Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HONGKONG2373
2006-06-08 09:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

MEGAPORTS - BILATERAL MEETING ADVANCES

Tags:  ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON EWWT HK CH 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHK #2373/01 1590904
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080904Z JUN 06
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4105
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7154
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 002373 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP GDAVIES AND WCOMLEY
EAP/CM RGOLDBERG/RFORDEN/KBENNETT EB/TRA DHAYWOOD, ISN/ECC
KCROUCH/JWORDEN, OES CDIAMOND, INL DGORDNER, S/CT SKONTOS
NSC FOR WILDER
ICE FOR JMYERS, JCLARK, DBROWN
CBP/INA FOR CONTAINER SECURITY DIVISION
TOKYO FOR ENERGY ATTACHE JMILLER
ENERGY/NNSA FOR DHUIZENGA, JGERRARD, WKILMARTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2030
TAGS: ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON EWWT HK CH
SUBJECT: MEGAPORTS - BILATERAL MEETING ADVANCES
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING

REF: A. HONG KONG 588

B. HONG KONG 979

Classified By: Economic Political Chief Simon Schuchat.
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 002373 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP GDAVIES AND WCOMLEY EAP/CM RGOLDBERG/RFORDEN/KBENNETT EB/TRA DHAYWOOD, ISN/ECC KCROUCH/JWORDEN, OES CDIAMOND, INL DGORDNER, S/CT SKONTOS NSC FOR WILDER ICE FOR JMYERS, JCLARK, DBROWN CBP/INA FOR CONTAINER SECURITY DIVISION TOKYO FOR ENERGY ATTACHE JMILLER ENERGY/NNSA FOR DHUIZENGA, JGERRARD, WKILMARTIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2030 TAGS: ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON EWWT HK CH SUBJECT: MEGAPORTS - BILATERAL MEETING ADVANCES RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING REF: A. HONG KONG 588 ¶B. HONG KONG 979 Classified By: Economic Political Chief Simon Schuchat. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 28-29, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Assistant Deputy Administrator David Huizenga led an inter-agency delegation (Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and State) to Hong Kong to discuss next steps in the USG's proposed implementation of the Megaports Initiative. Huizenga laid out an end-state vision of a fully operational radiation detection system for containerized cargo moving through Hong Kong, enhanced by container imaging information and the provision of information on U.S.-bound containers to U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) officials. Hong Kong Government (HKG) officials said that they were considering Megaports among a number of options for responding to the need for improved container security. The HKG also asked for more time to finalize its plan for improving security at the Port of Hong Kong. During the meeting with Huizenga, HKG officials asked questions about program costs, potential impacts on port operations, and the effectiveness of the program. During separate meetings, Hong Kong and South China terminal operators expressed a willingness to support any specific container security initiatives presented by the United States. However, they queried Huizenga about the benefits of the Megaports program and how they would be able to maintain competitiveness with other ports in South China, as well as recoup the costs of installing the technology and reviewing the cargo scans. End summary. -------------- -------------- Hong Kong Government Has Yet to Endorse Megaports Initiative -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on May 29, HKG Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau Principal Assistant Secretary David Leung told an inter-agency delegation, led by National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Assistant Deputy Administrator
David Huizenga, that the HKG was still deliberating on the U.S. Department of Energy's proposed Memorandum of Understanding on the Megaports initiative. Without providing specifics, Leung said that the HKG was considering a number of government and private sector-led programs for the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. He urged the USG not to limit the HKG's options by moving ahead with a government-private partnership with the Port of Hong Kong before the Government of Hong Kong determines what measures it will institute to screen cargo for nuclear and radiological material. Leung also asked questions about the projected cost of the Megaports project, and requested that Huizenga's delegation provide a cost estimate. Huizenga advised that costs vary from port-to-port, but that the Megaports Program budgets approximately USD $15 million per seaport. ¶3. (C) HKG Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau Deputy Secretary Mary S.C. Chow questioned Huizenga's delegation SIPDIS about overall development of the Megaports initiative globally and the potential impact of Megaports on port operations. Huizenga responded that the USG is very serious about cooperating with governments around the world to implement Megaports to enhance global container port security. Megaports is currently operational in the ports of Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Piraeus, Greece; Freeport, Bahamas; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Algeciras, Spain; and Singapore. Megaports projects are under development in the ports of Laem Chabang, Thailand; Haifa, Israel; Manila, the Philippines; Antwerp, Belgium; Salalah, Oman; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. ¶4. (C) Huizenga emphasized that the U.S. Government would work closely with Hong Kong Customs and terminal operators to ensure that Megaports was seamlessly incorporated into the Port,s terminal operations to minimize delays. Huizenga also highlighted new radiation portal monitor technology that may soon be available that would improve the overall operability of Megaports systems. Alarm rates at the Port of Rotterdam were also discussed. DOE/NNSA had arranged for HKG officials to visit the Port of Rotterdam the week before Huizenaga,s visit. In commenting on the visit to Rotterdam, the HKG relayed that the Dutch advised Hong Kong that primary alarm rates averaged approximately 2.8 percent, and that the volume of alarms and ensuing secondary inspections was manageable, and that the impact on the port,s operations was also manageable. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Interdiction and Security (Technology) Office Director Todd Hoffman speculated that compared to Rotterdam, Hong Kong would likely have relatively few alarms for radioactive materials since the Port of Hong Kong exports mainly finished goods. ¶5. (C) Chow expressed concern over whether the U.S. planned to screen transshipped cargo that moved ship to ship. Huizenga acknowledged that it was difficult to perform radiological scans of this type of cargo, and said that the USG's priority was to scan cargo that arrived through the "gate" of the port irrespective of its destination, or was offloaded from river barges onto the docks before being reloaded on container vessels, especially those containers bound for the U.S. According to Hong Kong Customs, only 19 percent of Hong Kong's container cargo is transshipped from ship to ship, and the majority of that is for intra-Asian trade; therefore, the opportunity for U.S. bound cargo to pass through Hong Kong uninspected for radiological material was slim. In addition, according to CBP Program Manager Patrick Simmons, the USG is also expanding radiological screening of inbound cargo, with a goal of screening 98 percent of inbound cargo at U.S. ports by the end of 2007. -------------- -------------- Inconclusive First-Round Test Results for the Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS) in Hong Kong -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Megaports radiological monitoring equipment can be incorporated into an Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS),which also includes X-ray imaging and container and vehicle identification. Modern Terminals and Hong Kong International Terminals (HIT) have tested ICIS, developed by Science Applications International Corp (SAIC),for almost two years. Although the systems function smoothly in gathering data, they have produced inconclusive results as a result of the high levels of naturally occurring background radiation at the port, according to Hoffman. Background radiation is approximately five times the levels found in the US due to the presence of radioactive thorium sand in the concrete. (This is a problem that the Megaports Initiative has encountered and mitigated elsewhere in Asia.) ¶7. (C) Hoffman said that, to improve the accuracy of the ICIS radiological detection equipment, SAIC should decrease the lane width and shields the lane from background radiation. A new data set would help to confirm that the ICIS system could work effectively in Hong Kong. The second operational test will also be used to evaluate whether Container Security Initiative,s (CSI) U.S.-based officials could assist in resolving container alarms to reduce the resource burden on Hong Kong Customs. ¶8. (C) During the meeting with the HKG, CSI Evaluations and Assessments Chief Todd Horton said that CSI hoped to receive the HKG's approval for a pilot proposal to allow radiation and imaging data from ICIS on U.S.-bound cargo to be transmitted back to the United States for review. Horton explained that this would significantly reduce the resource requirements on Hong Kong Customs because U.S. Customs officials could provide initial assessments of suspect containers, and only refer unresolvable cases to Hong Kong Customs for secondary inspections. Horton estimated that secondary inspections would require about 5 to 30 minutes. Leung responded that because the Integrated Container Inspection System currently under testing at the Port of Hong Kong is a commercial partnership and has no government involvement, the HKG would leave the decision at this stage on whether to send data back to the U.S. to the terminal operators. Leung also urged the USG not to limit the HKG's options by moving ahead and advising the Hong Kong terminal operators of USG support for the ICIS concept before the Government of Hong Kong determines what measures it will institute to screen cargo for nuclear and radiological material. ¶9. (C) At a subsequent meeting with the Consul General, Hoffman said that CBP planned to use the next 90 days to optimize the ICIS technology at the Hong Kong port terminals so that a new test could confirm the effectiveness of the radiological screening device. Both Hoffman and Huizenga expected to have a new set of results in about 120 days. -------------- -------------- Hong Kong and South China Terminal Operators Pledge to Support Specific USG Container Security Initiatives -------------- -------------- ¶10. (U) On the afternoon of May 29, the Huizenga delegation met at Modern Terminals with representatives from Hutchison Port Holdings, Modern Terminals, Yantian Terminals, Shekou Terminals, DP World, and Asia Container Terminals. For the port operators, Yantian Terminals Director and General Manager Kenneth Tse led the discussion. Modern Terminals Logistics General Manager Jessie Chung and also contributed. ¶11. (C) Tse summarized the port operators' key points as follows: -- Hong Kong and Southern China terminal operators would not use container security measures to gain a competitive advantage over one another (i.e., they all wanted to use the same system). -- The port operators placed a high importance on port security, and would support any specific initiatives that the USG proposed. However, given that the USG has only done a "pilot" so far with inconclusive results, the port operators and the Hong Kong Shippers Council had yet to hear a strong message from the USG about its desire to proceed with either the Megaports or ICIS initiative. -- Once the USG has optimized its technology for the local conditions and reached agreement on a final plan with the HKG, the terminal operators estimated that it would take about 6 months to acquire and install the technology. -- Tse noted the importance of positive incentives and asked the USG delegation whether any the installation of radiological portals would result in any benefits, such as a so-called green lane into U.S. ports. -- Hutchison Port Holdings Americas Senior Vice President Gary Gilbert emphasized that terminal operators would have to ensure that they could recoup their costs by installing radiological equipment. He asked whether the USG had any ideas about how to ensure that shippers compensated the port operators for installing and maintaining any new security package. He also advised that all South China terminal operators would install the same equipment and charge the same security fee downstream to ensure a level playing field and recoup security investment costs. -- Finally, Tse expressed a willingness to provide the USG with whatever container information was necessary to complete the testing of the Megaports concept in HK. ¶12. (C) Huizenga emphasized repeatedly that the USG placed a high importance on implementing Megaports. Huizenga committed to following up with SAIC to tailor the ICIS technology to include radiation shielding. Huizenga emphasized that Hong Kong's compliance would make it a world leader and role model in container port security. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶13. (U) Participants in the meetings are listed below. From the HKG (on the morning of May 29): Mary Chow, Commerce, Industry, and Technology Bureau (CITB) Deputy Secretary David Leung, CITB Principal Assistant Secretary Vivien Li, CITB Assistant Secretary Manda Chan, Principal Assistant Secretary for Security K.M. Fung, Economic Development and Labour Bureau (EDLB) Principal Assistant Secretary ¶K. Chow, Customs and Excise Department Assistant Commissioner for Boundary and Ports C.F. Li, Customs Senior Superintendent at the Ports and Maritime Command Kenneth Chu, Senior Customs Inspector Billy K.S. Au, Trade and Industry Department Principal Trade Officer From the USG: David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator, DOE/NNSA Jeff Miller, DOE Energy Attache to Japan Michael Fink, Megaports Initiative, NNSA/DOE Daniel Hartnett, Foreign Affairs Specialist, NNSA/DOE Andrew Grant, Acting Deputy Director, WMD Terrorism Office, Department of State Todd Hoffman, Director, Interdiction and Security Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Todd Horton. Chief of Evaluations and Assessments, Container Security Initiative, CBP Patrick Simmons, CBP Program Manager Scott Purvis, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Systems Architect Lauren Zucker, Policy Analyst, DHS Jacob Aguilar, CBP Officer Charles Massey, MARSEC Group Partner and DOE Contractor Thomas Howe, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attache Joseph Klaus, CSI Team Leader Political Officer Dusty Clayton From the Container Terminal Operators (on the afternoon of May 29): Kenneth Tse, Director and General Manager, Yantian International Container Terminals (a member of the Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) Group) Jessie Chung, General Manager Logistics, Modern Terminals (MTL) Gary Gilbert, Senior Vice President for the Americas, HPH Ben Kong, Hong Kong Customer Service Manager, DP World Alice Ho, Chief Financial Officer, Shekou Container Terminals Ltd Gloria Lo, CSI Service Development Manager, HPH Jessica Ng, Commercial Manager, George Chu, Senior Manager, CSI Service Strategy, HPH John Kok, General Manager, CSI, HPH Ken Chou, General Manager Commercial Development, HPH Paul Ho, Safety and Security Manager, Hong Kong International Terminals (a member of HPH) Lawrence Shum, Company Secretary for Yantian International Container Terminals Gloria Choy, Operations and Engineering Director, Asia Container Terminals Ltd Libra Ng, Logistics Manager, MTL Ivy Yip, Assistant Logistics Manager, MTL From SAIC (on May 28 for an ICIS tours at HIT and MTL for USG participants): Terry Gibson, Vice President, Business Development (also attended meeting on afternoon of May 29 with port operators) Keith Saunders, Business Development Manager Adrian Stoian, R&D Project Manager ¶14. (U) This cable has been reviewed by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Energy. Cunningham

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