CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000031 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2016 TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ SUBJECT: CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT CALL FOR PEACEFUL RESPONSE, SOME RESIDENTS BLAME U.S. REF: A) HILLAH 0029 B) HILLAH 0028 C) HILLAH 0026 HILLAH 00000031 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: AFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO, AL-HILLAH, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A February 25 car bomb in Karbala killed eight and wounded 31. An impromptu protest after the incident at the site of the attack included chants of "No, no America." Religious leaders in Karbala and Najaf were quiet after the incident, with no reports of calls from the mosques for demonstrations. When contacted by local REO staff regarding the Karbala bombing, a representative of the senior Shi'a religious leaders in Najaf called for a non-violent response and did not place blame on the United States. However, two political leaders in Najaf - one a SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) member and one a Sadrist -- did fault the U.S. for the bombing. The link, if any, between the Karbala attack and the February 22 bombing of the Al-Askariyah shrine in Samarra is unclear at this point in time. END SUMMARY. -------------- KARBALA CALM AFTER DETONATION OF CAR BOMB -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to the Iraqi Police (IP) in Karbala, at approximately 10:55am on February 25, a vehicle concealed improvised explosive device (VCIED) was detonated in a neighborhood in southwestern Karbala city. The neighborhood is outside the city center, where the twin shrines of Imams Hussein and Abbas are located. The VCIED was parked near a market and a Shi'a mosque. It was also approximately 50 meters from a police checkpoint and 250 meters from an IP station. Eight people were killed and 31 wounded. One IP officer reported that two policemen were among those killed. There was no substantial damage to nearby buildings. The bomb was remote controlled and had been placed in a Chevrolet sedan. Local residents saw the bomber leaving the area after the explosion. They seized and beat him before the police arrived and took him into custody. IPs and the Iraqi Army closed off streets in the neighborhood shortly after the incident. ¶3. (U) The Karbala Governor, Dr. Aqeel Mahmoud Al-Khaz'ali, appeared in a live interview on Al-Arabiya satellite television channel within an hour of the bombing and gave the basic facts on the incident. After the attack, a small demonstration broke out near the site of the bombing. Protestors chanted "No, no to terrorism," "No, no America," "No, No Saddam" and "Sayyid Sistani is a crown on our heads." ¶4. (C) Karbala IP Chief Colonel Razzak Abed Ali informed REO Hillah staff on February 25 that the suspect had an outstanding arrest warrant. Iraqi Security Forces had previously seized weapons and explosives at the man's house. The police have not yet indicated if the man is affiliated with any terrorist or other violent organization. IPs believe the man is Shi'a. ¶5. (U) After the detonation of the VCIED on the morning of February 25, there were no calls from the twin shrines or from other mosques in Karbala for demonstrations against the attack. On February 26, Karbala was quiet. Local REO staff reported there were no demonstrations, or speeches or statements from religious leaders. IPs and IA members prevented people from entering the city center, where the twin shrines are located. -------------- -------------- NAJAF CLERICS, LOCAL LEADERS CALL FOR CALM; SOME BLAME U.S. -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Local REO staff contacted several Najaf religious and political leaders on the afternoon of February 25 to get their reaction to the car bombing in Karbala. Sheikh Ali Rubaiee, the office manager for Ayatollah Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayadh (one of the four high-ranking Marja, or senior Shi'a clerics, in Najaf, of which Sistani is the leader) condemned the attack, blaming Wahhabis and other extremists who he said were using the security situation to attack the Shi'a. He stated that the Ayatollahs (the four senior Marja) always call for peace among all Iraqis, and offered that Sistani said, "that even if half of the Shi'a were killed, he [Sistani] will not legitimize the killing of one Sunni." The office manager said the Ayatollahs always call for peaceful protest and mourning, and for respect for the property and lives of all Muslims. ¶7. (SBU) Sheikh Khalid Al-Noumani, a member of SCIRI and the Deputy Chairman of the Najaf Provincial Council, condemned the attacks and placed blame on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Al-Noumani said he wanted "the people" to protect holy sites if the government could not do it. He also criticized U.S. forces for poor coordination and information sharing with the ISF, and argued that this "crippled" the latter, preventing it from doing its duty. Al-Noumani asked that the U.S. government take a HILLAH 00000031 002.2 OF 002 clear position on the authority of the ISF and on Iraqi sovereignty. ¶8. (SBU) Sahib Al-Ameri, a Sadrist political leader who is the head of the Shaheed Allah (God's Martyr) organization, criticized the Iraqi government for its handling of the situation. He said that the Sadrists will continue protesting in order to apply pressure on the national government to require "the invaders" to withdraw from Iraq "after all the crises this country has witnessed because of them." Al-Ameri blamed Zarqawi for the attack in Karbala, calling him an "American agent." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: Given that the South Central region of Iraq is still tense after several days of large-scale protests and scattered violence after the February 22 attack in Samarra, which seriously damaged the Al-Askariyah shrine but resulted in no casualties, the lack of any substantial demonstrations despite the killing of eight people in Karbala highlights the fact that the Shi'a region's response will be most forceful when terrorists target significant holy sites. ¶10. (C) Responses from political and religious leaders to the Karbala attack mirrored those after the February 22 bombing of the Al-Askariyah shrine in Samarra. The Marja'iyah in Najaf condemned the attack in Karbala and called for a non-violent response. In addition, the senior Shi'a clerics around Sistani did not fault the U.S. for the February 25 bombing. In contrast, two political leaders in Najaf placed at least partial blame on the U.S., with a local Sadrist blaming Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Zarqawi for the VCIED in Karbala and declaring him to be an "American agent," much as Sadrists faulted the U.S. for the Samarra attack. ¶11. (C) The extent to which the Samarra bombing and the resulting violence has affected Iraqis' - both leaders and regular citizens - views of the Coalition is unclear. The impromptu demonstration after the Karbala bombing with its anti-American message is likely an indicator of the increasing frustration Iraqis feel with the continuing violence and the slow pace of reconstruction, among other things, with the U.S. carrying a substantial portion of the blame for these problems among Iraqis. The Samarra bombing seems to have substantially increased the level of frustration and anger among the Shi'a, who feel the things they value the most - key holy sites and the past and current religious leaders they represent - are under siege. ¶12. (C) Local political leaders seem increasingly willing to tap into this anger by blaming the Coalition for problems in order to appear more independent and to raise their own profiles, with Moqtada Al-Sadr serving as a successful model for this approach. Increasingly, local leaders - even if they are on very good terms with the U.S. - see close relations with the U.S. as a political liability. As an example, a senior member of the Karbala Provincial Council recently (prior to the Samarra bombing) asked REO staff to visit him in the governate complex only on Saturdays, when there would be few people in the building. This PC member, an independent Islamist, has been and remains on very friendly terms with U.S. civilian and military officials in the region. With provincial elections just over the horizon, Iraqi officials, and the religious leaders they are close to, will likely seek to put additional distance between themselves and the U.S., at least in the eyes of voters. END COMMENT. FONTENEAU