EMBASSY ISLAMABAD-EMBASSY KABUL-CFC-A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 018708 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER EAID MASS PINR AF SUBJECT: EMBASSY ISLAMABAD-EMBASSY KABUL-CFC-A CONSULTATIONS READ OUT REF: A. GRENCIK-AGUILAR E-MAIL 09/14/06 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 17766 Classified By: CDA Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Islamabad-Embassy Kabul-CFC-A cable. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary. On September 12, select Embassy Islamabad, Embassy Kabul and CFC-A personnel met to discuss the security situation in the border areas and ways to improve the political, economic and social ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Participants focused on President Musharraf and President Karzai's upcoming visits to the U.S. Both Embassies were encouraged by recent high-level meetings between Pakistani and Afghan officials, but agreed that much work remained to improve relations. Participants greeted the North Waziristan agreement between the Government of Pakistan (GOP) and tribal elders with cautious optimism, recommending that the USG aggressively monitor the situation for the presence of foreign fighters in North Waziristan and the number of anti-coalition and ISAF incidents across the border. Prior to the next consultations, participants will promote further political exchanges between the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and GOP, monitor potential harmful elements in refugee camps, and work to encourage economic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan. End summary. Overview and Introduction -------------- ¶3. (C) On September 12, Ambassador Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Neumann, CFC-A Commander LTG Eikenberry, and their senior staffs met at Embassy Islamabad. The group discussed upcoming bilateral and trilateral meetings between POTUS, President Musharraf of Pakistan, and President Karzai of Afghanistan; assessed the Afghan-Pakistan relationship; reviewed the border security situation; and discussed ways to improve USG efforts in promoting economic, social, and political development in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. ¶4. (S/NF) In his opening remarks Ambassador Crocker outlined developments in Pakistan-Afghan relations, including recent meetings of senior officials. He said that the working groups would have a special responsibility to develop ideas that could be forwarded to Washington to consider while preparing for upcoming bilateral and trilateral meetings in the U.S. (REF A) ¶5. (S/NF) Ambassador Neumann reported that President Karzai's approach towards Pakistan had changed recently. President Karzai was much more focused on assuring President Musharraf that both Pakistan and Afghanistan had a common enemy. Ambassador Neumann said Karzai "was not an instrumentalist. He is not taken with organizational structures or confidence building measures." President Karzai was concerned that President Musharraf would not support a secular Pashtun-led Afghan government over the long-term and noted Karzai needed to be reassured in this regard. Ambassador Neumann described the insurgency as getting worse in Afghanistan, with fighting picking back up in the east and south, with Zabol increasingly threatened. ¶6. (S/NF) LTG Eikenberry said that the political situation in Afghanistan looked much better than the security situation. He described the seriousness of the security challenges in Afghanistan and the effort to neutralize mid-level Taliban commanders, who used Pakistan both for sanctuary and as a command and control base. Update since previous consultations in June -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Participants were encouraged by several important developments in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship since ISLAMABAD 00018708 002 OF 004 the last consultations on 7 June. Both countries' national security advisors, intelligence chiefs and presidents had met since then. Although GOA and GOP relations had improved since February/March, participants agreed much work remained to eliminate lingering suspicions each government had of the other. The group recommended continuing to encourage exchanges between GOP and GOA political leaders. Participants agreed to engage both governments to reinvigorate an apparently dormant agreement between the GOP and GOA to have regular ministerial-level meetings. Upcoming Washington visits -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Much of the discussion focused on preparing ideas to send to Washington in the lead-up to President Musharraf's and President Karzai's upcoming visits to the U.S. The bilateral and trilateral meetings with President Bush will provide an excellent opportunity to address and advance important USG strategic interests, including the significant upswing in violence in Afghanistan; questions concerning President Karzai's leadership abilities; and Pakistan's agreement with militants in North Waziristan. (Note: Ref A were specific recommendations for POTUS bilateral and trilateral meetings to SCA. End note.) Border Security and North Waziristan Agreement -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Presentations by CFC-A and Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) detailed the increase in anti-coalition incidents along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in recent months. The command and control operations for many of the anti-coalition incidents emanated from Pakistan, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Key insurgent command and control nodes also existed in Quetta, Peshawar and Miram Shah. Insurgents exploited the Durand Line's porous nature to conduct cross-border hit-and-run attacks from their sanctuary inside Pakistan and used Pakistan as a base for recruiting new militants, notably from border-area madrassas. ODRP briefed that the GOP deployed 74,000 troops in the FATA. The majority of the troops were not/not a part of the regular army, but were poorly trained, ill equipped paramilitary forces, including the Frontier Corps and civil armed forces. Following the North Waziristan jirga agreement the GOP will redeploy some forces from deep inside North Waziristan to areas closer to the border, to be used at checkpoints and as 'rapid reaction forces.' ¶10. (S/NF) Meeting participants discussed at length the strategic implications of the September 5 North Waziristan Agency (NWA) jirga agreement between the GOP and tribal elders (REF B). A CFC-A briefer presented diagrams showing that, since the June cease-fire between the GOP and militant groups operating out of NWA, attacks on coalition forces near the NWA border had actually increased in frequency. Analysts thus concluded that the cease-fire had not led to a decrease in cross-border militant activity from the NWA. Some analysts questioned whether the jirga agreement would succeed in lowering anti-coalition militant support from the NWA, since the cease-fire had failed to do so. Although participants ultimately were cautiously optimistic that the agreement could lead to improvements in border security, there was consensus on the need to strongly emphasize to the GOP that interested parties needed to see measurable results, most importantly a decrease in attacks on coalition and ISAF forces. Estimates of how long it would take to assess the success of the agreement varied from sixty days to one year. The group agreed there should not be a specific timetable for judging the success of the agreement, but the USG would continue to monitor the anti-coalition activities that emanated out of Pakistan and the presence of foreign fighters in the FATA. If anti-coalition activities near the Afghan border did not drop, the USG would press the GOP for a ISLAMABAD 00018708 003 OF 004 different solution. Status of Afghan Refugees -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) The GOP was now focused on the mandatory registration of Afghan refugees who were counted in the 2005 census and did not plan to close any more camps this year. The participants recommended close monitoring of the activities taking place in the remaining camps. Ambassador Crocker noted that some of the refugee camps are breeding grounds for unwelcome elements, including terrorists and narco-traffickers. Islamabad RefCoord was making make discreet inquiries with IO and NGO officials about the security situation in the camps and would have a report by November 1. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was now manning check posts at large camps such as Girdi Jungle. Both Ambassadors noted that an inter-agency effort was needed to gain accurate USG reporting of activities in the remaining refugee camps. Economic and Social development -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and FATA development figured prominently in the discussions of economic and social development. An ROZ assessment team recently conducted a study in Pakistan and was currently in Afghanistan. A final report covering both Afghanistan and Pakistan was expected by late October. The USG seemed much more interested in promoting the ROZ idea than either the GOP or GOA. To make the ROZ concept successful, the GOP and GOA, needed to take greater ownership of the ROZ proposal. Many Afghans were very suspicious of the whole concept, assuming that most of the economic benefits would flow to the Pakistani side. Pakistan, in particular the private sector, had to help convince their Afghan counterparts of the economic benefits of working together. Participants proposed supporting possible joint or parallel visits by Pakistani and Afghan trade officials to study existing Qualified Industrial Zones in Egypt and/or Jordan. ¶13. (SBU) USAID Pakistan had recently re-opened its office in Peshawar after twelve years. The USAID development program in the FATA mirrored national programs in terms of activities related to health, education, and economic growth. USAID and the UK's Department For International Development (DFID) supported the FATA Secretariat in its efforts to develop a FATA development strategy, which was expected to be finalized in September. Capacity and ownership remained as two vital concerns to FATA development and implementation of programs; while the GOP had been increasing allocations in recent years for development in the FATA, these funds had not been fully spent because of a lack of capacity. ¶14. (C) There was discussion about moving a trilateral economic process forward in a less formal way than through U.S. participation in the Afghan-Pakistan Joint Economic Commission, which meets infrequently and was not particularly productive. Finally, USAID Afghanistan mentioned working with the new Afghan Education Minister Atmar, perhaps jointly with Minister Ghazi, to promote more moderate curricula in the madrassas. Conclusion -------------- ¶15. (S/NF) Participants agreed that the consultations were productive in generating ideas to improve the political, economic and security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and agreed to meet again in a few months. In the interim they agreed to do the following: -- Work towards increasing the number and frequency of meetings between Pakistani and Afghan political leaders. ISLAMABAD 00018708 004 OF 004 -- Aggressively monitor the North Waziristan jirgra agreement for the presence of foreign fighters in North Waziristan and cross border attacks on coalition and ISAF forces. -- Monitor the presence of unwanted elements, such as terrorists and narco-traffickers, in refugee camps in Pakistan. -- Support possible joint or parallel visits by Pakistani and Afghan trade officials to study existing Qualified Industrial Zones in Egypt and/or Jordon. -- Work with the new Afghan Education Minister and the Pakistani Education Minister to promote moderate curricula in Afghan madrassas. BODDE