MEETING OF REO AL-HILLAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE (EAC)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, AND DS/ITA
BAGHDAD FOR MGT, RSO, AND NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/6/2016
TAGS: ASEC AEMR AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: MEETING OF REO AL-HILLAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE (EAC)

REF: 05 AL-HILLAH 0301

CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (c),(g)




1. (C) Summary: The REO Al-Hillah EAC was convened on 1 March

2006. It was chaired by the Regional Coordinator, and in
attendance were representatives from RSO, POL, PRT, USAID, KBR,
and ORA. The REOs US Army LNO and the 2/4 BCT S-9 were also
present, and advised on the posture of Coalition forces in the
region. This meeting was called after REO management learned of
an impending closure of FOB Charlie in Al-Hillah. The scheduled
date for full removal of Coalition forces is currently set at 31
May, despite the concerns previously forwarded in the reference.
The reference, dated 19 October 2005, set forth an EAC
assessment of the impact FOB Charlie's closure will have on the
REO's operations. The EAC reviewed the ramifications of the
newly revised closure plan, focusing on the security
requirements necessary to maintain the REO's existing location
and operational posture. A summary of the findings is set forth
herein. End Summary.


2. (C) Details: REO Al-Hillah was established in close
proximity to FOB Charlie out of necessity, with the FOB
providing the REO with essential security and logistical
services. The operational environment in the South Central
region remains non-permissive, and this necessity remains.
Because the FOB's proposed closure is due to circumstances
beyond the control of the REO, the continuation of REO
operations is fully contingent on the future provision of those
services currently fulfilled by FOB Charlie. This reality
exists regardless of existing FOB closure plans. As previously
stated in the reference, REO Al-Hillah's future viability will
depend on the continuation or replacement of the essential
security functions that the FOB provides to our diplomatic
activities such as QRF, safehaven, and an active presence in our
vicinity, in addition to basic logistical services. It should
also be noted that the other three REOs in Iraq are either
located on or adjacent to Coalition bases, for good reason. A
closure of FOB Charlie would put REO Al-Hillah in a uniquely
vulnerable position, further exacerbated by the absence of an
improvement in key facets of the security environment in South
Central Iraq. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that one of
the most active combat zones in Iraq is located in Northern
Babil Province, a mere 20 miles from Al-Hillah.


3. (C) The presence of a Coalition base alongside the REO has
been continuous to date, and the EAC believes that its
stabilizing effect on the area has been critical. Both its
function as a deterrent to hostile activity in the area, and the
defense in depth provided by Coalition combat patrols operating
out of the FOB are essential elements to the REO's current
security posture. Without active patrolling in our AO,
chokepoints, key intersections, and MSRs can become easy targets
for IED emplacement. Hostile forces could operate in the
vicinity with virtual impunity, especially during the hours of
darkness. The IED threat in this region is also well
documented, and the REO's operational tempo remains high.
Overland travel is a necessity in the absence of dedicated air
assets, and choice of routes to and from the provinces is very
limited. Existing combat patrols also clearly deserve much of
the credit for the infrequency and abbreviated nature of
indirect fire attacks conducted against the REO to date.
Without fear of immediate reprisal, these attacks could become
extended in nature, with observers located on vantage points
around the REO adjusting fire onto key locations of the compound.


4. (C) The REO's small footprint makes the requirement for a
QRF a fundamental one in the existing threat environment.
Potential external threats to the compound are numerous, and the
current 5 - 15 minute response capability provided by the US
Army Armored Cavalry Squadron currently stationed at FOB C is
critical. Without this external capability, worst case
scenarios could include both points of egress from the compound
being sealed off by outside forces, or external direct or
indirect fire attacks continuing unabated. Historical examples
in both Najaf and Al-Kut (CPA facilities) demonstrate how a
rapidly deteriorating security situation can leave a small
facility isolated and untenable. Even if FOB Charlie was turned
over to the ISF, an accessible safehaven for REO personnel would
cease to exist if these forces lost control of a deteriorating
situation or became unwilling to fight. The size of the REO
compound and correspondingly few landing zones dictate that an
air evacuation would take an inordinate amount of time and
successive sorties. This leaves overland evacuation as the only
option in the event a short-fuzed drawdown of the REO becomes
required. Such an action would be impossible without a
Coalition FOB in the area, especially given existing limitations

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on vehicular resources at the REO. Even with a reaction force
on 24-hour standby, the most optimistic estimate on moving a
HMMWV-mobile unit from the next closest military installation
(FOB Kalsu) during hours of darkness would be 45 minutes.


5. (S) The proliferation and strengthening of armed militias in
South Central Iraq poses potentially serious consequences.
Although the US Army MSC at FOB Charlie assesses the Iraqi
Police and Iraqi National Guard in Al-Hillah as the most capable
forces of their kind in the South Central region, the REO EAC
remains concerned because historically, Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) throughout the region have displayed an inability or an
unwillingness to consistently confront armed militia groups.
Compounding this issue, most Police forces in the region are now
thoroughly penetrated by those seeking to further the influence
of religious parties and militias, such as JAM and Badr Corps.
Al-Hillah remains the only major city in the area with a police
force that cannot be considered corrupted by outside influences,
due in no small part to the leadership of General Qaise Hamsa.
An ongoing and concerted effort by the Babil Provincial Council
to remove General Qaise continues, for this very reason, and it
is highly improbable that he will be able to retain his position
indefinitely. The Babil Governor also recently initiated an
attempt to move the Hillah SWAT team to Ministry of Defense
(MOD) control. The US Army MSC in the area assesses this as an
attempt to relocate this effective and independent unit to
another area, at which time the Governor would backfill the unit
with personnel loyal to him and SCIRI; the Governor's
pro-Iranian inclinations are well documented. Factors such as
these combine to cast serious doubt on the future viability and
effectiveness of the Iraqi Police in the area. With the closure
of FOB Charlie, the local police force will no longer have the
benefit of backup and moral support afforded by Coalition Forces
stationed in the area.


6. (S) The expansion of Iranian influence throughout the South
Central region also carries with it dangerous implications that
should not be ignored. DS/ITA recently forwarded an
intelligence report, dated 3/3/06, confirming widespread arming
of Mahdi Militia (JAM) members by the Iranian government. This
is only the latest addition to the ever-increasing compilation
of anecdotal and actual evidence, pointing to hostile Iranian
activity in the South of Iraq. The effective use of surrogates
by Iran is well documented, especially in the case of Hezbollah
in Lebanon and elsewhere; the danger posed by a similar scenario
could have wider implications to US diplomatic activities in the
region if US-Iranian relations further deteriorate over the
looming nuclear crisis. Intelligence reporting indicates that
JAM has threatened to attack US interests if the US undertakes
actions to curb Iran's nuclear program.


7. (C) REO management was recently informed of a proposal to
base approximately 120 military personnel on the REO, in an
attempt to counter-balance the removal of Coalition forces from
FOB Charlie. It has been proposed that these troops would be
dedicated to training and mentoring Iraqi Police and military
units, and would not act as a dedicated security force for the
compound. The EAC believes that although this plus up in combat
capable personnel could theoretically augment the capacity to
blunt some forms of hostile action directed at the REO for a
longer period of time, it does replace the capabilities provided
by a local QRF. Because of the small size of the REO compound,
a collocated military force could be rendered only marginally
effective or ineffective by virtue of proximity to a security
incident or hostile action directed at the REO compound.
Examples of this would be concentrated indirect fire along the
compound's axis or coordinated attacks at the compound's two
egress points, both of which could require intervention from
outside the compound. The 120 additional personnel could help
to provide a marginal presence in the Al-Hillah area through
joint combat patrols with ISF counterparts. It must also be
realized however, that this would represent a significant
reduction in the current capacity, because to date this function
has been carried out by a battalion-sized Coalition force.
Operation of military forces off the REO will also raise the
profile of the compound, making it not only a diplomatic
facility but by some measure a military installation as well.
This could possibly lead to increased targeting of the REO by
hostile elements.


8. (C) The proposed basing of troops on the REO also poses
certain logistical problems. First and foremost, little usable
space remains on the compound. The one open area not currently
dedicated is overlooked by a vehicle overpass; to date this area
has been deemed unsuitable for housing COM personnel, for this
very reason. A survey by MNFI force protection experts would be
required to determine if this area could be made usable to
billet MNFI personnel through emplacement of 20 foot T-walls or
similar defensive items. Additionally, space constraints
dictate that the REO is unable to accommodate a large increase

HILLAH 00000039 003 OF 003


in personnel in the current configuration. Due to an influx of
personnel for the PRT, there are currently no additional
billeting spaces available. Should the decision be made to add
personnel and vehicles to the REO, the following must be taken
into consideration:

- Additional office and billeting space would have to be
made available, in amounts proportionate to any planned increase
in REO occupancy.
- Parking for additional vehicles is virtually non-existent.

- No maintenance ability for military vehicles exists at the
REO.
- TO-100 would have to be modified to support the increase
in personnel. Depending on the number of personnel, additional
support facilities would have to be constructed (DFAC, laundry,
etc.)

The current FRAGO with the 1/10 Cavalry based at Camp Charlie
provides escort for all PWC (food) and equipment delivered to
the REO. Loss of this support would necessitate implementing
another FRAGO to provide bi-weekly escort to and from Scania or
another location, to include immediate escort return, due to a
lack of parking on the compound for extended stays of
semi-trucks/trailers. FRAGO would also have to include
provision for outgoing mail and financial service support/escort
on a bi-monthly basis.


9. (U) REO Al-Hillah can facilitate an agreement with
landowners for space on the REO compound, in the event the
security concerns for the location next to the overpass could be
addressed. Past experience dictates however, that the time line
being considered for construction of the proposed camp to house
the additional troops is overly optimistic. As there are no
other billeting options available at the REO, a more realistic
schedule for FOB Charlie's closure would need to be considered.


10. (C) While the EAC believes the relocation of 120 troops to
the REO compound is preferable to a complete withdrawal of all
Coalition forces in the area, this concept does not truly
address the problem at hand. The previously discussed factors
combine to make it problematic at best, and its implementation
would be accompanied by the automatic assumption of a
significant amount of increased risk. Moving the REO to
collocate with Coalition Forces at another FOB in the region is
an option that could potentially be viable, in spite of the fact
that the closest such installation to FOB Charlie is FOB Duke -
also slated for closure in the near future.


11. (C) Conclusion: To date, local Coalition Forces have
facilitated the conduct of diplomacy in the midst of a war zone,
with a minimum margin of safety, by fulfilling the critical
functions outlined above. The EAC is unanimous in its belief
that in order for the REO to truly operate safely in the current
threat environment, Coalition Forces at their current level
should remain in close proximity to the REO to provide the
necessary continuing presence, as well as QRF and safe haven
functions. In the absence of a distinct improvement in the
security situation in South Central Iraq, any exception to this
standard would automatically entail a proportionate increase in
the risk posed to our operations. All EAC members also believe
that a full reliance on Iraqi security forces at the present
time poses an unacceptable level of risk to US civilian
personnel at the REO. REO Al-Hillah would "find out the hard
way" if local ISF were not up to the task, and the consequence
could be nothing less than needless loss of lives. If
maintaining diplomatic engagement in South Central Iraq is to
remain a USG priority, then appropriately providing for the safe
conduct of this activity should be a concurrent and equally
important USG priority. The importance of this tenant is
underscored because USG engagement has recently been expanded
with the activation of the Babil Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT). The overall success or failure of this initiative (to
include planned PRTs dedicated to Karbala and Najaf, with
proposed future collocation at REO Al-Hillah in some cases) will
be heavily dependent on the nature of the local security
environment. The Al-Hillah EAC believes that MNFI base closure
plans should be adjusted to reflect this reality, and to support
the broader USG agenda in this region.
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