PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (3): ELECTORATE AND PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 019123

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK PREL
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (3): ELECTORATE AND PARTIES
BOTH IN FLUX

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121

B. ISLAMABAD 19122

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary and introduction. Pakistani voters have
historically alternated between anti-incumbent backlashes and
populist ground swells in which voters simply join the
bandwagon of expected winners. Which behavior prevails in
the coming elections will depend on the ratio of
anti-government sentiment to public perceptions that certain
candidates/parties have unstoppable momentum. Poll results
suggest that the public is displeased with the government's
performance, but unconvinced that the major opposition
parties offer a viable alternative. Given the volatility of
Pakistan's coalition politics, it is too early to judge
whether the government can maintain that edge between now and
the elections. International incidents, a deal between the
GOP and one (or more) of the opposition parties, or the
return of the country's exiled political leaders could each
shift the balance of public sentiment for or against any of
the mainstream parties...whether currently in power or not.
In the end, the electorate's deeply-ingrained feudal
loyalties, appetite for populist demagoguery and disinterest
in issues-based campaigns may carry more weight in
determining the make-up of Pakistan's next government than
the politician's best-laid plans.


2. (C) This cable, the third in a series of cables mapping
the political terrain as Pakistan approaches nationwide
elections in 2007, assesses the historic behavior and current
attitudes of Pakistani voters, as well as the muddy waters
surrounding mainstream political parties and leaders.
Subsequent installements in this series will focus on whether
President/General Musharraf will shed his uniform,
Musharraf's coalition options and recommendations on how the
U.S. can best promote credible and open elections. End
summary and introduction.


Throw the Bums Out or Jump on the Bandwagon?
--------------


3. (C) Pakistanis are intensely politicized, alternating
between a negative anti-incumbent impulses and a more
pragmatic willingness to back whomever they judge to be the
likely winning team. Aitzaz Ahsan, an articulate Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) insider currently out of favor with PPP
leader Benazir Bhutto, explains the former in terms of the
economic and social gap between those who govern and those
who are governed. He observes that, from election to
election, ordinary Pakistanis routinely cope with
run-of-the-mill government abuse: heavy-handed police,
unresponsive utility representatives, corrupt judges,
understaffed government hospitals and more. Elections,
according to Ahsan, provide an outlet for release, allowing
the Pakistani people to throw the rascals out. If the
government has been particularly abusive, elections can be a
period of unruly catharsis, as was the case following
Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto's tenure as Prime Minister. Ahsan
points out that no civilian government in Pakistan's history
has ever been re-elected. If voters have a strong sense of
alienation and pent-up frustration and feel the governing
party (and President Musharraf) is vulnerable, public
sentiment could turn against the ruling Pakistan Muslim
League (PML),to the benefit of the PPP and Pakistan Muslim
League-Nawaz (PML-N).


4. (C) Analysts have also detected a bandwagon effect:
voters test the winds and vote for the candidate(s) they feel

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has the best shot of success. If voters feel the government
already has the election sewn up or, more likely, that the
opposition is weak and could do no better, they may save
themselves the bother of Election Day analysis and simply
vote for the ruling PML.


Too Early for Anyone to Have an Edge
--------------


5. (C) At this stage, however, none of the parties is in a
position to alter the status quo and shift public opinion
significantly in its favor. The major secular opposition
parties have been unable to articulate an agenda that
addresses the genuine concerns of ordinary Pakistanis; each
faces an uphill battle in overcoming their well-founded
reputation for corruption and autocratic ruling styles. Out
of power for 7-10 years, the PPP and PML-N are weak and will
continue to atrophy unless their exiled leaders return to
rally their base; neither has demonstrated the ability or
willingness to nurture vibrant new leaders. Unrelenting
cries for the exiles' return may simply prove the adages that
absence make the heart grow fonder, while intimacy breeds
contempt: both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are known
commodities to Pakistan voters. Neither generates the ardent
support they once enjoyed. Indeed, if either returned to
Pakistan, he/she would have to account for his/her dismal
record of governance, but without the buffer that distance
now provides.


6. (C) For their part, Musharraf and the PML government must
grapple with the twin evils of inflation and unemployment,
exacerbated by a weak party organization that lacks genuine
grass-roots support. Many who admire Musharraf and his goals
despise the current leadership of his party, the Chaudhary
family, viewing it as corrupt, power-hungry, and opposed to
genuine reform. Amongst Pakistan's elite, post rarely
encounters vocal supporters of Musharraf or the PML
government. The Prime Minister and other officials are
currently dodging accusations of corruption following a
series of questionable privatization deals and stock market
scandals. Another irritant is the perception of growing
institutional corruption by the military and
military-affiliated industrial conglomerates, which is
increasingly encroaching on the civilian economy, crowding
out employment and commercial opportunities. Polling data
highlights regional cleavages that the PML leaders have yet
to address: the party has virtually no support in the
provinces of NWFP and Balochistan.


A Divided (or Befuddled) Electorate
--------------


7. (C) Unless either the PML or the secular opposition
parties can dramatically alter these negative perceptions
over the next year, none can claim a lock on electoral
support in 2007/8. Polls confirm the anecdotal evidence of a
divided electorate, unenthused about any party or individual.
A recent International Republican Insitute (IRI) survey,
which used internationally accepted statistical sampling to
conduct a nationwide poll between May and June, illustrates a
crazy quilt pattern of public opinion: for example, while
sixty percent of respondents claimed to approve of
Musharraf's performance, only 28 percent identified Musharraf
as the most suitable leader to handle Pakistan's problems;
the President was followed closely by Benazir Bhutto at 23
percent, and Nawaz Sharif at 16 percent. When asked about
democratization and current GOP policies, some 35 percent of
voters consistently provided answers favorable to President
Musharraf. Prime Minister Aziz had a job approval rating of

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54 percent, but only 15 percent consider him the best
candidate for Prime Minister. Eighteen percent opted Benazir
Bhutto, 13 percent for Nawaz Sharif, and 5 percent for
Musharraf.


8. (C) The personal popularity of Musharraf and Shaukat
Aziz does not translate into strong support for the PML
government: only 37 percent stated that the current
coalition had done a good job and deserved reelection. When
asked which party would best handle Pakistan's problems, 28
percent supported the PML, 22 percent the PPP and 16 percent
the PML-N. The parties' favorability ratings were even
closer: 23 percent favoring PML, 22 percent the PPP and 16
percent the PML-N. These results broadly track with previous
findings that confirm Musharraf as Pakistan's most favored
political leader (followed by Benazir),but within a
closely-divided electorate. A private UK poll conducted in
January 2006 found that out of a field of eleven, 24 percent
favored Musharraf, 16 percent favored Benazir and 11 percent
favored Nawaz. (Note: Surveys consistently show the
Islamist parties cumulatively polling in the mid-single
digits. End note.)


Rx: TCL for Voters, A Shot of Adrenaline for the Parties
-------------- --------------


9. (C) PPP/Aitzaz Ahsan notes that Pakistani politicians
cannot assume that polling results will accurately predict
actual voter behavior, as voting in many regions -- both
rural and urban -- often requires arduous commitment by
civic-minded Pakistanis and commensurate support from
political parties. For example, Ahsan recalled that in 1988,
the PPP base was so passionate in its support for Benazir
that the party did not need external inducements to get its
voters to the polls. In contrast, Ahsan says, the party must
now arrange transportation and compensation for voters'
opportunity costs (e.g., lost wages, food in place of
home-cooked meals, etc.). The PML faces the same challenges,
but carries the institutional advantages that fall to the
incumbent.


10. (C) Absent significant change -- in electoral tactics by
the parties, new electoral coalitions, an outside shock to
the system, or outright electoral fraud -- no party is
currently positioned to achieve an outright majority in the
upcoming poll. National sentiment is now divided between the
three large secular parties, but with significant numbers of
voters supporting smaller regional groupings. The advantages
of incumbency and Musharraf's generally favorable approval
rating may help the PML achieve a plurality (a feat it did
not achieve even in the heavily rigged 2002 elections),but
brash PML predictions of a landslide victory are unfounded.
With the elections not likely for another twelve months,
there is ample time for the party's mushy polling number to
solidify...or soften further; the only certainty is that its
future as the ruling party is far from assured. Similarly,
the PPP and PML-N face an uphill battle in energizing their
voters and overcoming the parties' strongly perceived
negatives; their present strategy of waiting for public
sentiment to shift against Musharraf will only lead to their
failure.


Populism, Feudalism and Price Hikes
--------------

11. (C/NF) Even a casual observer of the Pakistani political
scene is struck by dearth of policy analysis (or awareness)
amongst party leaders and workers; the proclivity of senior
political leaders to nurture personality cults within their
parties at the expense of positive issue-based campaign

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strategies; and the receptivity of the masses to demagogic
denunciations of price hikes in basic commodities and
emotional appeals to bruised national pride. A year out from
elections, with the electorate in a muddle and the parties'
strategies in flux, we should not be surprised if the 2007
campaign devolves to the lowest common denominator --
mud-slinging, appeals to patriotic fervor and glorification
of the parties' iconic figurehead -- with little considered
debate on the internal challenges and external relationships
that will determine Pakistan's future.
BODDE