DECONSTRUCTING BABIL? SECULAR SHI'AS AND SUNNIS WARY OF PC,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000091 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR NCT E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DECONSTRUCTING BABIL? SECULAR SHI'AS AND SUNNIS WARY OF PC, COALITION FORCES REF: A) HILLAH 79 B) HILLAH 80 C) HILLAH 82 HILLAH 00000091 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. The unabated efforts of the Babil Provincial Council (PC) to usurp power from local municipalities and gain control of the provincial security forces continue to provoke a secular Shi'a and Sunni backlash against the SCIRI-controlled body (reftels A, B, and C). While it is difficult to gauge the extent of this trend within the entire provincial community, secular Shi'a and Sunni opinion leaders, including reporters, NGO activists, police, and tribal leaders, continue to express their frustration with the PC. These opinion leaders also view USG reconstruction efforts in Babil as ineffective and perceived U.S. political disengagement in the province as irresponsible. They also continue to ask the REO and the PRT to provide strong leadership over the PC, without which they maintain, reconstruction efforts will be in vain and this strategic region south of Baghdad will become increasingly unstable. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (SBU) Secular Shi'as in Babil represent a small portion of the entire Shi'a population. They tend to be generally well educated and are usually either middle or upper class. The Sunni population of Babil comprises of approximately twenty percent of the total population of the province and is concentrated mostly in northern Babil. -------------- WHAT RECONSTRUCTION? -------------- ¶4. (C) Concerning the PC, reconstruction and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT),a secular Shi'a journalist declared that the "people are not satisfied." "The PC and the government" he continued, "want to make projects fail or they authorize projects because they are in the direct [financial interest] of the PC." Signs of reconstruction in the province are non-existent, the journalist claimed, and that the PRT should realize that the PC only recommends projects that correspond with their political vision and enhance members' financial positions, i.e. corruption. Babil is lacking many basic necessities, including hospital equipment, cooking gas, fuel, electricity and most importantly, employment opportunities, despite the best efforts of the PRT to assist the provincial government, according to the journalist. ¶5. (C) REO and PRT staff recently met with a delegation of secular Shi'a journalists during a "brown bag lunch" and discussed media development and local political issues. The journalists explained that while technically they feel free to report on topics they deem important for public consumption, they remain unsure as to which subjects remain inappropriate to address. Direct critiques of the PC and SCIRI policies, they further stated, are not issues they would often report, as such attacks could result in severe retaliation, including torture, kidnapping, assault on family members, and assassination. This issue was such a concern that the participants even asked REO staff to assist them in securing firearm permits from the Babil police. As to the accomplishments of the PC in the sphere of reconstruction, one journalist summed it up by declaring that, "They do not reconstruct, they deconstruct." -------------- THE PC AND THE SUNNI POPULATION -------------- ¶6. (C) A Sunni human rights NGO leader related to REO staff that, "you helped us to get rid of Saddam, but you left us with a worse regime." Sunnis in Babil, he maintained, face daily discrimination at the hands of the local government and the PC. When asked to provide specific examples of discrimination, he stated that the government and the PC have been actively targeting Sunnis since the fall of the old regime. The police in northern Babil, he explicated, purposefully arrest a son from every family, employ torture techniques worse than those used by Saddam's security forces, and have taken control of Sunni Mosques. Furthermore, he argued that the current attempt by the PC to dissolve the Sunni-controlled Iskandariyah City Council only further demonstrates the PC's efforts to marginalize Sunni political participation in the province (ref A). -------------- THE PC VERSUS QAIS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Sunni and secular Shi'a outrage concerning the alleged termination of General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri has HILLAH 00000091 002.2 OF 002 also increased their suspicion about the activities and motivations of the SCIRI-dominated PC (ref C). On May 13, Iraqi Police (IP) and military reports confirmed that a large demonstration of approximately three hundred to seven hundred people (mostly IPs) in support of Qais occurred in central Al-Hillah, the provincial capital. The protest sparked fears within the Governor's administration of a possible IP mutiny, although first hand accounts indicate that the IPs remained mostly peaceful during the rally. An Iraqi Police Lieutenant and supporter of Qais stated that a representative from the governor's office met with the protestors during the demonstration and told them that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had refused to endorse the PC decision to fire Qais. However, other reports received by the REO do not support this claim, and it is possible that the governor's office simply told the IPs this in order to convince them to disperse. ¶8. (C) Individual policemen have stated that if the PC successfully fires the popular General, at least half of the Babil IPs will be forced to quit their jobs due to fear of reprisals and that SCIRI will have achieved its objective of taking control of the Babil security forces. On multiple occasions, secular government officials including the Mayor of Al-Hillah, IP leadership and Qais himself have requested that the REO intervene on behalf of the besieged General. It is interesting to note that in a strange twist of fate, northern Babil Sunni tribal sheikhs have voiced their public support for Qais (a Shi'a) to REO staff on two separate occasions (ref B). These individuals have also expressed to REO staff their frustration that the United States is not doing enough to help the General. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Clearly the Sunnis and secular Shi'a of Babil have legitimate reasons to feel frustrated with the current administration of the province. The PC's maneuvering to augment their authority on the municipal level and garner power over the Babil security forces is only further estranging the PC from the province's non-Shi'a Islamist population. The perception amongst Babil Sunnis and secular Shi'a is that the USG is unwilling to influence the political developments on the ground, whether through guaranteeing Qais' professional survival, rebuilding the province quickly, or reigning in the SCIRI-dominated PC, which only adds to their aggravation. The proliferation of such a belief will certainly undermine the Coalition's credibility with these groups. The REO and PRT continue to publicize to the PC, local civic groups and the population of Babil as a whole, through individual contacts and public diplomacy efforts, that the U.S. will support the province by cooperating on reconstruction efforts and assist the Iraqi government with helping them to establish democratic processes (septel). END COMMENT. MEURS