ETHNIC MINORITY NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND MIGRATION:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001050 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV KIRF PREF VM SUBJECT: ETHNIC MINORITY NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND MIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS REF: EAP/MLS 9/12 EMAIL; B) HCMC 917; C) HCMC 72; D) HCMC 760; E) HCMC HO CHI MIN 00001050 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Ref A reported allegations about conditions in the Central Highlands made by ethnic minority advocacy groups to Department officials on September 11. The advocates asserted that ethnic minority individuals are not fleeing for economic reasons, but because of severe human rights and religious persecution in the Highlands; that Mission officials cannot ascertain the true conditions in the Central Highlands because of GVN controls and intimidation; and that the GVN harasses and seizes remittances from Visas-93 (family reunification) beneficiaries. This message provides our analysis of factors at play in the Central Highlands and refutes the assertions of systematic persecution of ethnic minorities in general and Visas-93 beneficiaries in particular. Triangulating and Vetting Information -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ConGen and Embassy officers regularly visit the Central Highlands. In addition to our visits, we are in frequent contact with independent sources in the Catholic Church and Protestant community operating in the area. Over the past year, we have also conducted dozens of private discussions with ethnic minority Visas-93 beneficiaries in HCMC, as well as private meetings with ethnic minority returnees and their families and other ethnic minority individuals in the Central Highlands. Our sources frequently debunk allegations of mass arrests, lockdowns of entire villages or severe harassment of Visas-93 (family reunification) beneficiaries. However, we have been able to document cases of serious abuse (Refs B and C),despite official attempts to "prepare" villagers in advance of our visits. Furthermore, official "escorts" have not deterred ethnic minority individuals from speaking frankly with us. For example, some ethnic minority returnees were very plain spoken about their belief in ethnic separatism in front of provincial government and security officials (Refs D and E). No Generalized Harassment of Visas-93 Beneficiaries -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Our information -- including numerous private interviews with Visas-93 beneficiaries in HCMC -- does not/not support claims that the authorities in the Central Highlands currently have a policy of retaliation against the families of Visas-93 petitioners. The beneficiaries tell us that, following initial police scrutiny after the flight of their spouses, they have been able to go about their business without harassment. Detentions or harassment of particular VISAS-93 beneficiaries appears to be in response to actions by those beneficiaries, such as attempting to follow the spouse to Cambodia or clandestine support for family members wanted by police for questioning. With a handful of exceptions, beneficiaries have not had remittances from family members in the United States seized or withheld. They also have not been asked to pay bribes to travel to HCMC or to obtain documents and passports. Some have told us that local officials have helped them fill out their various application forms to expedite the migration process (these applicants were illiterate). Over 70 percent of our current Visas-93 caseload has been interviewed and processed in HCMC, with over half having already left for the United States. Additionally, there are indications that some beneficiary families do not wish to leave the Central Highlands. Poverty a Factor in Migration -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Our interviews with returnees from Cambodia and our private meetings with Visas-93 beneficiaries indicate that economics is an important factor driving cross border migration to Cambodia. Our Visas-93 beneficiary interviews also appear to show that some ethnic minority individuals in Cambodia exaggerated or distorted their circumstances in Vietnam to make the best possible case for refugee status. For example, per Ref F, one ethnic minority refugee seeker told interviewing officials in Cambodia that his land was taken by the government. His wife told us that they were given five acres. The demographics of the border crossers also highlight economics as a driver of migration: many migrants are young, male, single and terribly uneducated; they have little or no land; and, their economic future in Vietnam is marginal at best. Few of these migrants were born when the Vietnam War ended. (Ironically, one of the more successful ethnic minority individuals we have met in the Central Highlands province of Gia Lai is a former soldier in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the current deacon of the Protestant church in his village.) Dega: Why in the Central Highlands? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands have suffered from land dislocation, poverty and discrimination for at least five decades. This, however, is no different from other ethnic minority groups and, for that matter, ethnic Kinh (Vietnamese) peasants elsewhere in Vietnam. In fact, compared to other ethnic minority groups elsewhere in HCMC's consular HO CHI MIN 00001050 002.2 OF 002 district, the ethnic communities in the Central Highlands are more prosperous and appear to receive more government assistance. For example, many Visas-93 beneficiaries tell us that their villages are connected to the power grid, have potable water and see some government efforts to develop their villages. ¶6. (SBU) The concept of ethnic minority identity -- Dega -- is much more pronounced in the Central Highlands than in other ethnic minority areas of the south. As reported Ref G, the ethnic minority national movement in the Central Highlands -- FULRO -- did not end in 1975. FULRO continued an armed anti-GVN ethnic minority insurgency in the Central Highlands until 1992. Although the armed resistance that FULRO mounted never threatened Vietnamese control of the Central Highlands, the resistance complicated reconstruction and helped cement negative attitudes of the new provincial leaders towards some ethnic minorities. Moreover, despite the collapse of the FULRO insurgency, the idea of ethnic minority, "Dega" nationalism continues to resonate among some in the ethnic Ede, Jarai and Mnong communities in the Central Highlands. Continued economic and social grievances in the Central Highlands create fertile ground for the Dega movement to attract sympathizers. Other ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands and elsewhere in Vietnam do not have these nationalist aspirations. Religion and Dega -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Protestantism appears to be the dominant religion among the ethnic minority communities that have had the greatest involvement in the Dega movement. GVN arrests and repression there do not represent an animus against Protestantism per se, but are principally a response to security concerns over separatism. The emergence of the "Dega Protestant Church" in the late 1990s led the GVN to classify all Protestants in the Central Highlands as Dega sympathizers. As far as local authorities are concerned, the "Dega Protestant Church" is continuation of the FULRO movement by other means. The presence of Dega nationalists in Protestant religious organizations in the Central Highlands -- including the GVN-recognized Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam -- has complicated and slowed the process of registration and recognition of churches and congregations. However, over the past two years, Protestant religious organizations operating in the Central Highlands that do not have a nationalist/separatist overlay have been given far more leeway to operate. ¶8. (SBU) It is unclear to what extent the current efforts of Dega activists would be considered protected speech in the United States. However, any whiff of separatism is intolerable to the GVN. ¶9. (SBU) The Vietnamese intelligence services are thorough. They attempt to monitor all communications to and from the Central Highlands, especially with the United States (Ref H). They are convinced -- and some of our sources independently corroborate -- that groups in the United States are continuing to fan ethnic minority separatism through the Dega Church and other activities. These actors also reportedly encourage flight to Cambodia. By doing so, these U.S.-based groups are putting ethnic minority communities in the Central Highlands at risk. Additionally, the resettlement of economic migrants to the United States via Cambodia creates a pull factor that only encourages other poor, ethnic minority individuals to "try their luck," intensifying the knee-jerk GVN security effort to secure its borders against illegal migration to Cambodia. WINNICK