AFGHAN AMBASSADOR ON FM SPANTA'S JUNE 23 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 012211 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2016 TAGS: PK PREL AF IN SUBJECT: AFGHAN AMBASSADOR ON FM SPANTA'S JUNE 23 VISIT TO ISLAMABAD Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: On June 25, Afghan Ambassador Tarzi offered poloff a read-out of foreign Minister Spanta's June 23 visit to Pakistan, his first bilateral foreign travel since assuming office. While in Islamabad, Spanta was received by President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and Foreign Minister Kasuri, who had personally invited Spanta to visit following their bilateral discussions on the margins of the June 19-21 OIC Ministerial in Baku. According to Tarzi, the themes of economic and security cooperation dominated all official meetings. Although the meetings were cordial, neither side appeared satisfied with the other's response on two core issues: for Afghanistan, cross-border terrorism; for Pakistan, the fear of India using Afghanistan as a base for nefarious operations in Balochistan and the Tribal Areas. The parties agreed to a schedule of follow-up diplomatic and security meetings to build momentum for improved bilateral relations, but overcoming mutual suspicion and mistrust will clearly require substantial effort. End summary and introduction. ¶2. (C) Tarzi characterized the meetings between FM Spanta as cordial, noting that the two foreign ministers appear to be developing a solid working relationship. In addition to maintaining mil-mil contacts through Tripartite Commission mechanisms, the sides agreed to energize bilateral Pak-Afghan interaction through quarterly meetings of the Foreign Ministers and bi-monthly consultations between intelligence agencies. Without disclosing much detail, Tarzi said that Spanta's talks with the Pakistani leaders included economic issues such as trade corridors with Central Asia and a potential Turkmenistan-Afghanistan gas pipeline, but discussion of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was deferred for a future meeting. (Note: Post has forwarded MFA press release no. 222 describing Spanta's visit to SCA/PB. End note.) ¶3. (C) Tarzi became visibly excited when recounting a briefing by the Pakistan side objecting to the proliferation of Indian consulates and other official establishments in Afghanistan, an issue that figured prominently in all three of FM Spanta's official meetings. According to Tarzi, the Pakistani side insisted that there are twelve (12) official Indian posts in Afghanistan, refusing to accept the Afghan's reassurance that India has been allowed to open only four (4) lightly-staffed consulates, two of which -- Kandahar and Jalalabad -- have served nearby Sikh and Hindu communities since Partition. (Note: Tarzi said that the two other Indian consulates -- Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif -- were opened in the early 1990s during the mujahideen government. End note.) Responding to Pakistani angst that Indian agents are using these diplomatic missions to launch mischief in Balochistan, the Afghan officials assured their hosts that Kabul will not allow India or other foreign elements to conduct anti-Pakistan operations from Afghan territory. That said, Spanta told the Pakistanis not to drag Afghanistan into its decade-long conflict with India-- a message that he repeated publically upon his return to Kabul. (Note: Tarzi confessed his personal frustration at his inability to disabuse the GOP of its misimpression regarding the nature and extent of the official Indian presence in Afghanistan, saying that Pakistani diplomats in Kabul are fully aware of the size and location of India's diplomatic missions. Post is not surprised that the "Indian consulate" conspiracy took up much of Spanta's visit, as Pakistani interlocutors at every level subscribe to the theory. End note.) ¶4. (C) Tarzi was also concerned that Pakistan's oft-voiced commitment to prevent cross-border terrorism will not translate into action. Although FM Spanta received strong messages in each meeting regarding Pakistan's resolve, Tarzi ISLAMABAD 00012211 002 OF 002 said that the Afghans were looking for concrete results. When poloff pressed on what those results might be, Tarzi offered nothing more specific than saying that Kabul had been pleased by Pakistan's security cooperation during the 2004 presidential election. When the Pakistani side raised its own concerns with terrorist/militants entering Pakistan from Afghanistan, Tarzi said that the Afghan side repeated its assurance that the Karzai government has no interest in destabilizing Pakistan. Discussion during Spanta's visit did not specifically address the GOP's three-tiered strategy to stabilize the tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border, although Tarzi suggested that this could be the subject of subsequent consulations. ¶5. (SBU) Post has sought appointments with MFA officials to gauge the Pakistani assessment of Spanta's visit, only to have its requests deferred until the conclusion of the MFA's annual Chief of Mission convocation on June 29. ¶6. (C) Comment: Conveying skepticism regarding the GOP's commitment to improving bilateral relations, Tarzi speculated that FM Kasuri had quickly arranged Spanta's visit so that he could report that he had "checked the box" during his upcoming visit to Washington in July. Tarzi was as quick to ascribe responsibility to (and insinuate direct support by) the GOP for Taliban and anti-Coalition militants crossing into Afghanistan as he was to distance the Karzai government from any responsibility for cross-border activity (whether sponsored by al Qaeda, the Taliban or India) in the other direction. Overcoming these mutual suspicions and mistrust to energize this most recent rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad will continue to require active USG engagement and counsel. CROCKER