WASIT SISTANI REP RESIGNED TO INCREASING SADRIST INFLUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000038 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/5/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER KISL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: WASIT SISTANI REP RESIGNED TO INCREASING SADRIST INFLUENCE CLASSIFIED BY: AFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO, AL-HILLAH, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Former Transitional National Assembly member and Wasit province representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Habib Saman Al-Khateeb, expressed his frustration with the rising influence of Sadrists in his hometown of Numaniyah and across the province in a meeting with Regional Embassy Office Al-Hillah staff on March 4. Al-Khateeb, who at the request of Sistani, did not stand for election in the Council of Representatives, strongly doubted that the incoming government, regardless of its composition, would be able to effectively control Moqtada al-Sadr and his affiliated militia. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Al-Khateeb, one of the most senior clerics in Wasit, criticized the rising influence and power of Sadrists in his hometown of Numaniyah and across South Central and Southern Iraq. Armed Sadrist militiamen, according to Al-Khateeb, are present in ever-increasing numbers on the streets of Numaniyah and other cities in the region. While Al-Khateeb offered that his mosque in Numaniyah still draws a larger following than the nearby Sadrist mosque, he believed that the "re-generation" of the Sadrist movement observed since an April 2004 uprising would only continue to grow stronger. ¶3. (C) Al-Khateeb, reflecting on his experience in the Transitional National Assembly, expressed his frustration at the inability of the national or provincial governments to control militias in general, and the Mahdi Milita in particular. He described the inability of the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces to decisively defeat Moqtada Al-Sadr and the Mahdi Milita as the greatest disappointment of his political experience. (NOTE. Al-Khateeb's son was killed by Sadrists during the 2004 attack on the Al-Kut office of the Coalition Provisional Authority. END NOTE.) Al-Khateeb attributed the electoral success of the Sadrists and the United Iraqi Alliance in part to violent intimidation on the part of Sadrists. In general, Al-Khateeb was very critical of his colleagues in the TNA, asserting that most were in politics for personal gain. ¶4. (C) The incoming government, particularly if Prime Minister Jafari returns for a second term, will be equally unsuccessful in bringing the militias under control, Al-Khateeb offered. Jafari, in his opinion, is beholden to the support of the Sadrists and is unwilling and unable to disarm the Mahdi and other sectarian militias. While Al-Khateeb fully agreed with the U.S. insistence that the security ministries not be controlled by persons with militia ties, he also doubted that in the end, independent candidates could be found for the positions. ¶5. (C) Al-Khateeb also briefly addressed the Shi'a response to the Samarra mosque bombing, detailing his efforts to appeal for calm in the streets of Numaniyah in the days immediately following the blast. Personally, Al-Khateeb added, he did not blame the United States for the attack, but that he could not say the same for the Shi'a of Iraq as a whole. ¶6. (C) COMMENT. Al-Khateeb, one of the most respected and senior clerics in Wasit, viewed the end of his brief foray into national politics with a mixture of relief and frustration. His views on the rise of the Sadrists illustrate the difficult choice faced by clerics in the Shi'a heartland. They can remain above the fray and risk marginalization and the loss of their constituency or engage in the worldly machinations of Shi'a Islamist political parties and risk censure from the clerical establishment. FONTENEAU