TRAN KHUE DISCUSSES THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF VIETNAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000607 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/6/16 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR VM SUBJECT: TRAN KHUE DISCUSSES THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF VIETNAM REF: A) HANOI 1338; B) HANOI 1320 HO CHI MIN 00000607 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Silberstein, Political Officer, ConGen HCMC, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (d) CLASSIFIED BY: Consul General Seth Winnick for Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On June 6 we met with political dissident Tran Khue in HCMC to discuss developments related to the "Democratic Party of Vietnam," which Khue and other dissidents launched in Hanoi on June 1. Khue said that he has been tasked with opening a Party office in HCMC; he has sufficient funding from "internal and external sources" to do so. Prior to traveling to Hanoi to launch the DPV, Khue consulted in person with other prominent dissidents, including Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam leader Thich Quang Do, who reportedly supports the DPV. Khue said he has sharp difference with other dissidents, who he portrayed as more extreme. Khue said he does not believe members of the DPV face imminent arrest; Vietnam's WTO entry (which he supports), the Congressional PNTR vote, the President's visit for the APEC Leaders' Summit and internal political factors within the Communist Party constrain the GVN from acting against the DPV. If anything, he understands that the GVN is looking to find a face-saving way to release prominent dissidents such as Pham Hong Son. Thus far HCMC-based media has been muted on the DPV and the latitude that Khue's police minders are giving him and other dissidents to meet and consult with each other is notable. Khue understands that his calculations on GVN restraint may be wrong, but says he is prepared to face the risk. End Summary. HCMC Consultations on the DPV -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 6 we met in a cafe in HCMC with political dissident Tran Khue to review developments related to the "Democratic Party of Vietnam (DPV)," of which Khue is a founding member. Khue told us that in April, prior to his departure for Hanoi to set up the DPV, he consulted Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) General Secretary Thich Quang Do as well as with democratic activist Nguyen Dan Que. This was his third meeting with Thich Quang Do at the monk's pagoda in HCMC. He met Dr. Que at his home. Khue said that Thich Quang Do approved of the proposal to set up the DPV, telling Khue that Vietnam needed political pluralism. TQD apparently rebuffed an offer to join, telling Khue that as a religious figure it would not be appropriate to join, but that "he had a political viewpoint and that he fully supported the DPV." (Note: To date we have not seen a public statement from the UBCV in support of the DPV or its members, since the establishment of the DPV on June 1. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Khue portrayed Dr. Que as sympathetic to the DPV, but also unwilling to join. Khue said it was a matter of political philosophy (and perhaps personal pride); the DPV has a three-point agenda for free assembly, free elections and free press in Vietnam. Que's "nine-point roadmap" goes beyond what the DPV is willing to advocate at this point in time, Khue told us. He said that he also met with Hoa Hao activist Le Quang Liem, Mennonite Pastor Nguyen Hong Quang and Father Chan Tin to discuss the DPV. ¶4. (C) Khue said that the DPV has sharp disagreements with Hue-based dissident Father Nguyen Van Ly and HCMC-based dissident Do Nam Hai (aka Phuong Nam). Khue has met with Father Ly three times at Khue's home in HCMC since the Catholic priest was released from prison in September 2005. Khue said that he told Ly and Hai, his former protege, that to be effective, activists must win the support of reformists within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV),avoid insulting President Ho Chi Minh, and, accept that the Communist Party has had some achievements. According to Khue, Ly and Hai "want to overturn everything," and go well beyond the position of the DPV. The DPV wants to stake out political middle ground between the communist Party and anti-communist Vietnamese extremists. Events in Hanoi -------------- ¶5. (C) Khue confirmed the depiction of events surrounding the police raid at Hong Minh Chinh's house in Hanoi on May 27 that DPV associate Dai Nguyen provided Emboffs (reftels). When he refused to accompany police at the time of the raid, burly policemen "escorted" him to the station. Once there, however, police were respectful and he was prepared to chat with them. The meeting was videotaped, Khue said, although he refused to sign a "minute" of the proceedings that the police prepared. He refused to attend a follow up session with police on May 28. Khue said that, in addition to confiscating computer equipment at Hong Minh Chinh's residence, the police also placed cell phone blocking equipment near Chinh's home as well as at a friend's house where Khue was staying. ¶6. (C) Khue said that he was supposed to chair the May 30 briefing for diplomats on the DPV (ref b). However, on the morning of the day, police invited him to go on an outing at a HO CHI MIN 00000607 002.2 OF 002 tourist resort some 30 kilometers outside of Hanoi. Khue accepted the invitation. Police kept him eating and drinking outside of Hanoi until 6 p.m., by which time the briefing was over. When asked why police didn't try the same tactic with Dai, Khue said that he did not know. He was told by Dai that the lawyer was summoned by police in the morning for a working session, in which Dai reportedly was warned not to bring Khue to the meeting with diplomats. Khue noted that the police in charge of the DPV are from the "A42" unit, which, according to our information, is tasked with monitoring "political opportunists and released counter-revolutionaries." Next Steps -------------- ¶7. (C) Khue stated that the DPV plans to release an "action plan" and to set up an office in HCMC in the near future. Khue has plans to hire staff, lawyers and personal bodyguards for the HCMC operation. Asked about funding, Khue said that the DPV has sufficient funding from "internal Vietnamese and external Viet Kieu sources" that are channeled through the organizers of the Vietnamese Democratic Movement website that he helped establish (www.ptdcvn.com). Khue also claimed that the DPV was receiving assistance from "foreign governments and foreign NGOs," but when pressed said that he would publicize that information "later." ¶8. (C) Khue lauded Vietnam's WTO accession, but said the process must be coupled with a push for democratization inside the country. He welcomed the June 4-6 SecDef visit to Hanoi, as it demonstrates increased USG engagement in South East Asia. The Vietnamese know that the U.S. is the only counterweight to China, Khue added. Is Arrest Imminent? -------------- ¶9. (C) Although saying that the "Party understands that what we are doing is very dangerous," and that pressure on them may be intensified, Khue did not think that the DPV members were in danger of imminent arrest. Police did not threaten him directly with arrest or imprisonment in Hanoi, although family members have been warned more obliquely that he should be "careful." Khue's family also has not faced any significant increase in harassment from the police beyond the "usual" cutting of phone lines and Internet access. Police also continue to intimidate the renters of the storefront in his house, telling them that it is an "insecure area." His family is about to lose the fifth set of renters in the past two years. ¶10. (C) WTO entry, the Congressional vote on extending to Vietnam Permanent Normal Trading Relations, the upcoming APEC Summit and the President's visit constrain the GVN from moving against the DPV, in Khue's view. "Everyone has read the President's State of the Union Address and knows of the U.S. commitment to democracy," he said. Vietnam had made commitments to the international community on human rights and religious freedom. Vietnam also needs to think twice about U.S. Congress and EU Parliament reaction before making any arrests. The GVN is aware of the experience of the Burmese junta and does not want to go down that path, Khue said. ¶11. (C) In addition to external pressures, the Party also is wrestling with the PMU-18 corruption scandal and other internal issues that are more pressing than the DPV. If anything, Khue sees the Party as trying to find a face-saving way to release prominent dissidents such as Pham Hong Son and Nguyen Vu Binh, not to "arrest more of us." Khue understands that the authorities offered to release Son if he signed a "cease and desist" pledge similar to the one Nguyen Khac Toan made prior to his release from prison. Son has thus far refused to play along, Khue said. ¶12. (C) Khue acknowledged that his calculations could be wrong and that his freedom depended on Hanoi, which could decide to move against the DPV. He was ready to accept any risk, including jail and death, so that "others do not have to fear." ¶13. (C) Comment: Khue was relaxed and smiling at our meeting and was happy to talk about the DPV gameplan. He promised us discretion and we promised him the same. The latitude that authorities are giving Khue and other dissidents is interesting; the police clearly could have blocked Khue from meeting with Thich Quang Do or Father Ly. Thus far, the official public response to the DPV and the overall surge in dissident activity has been muted, in contrast to the public vitriol and physical attacks against DPV leader Hoang Minh Chinh in HCMC and then Hanoi upon his return from the United states in early 2006. With the exception of one op-ed in the "Voice of Vietnam," the DPV has not yet been raised in any HCMC-based media outlets, including the local Party mouthpiece "Saigon Giai Phong" (Saigon Liberation). End Comment. WINNICK