, Feudalism and Price Hikes -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Even a casual observer of the Pakistani political scene is struck by dearth of policy analysis (or awareness) amongst party leaders and workers; the proclivity of senior political leaders to nurture personality cults within their parties at the expense of positive issue-based campaign ISLAMABAD 00019123 004 OF 004 strategies; and the receptivity of the masses to demagogic denunciations of price hikes in basic commodities and emotional appeals to bruised national pride. A year out from elections, with the electorate in a muddle and the parties' strategies in flux, we should not be surprised if the 2007 campaign devolves to the lowest common denominator -- mud-slinging, appeals to patriotic fervor and glorification of the parties' iconic figurehead -- with little considered debate on the internal challenges and external relationships that will determine Pakistan's future. BODDE