PAKISTAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 018379 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, SCA, PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: AF MCAP MOPS PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: PAKISTAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS MOUNTAIN THRUST AND MOUNTAIN FURY Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Introduction and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Operation MTN Thrust began in Southern Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimroz) in May. The Operation set the conditions for NATO Operation Medusa, which began in July. Operation MTN Fury began in Eastern Afghanistan (Ghazni, Loghar, Paktika, Paktiya, and Khowst) August 1, with decisive operations beginning on September 13. Prior to the operations, Combined Joint Task Force - 76 (CJTF - 76) and Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) presented goals for the operations to the Pakistan military (Pak-Mil leadership and requested assistance preventing infiltration and exfiltration across the Pak-Afghan border. ¶2. (C) Comment: ODRP reports that cooperation from Pak-Mil has been good. (Note: Because the GOP historically views the Baloch/Kandahar border as a law enforcement issue rather than a military and security one, the extra troop presence was provided strictly in response to U.S. requests. End Note.) ODRP notes that, while support to Operation MTN Thrust was useful, the GOP relied heavily on the Frontier Corps (FC),whose troops continued to be less capable than the Pakistan Army's. Pakistan security forces, especially the FC, had limited mobility due to lack of air and ground assets to cover expansive distances on a less-than-optimal road system. ODRP reports the Pak-Mil's increased presence enhanced the closure of the border between Afghanistan and Balochistan and resulted in the arrests and contraband seizures noted in paragraph 4. Nevertheless, committed groups of anti-coalition militias (ACMs) were still able to avoid the heightened presence and cross the border. (C) Comment continued: While some observers intitially feared that the North Waziristan Agency jirga agreement might complicate Pak-Mil support to Operation MTN Fury, the GOP continues to assure post that the agreement will not change Pak-Mil support and commitment to the operation. Cross border activity by ACMs would violate the agreement and could be met by Pakistani military action. Furthermore, Pak-Mil has assured us that total troop numbers in NWA have not changed since the agreement was signed on September 5. Less �0A;than a week into decisive operations, it is too early to guage GOP effectiveness in combatting ACM cross-border activity. End Comment -------------- Operation Mountain Thrust -------------- ¶4. (C) Pak-Mil reports that, operating in Balochistan, it has obtained the following results since the operation began in May: --No important cross border militia movement --Good cooperation from the Pakistan civil administration --Free medical camps established in remote border areas treating more than 2500 Pakistani patients and distributing rupees 500,000 (USD 8,000) in medicines --Apprehension of 726 illegal Afghans --Apprehension of 12 Anti-coalition militia suspects from Wana, South Waziristan Agency --Apprehension of four foreign fighters (Turkish nationals) --Seizure of arms and ammunition of various caliber --Seizure of 10,469 kilos of narcotics and arrest of 15 individuals -------------- Operation Mountain Fury ISLAMABAD 00018379 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Based on the U.S. military's goals for Operation MTN Fury, Pak-Mil has developed the following principles for its reaction to the operation, which began August 1. (Decisive operations began September 13.) --hold sensitive crossing points in strength to deny infiltration and exfiltration; --position quick reaction forces (QRFs) in each sector to reinforce the established posts and to deny freedom of movement to anti-coalition militias (ACMs); --maintain sufficiently strong reserves, including Special Services Group forces (SSGs) supported by aviation and artillery in each sector to retain offensive capability; --preempt ACM activity through well conceived and coordinated intelligence collection plans while keeping the border under effective surveillance; --assist coalition forces by sealing the border during the conduct of Operation MTN Fury, preventing cross border movement at all costs. ¶6. (C) Troop deployments in FATA in response to Operation MTN Fury: North Waziristan Agency: 7 Division: 6th Brigade, 27th Brigade, 117th Brigade, 207th Brigade (12 Army battalions and 12 Frontier Corps Wings along the border.) (Note: Each FC Wing consists of 600 troops. End Note.) South Waziristan Agency: 9 Division: 116th Brigade; 325th Brigade (6 Army battalions and 8 Frontier Corps Wings along the border.) Kurram Agency: Five Frontier Corps Wings (less two companies) One Army battalion reserve One company-size and five platoon-size quick reaction forces Khyber Agency: Three Frontier Corps Wings Three platoon-size quick reaction forces Mohmad Agency: Three Frontier Corps Wings Three platoon-size quick reaction forces Bajaur Agency Seven (plus) Frontier Corps Wings. CROCKER