MUMBAI BOMBINGS: PAKISTAN SEES POSTPONEMENT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 013801 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PK IN SUBJECT: MUMBAI BOMBINGS: PAKISTAN SEES POSTPONEMENT OF COMPOSITE DIALOGUE TALKS AS A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT REF: A. ISLAMABAD 13519 ¶B. NEW DELHI 5036 Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, d ¶1. (C) Summary. Pakistani leaders, including President Musharraf, regret India's cancellation of the Foreign Secretary level Composite Dialogue talks planned for July SIPDIS 20-21. They confirm that Indian counterparts informed them over the weekend that the talks would not be taking place. Although they had anticipated India's decision, they are nonetheless disappointed, with President Musharraf observing that stalling the talks plays into the hands of terrorists who oppose the peace process. End Summary. ¶2. (U) President Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Foreign Minister Kasuri have all expressed concern in recent days over India's cancellation of the Foreign Secretary level Composite Dialogue talks planned for July 20-21. The talks were to have been the conclusion of the third round of the Dialogue, addressing a range of possible Confidence Building Measures that have been raised in lower-level negotiations over the past six months. Following Musharraf's July 18 meeting with the National Security Council, the GOP issued a news bulletin reporting that he had cautioned that stalling the peace process would be "unfortunate" and would play into the hands of terrorists. "We must not allow such terrorist acts to undermine the historic opportunity for lasting peace between Pakistan and India." Musharraf went on to regret the "unsubstantiated allegations" emanating from India and renewed his earlier offer to "help with the investigation" if India were to share concrete information. ¶3. (U) According to press reports, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has also urged that the peace talks should continue, despite the Mumbai blasts. "We should carry on," he said, adding that India had not responded to Pakistan's offer of cooperation in the investigation. Foreign Minister Kasuri is also reported to have weighed in, characterizing the postponement of the talks as a "negative development," and complaining that India was making unhelpful "spontaneous allegations" and turning Pakistan into a "scapegoat." Kasuri went on to question what interest the Pakistan Government could possibly have in supporting terrorism and promoting instability when Pakistan's future lay in its role as a "hub" between South and Central Asia. Pakistan wanted stability in the region, and was working hard to that end. ¶4. (U) On July 19, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan convened G-8 and EU Ambassadors to confirm that Pakistan had received notice from India that his meetings scheduled for July 20-21 were not possible because of the environment surrounding the Mumbai blasts. New dates had not been floated, but he interpreted Manmohan Singh's comments in the wake of the blasts as an encouraging indicator that the peace talks were not stalled. Khan repeated Pakistan's offer to assist in the investigation on the basis of solid evidence. Pakistan was a part of the cadre of nations fighting the war on terror, he observed, and would certainly act if given specific information. Pakistan took the position that there should be no activity from its soil that was harmful to another nation. Khan hoped that CBMs would remain in place, because the process was important for the two nations, for the region and for the world. Moreover it would be constructive to devote renewed efforts on long-stalled issues like the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek. The "ultimate CBM is the ability to resolve problems," he observed. Khan acknowledged, however, that he had no idea when the talks would reconvene or where. ¶5. (C) In a July 19 meeting with Polcouns, DG for South Asia ISLAMABAD 00013801 002 OF 002 Jalil Jilani said that India's postponement of the talks was not a surprise. Indeed, even before the attacks he had noticed a surge in unsubstantiated allegations of Pakistan's involvement in terrorism. These allegations were inconsistent with the evidence, as acknowledged by third parties and even by some Indian officials, that levels of infiltration had dropped by as much as 80 percent. At the "highest level" even Indians were aware of Pakistan's efforts. The Indian Home Secretary, after a visit to Pakistan in June, had publicly acknowledged that the number of incidents had dropped significantly. Jilani said that in Pakistan's view it would be impossible to reduce the number incidents to zero because there were highly motivated "disgruntled elements" that would continue trying to mount operations, whether from Indian Kashmir or elsewhere. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz had assured Indian leaders that there was no official support from Pakistan and National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz had discussed the issue at length with his Indian counterpart last month in Dubai. ¶6. (C) Echoing Musharraf and Riaz Khan, Jilani stressed that Pakistan was eager to assist India in the investigation. But it needed clear information. Unfortunately, India was historically very reluctant to share such information out of fear that it would reveal sources. But in Jilani's view there was also a political dimension; he suspected that India welcomed the excuse to officially postpone the talks because they were in a stalling phase anyway on virtually all significant issues. Nonetheless Jilani regretted the postponement, saying that he thought the sides were close to agreement on a CBMs relating to nuclear accidents, prisoners and visas. Jilani characterized Pakistan's reaction to Indian accusations and implications as "very moderate, very mature." There had been no counter accusations following the postponement of the talks. Pakistan had simply said it was a "negative development." "Pakistan's goal is to get back to the dialogue process," he concluded, "that is the bottom line." Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We understand that postponement of these talks was all but inevitable, given Indian public sentiment in the wake of the Mumbai bombing -- specifically the public perception that Pakistan must have been involved. However, these talks and the modest CBMs emerging from them, are one of the few bright spots in the relationship and they have had a significant impact in shaping Pakistani perceptions of India. Musharraf is correct in observing that the sides should not allow terrorists, who have long opposed peace efforts, to hold the process hostage. CROCKER