PROMINENT HONG KONG PROTESTANT DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 003207

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP AND EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2031
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL HK CH VT
SUBJECT: PROMINENT HONG KONG PROTESTANT DISCUSSES
SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (C-AL6-01115)

REF: HONG KONG 1362

HONG KONG 00003207 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Jeff Zaiser; Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment. On July 31, Reverend Chan
Kim-kwong, Executive Secretary of the Hong Kong Christian
Council (HKCC) told poloff that the issue of Sino-Vatican
relations had moved beyond the State Council's purview and
was currently being deliberated by the General Office of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, with
meetings chaired by President Hu Jintao. Chan said some of
his Vatican contacts believed that Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph
Zen had "sabotaged" Archbishop Claudio Maria Celli's visit to
Beijing last month, through a premature leak to the media,
due to his concern that the Vatican was rushing to negotiate
with the PRC. Zen wanted more personal influence on the
Vatican's China policy, but was not part of the Pope's "inner
circle" of China policy advisors. Chan observed that
implementation of new regulations intended to ease
registration of religious organizations in the mainland had
been mixed at best, primarily because officials at the local
and provincial levels paid little or no attention to
religious issues. Chan also noted the recent "promotion of
Buddhism" by Chinese officials as a possible area of concern,
especially if preferential treatment of Buddhism would come
at the expense of other religions operating in China. End
Summary.


2. (C) Comment: It was clear in previous discussions with the
papal representative in Hong Kong that the Vatican Foreign
Ministry was upset by Zen's leak of Celli's visit to Beijing,
which the representative attributed to Zen's
"misunderstanding" of the confidential nature of the trip.
However, Chan's comments suggest that Zen may be much more
"media savvy" than some observers had believed. End Comment.


3. (C) On July 31, poloff discussed mainland religious
freedom issues and Sino-Vatican relations with Reverend Chan
Kim-kwong, Executive Secretary of the Hong Kong Christian
Council (HKCC). In addition to his prominent position within
the Protestant organization, Chan also is an Honorary
Research Fellow of the University Services Center for China
Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and has
published papers on Sino-Vatican and PRC religious issues.
This is the first of two cables reporting on poloff's July 31
meeting with Chan.

President Hu In Charge of Sino-Vatican Relations
-------------- ---


4. (C) Sino-Vatican relations were in a deadlock, said Chan.
Discussion of the issue had now moved beyond the State
Council's purview and was currently being deliberated by the
General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party. These meeting were chaired by President Hu
Jintao.

Zen and the Vatican
--------------


5. (C) Chan, who has contacts within the Vatican through his
previous research on Sino-Vatican issues, said some of his
Vatican contacts believed Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen had
"sabotaged" Archbishop Claudio Maria Celli's visit to Beijing
last month. Chan said Zen was more concerned about the state
of religious freedom in China and did not "like" former
Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Angelo Sodano's approach
to Sino-Vatican negotiations. Zen wanted to have more
personal influence on the Vatican's China policy, but he was
not part of the Pope's "inner circle" of China policy
advisors. Because of his concern over the Vatican's "rush"
to negotiate normalization of Holy See-PRC ties, Zen
deliberately "prematurely leaked" news of Celli's visit to
Beijing, which many Vatican officials had hoped would be a
"breakthrough mission." Celli and Monsignor Gianfranco Rota
Graziosi already had bought their tickets and were prepared
to leave for Beijing when Zen's comments about a Vatican
delegation already in Beijing were published in the media.
In an effort to make it appear that Zen's information had
been incorrect, Celli and Graziosi delayed their trip by two
days. In the meantime, however, the Chinese were clearly
upset by the media leak, gave the Vatican delegation a "cold
reception" upon arrival in Beijing, and only scheduled a
five-minute meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister. Both
sides signified their unhappiness by making no official
announcements upon conclusion of the visit.

HONG KONG 00003207 002.2 OF 003




6. (C) The Pope's March 27 ceremony for the 15 newly elevated
cardinals was another example of Zen "trying to flex his
muscle," said Chan. Traditionally, cardinals were permitted
to bring approximately ten family members and friends to
participate in this special occasion, followed by a brief --
perhaps ten second -- opportunity to greet the Pope and take
a photo. Unlike the other cardinals in attendance, however,
Zen chose to make his moment a high-profile media event,
taking several minutes to introduce former Democratic Party
Chairman Martin Lee and "Apple Daily" publisher Jimmy Lai to
Pope Benedict (ref A). With a large Hong Kong media
contingent present, Zen's actions overshadowed the other
cardinals present at the ceremony.


7. (C) Chan said Zen's actions have not gone unnoticed by the
Pope. During an early June trip to Rome, although Zen
clearly indicated his desire for a private audience, Pope
Benedict did not schedule a meeting. Chan denied, however,
that there was any rift between Zen and the Pope, and said
Zen was not worried his relationship with the Pope,
especially since the two men were "theologically aligned."

The Status of Religious Freedom in Mainland China
-------------- --------------


8. (C) According to Chan, who spends half of the year in
China conducting religious research, there has been no
noticeable increase or decrease in harassment, nor has he
detected any new patterns in Public Security Bureau arrests.
Implementation of new religious affairs regulations,
effective since March 2005, has been at best mixed, primarily
because officials at the local and provincial levels paid
little or no attention to religious issues. The new
regulations technically had eased registration of religious
organizations, such as house churches, by not requiring
affiliation with the official Three Self Protestant Movement
(TSPM). However, the law had been "rushed" and
implementation at the local levels was a "big mess." Chan
believed the religious reform "works on paper," but after one
year there is still uncertainty over what is expected at the
provincial and local level Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB)
offices. For example, it was not clear whether the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) would require
each province to designate a RAB official to monitor and
oversee each newly registered group. For many cash-strapped
localities, implementation of these new religious regulations
was simply not a priority.


9. (C) Another concern of the PRC Government, said Chan, was
the question of how to monitor the expansion and
diversification of religious activity in China. The Central
Government had been extremely interested in a 2004 scholarly
article Chan had published on "China's Socioeconomic Changes
and Implications for the Religion-State Dynamic in China,"
which Chan said had been widely circulated among the Chinese
leadership. (Note: The article can be downloaded at
"lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2004/2CHA-FIN3.pd f" End Note.)
In this article Chan argued that, as China entered the World
Trade Organization, Chinese society would become increasingly
exposed to a more international understanding of religion's
role in society. Furthermore, with the return of overseas
Chinese people and the proliferation of foreign businesses in
China, the PRC Government would be forced to adjust their
understanding of the relationship between religion and the
state. Chan concluded that the "Chinese Government should
realize the importance of religious liberty in establishing a
stable social environment. It should adopt a new policy
towards religion by loosening its internal and international
control over religion."


10. (C) Chan also noted that the Central Government had in
recent years tolerated the growth of several religious groups
not among the five officially recognized religious groups
(Buddhist, Daoist, Islamic, Catholic, and Protestant).
Several groups, including the Church of Latter Day Saints,
Ba'hai, and the Unification Church, had in recent years been
permitted to operate in a less restrictive environment. For
example, the Russian Orthodox Church recently had received
permission to build a chapel in Beijing, had sent 13 Chinese
Orthodox students to Moscow for theological training, and had
been permitted to have Russian priests directly minister to
adherents in China. Chan believed this relatively tolerant
official attitude stemmed from two factors: First, the
Orthodox Church has operated in a low-key manner; and second,
the Chinese may have wanted to offer Russia a "goodwill

HONG KONG 00003207 003.2 OF 003


gesture" to improve Sino-Russian ties. Of particular note,
said Chan, was the fact that the Chinese authorities have, so
far, not made any comments about possible "foreign
intervention" by the Russia-based leader of the Orthodox
Church, the Patriarch of Moscow.

Is China Endorsing Buddhism Over Other Religions?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Chan noted the recent "promotion of Buddhism" by
Chinese officials as a possible area of concern. In April,
China hosted the inaugural World Buddhist Forum, China's
first international religious gathering. Chinese officials
view Buddhism as more in line with Chinese cultural values of
harmony. Chan wondered whether the perceived preferential
treatment of Buddhism would come at the expense of other
religions operating in China.
Sakaue