WASIT COR REP ON UIA OVERTURES TO ALLAWI

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000023 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: WASIT COR REP ON UIA OVERTURES TO ALLAWI CLASSIFIED BY: GARY ANDERSON, ACTING REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO, AL-HILLAH, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Shaykh Jamal Al-Batik, the sole Wasit National Iraqi List (ballot number 731) member in the incoming Council of Representatives, related discussions between Iyad Allawi and Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. According to Al-Batik, Hakim has been in contact with Allawi several times in search of ways to outmaneuver UIA (ballot number 555) Prime Minister-designate Ibrahim Al-Ja'afari. Al-Batik predicted the UIA would eventually fall apart under pressure from other political parties and the U.S. to form a national unity government. Al-Batik also used the meeting to vent one final time against perceived U.S. inaction against voting and campaigning irregularities during the December 15, 2005 election. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- HAKIM CONTACTS ALLAWI: NATIONAL UNITY GOV. DISCUSSED -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Al-Batik, Allawi has been in touch with Al-Hakim, both on the telephone and in person, over the past several days. Al-Batik, who is in communication with other INA members familiar with the discussions, said Al-Hakim indicated his extreme displeasure over the selection of Ja'afari as the UIA/555 nominee for Prime Minister. Allawi, according to Al-Batik, stressed to Al-Hakim that his delegation to the CoR would continue to insist upon a national unity government and that the federalist and separatist aspirations of the South must be brought under control. Ja'afari, in Allawi's opinion, is entirely unsuited to this task. ¶3. (C) Based on his conversations with UIA representatives as well as Allawi list members, Al-Batik said he thought the Sadrists were the unstable element in the pro-Ja'afari group. The Sadrists, in the end, would refuse to cooperate in any fashion with the Allawi list, and would thus break from the UIA/555 as pressure to form a national unity government increases. -------------- -------------- ELECTION WOUNDS STILL RAW, BUT GRATEFUL FOR PROACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN COALITION NEGOTIATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Al-Batik expressed his intense frustration at what he thought were unfair and illegal campaign practices by members of the UIA/555 prior to the December 15, 2005 elections. The U.S., in the opinion of Al-Batik, was constantly kept informed of voter intimidation, defacement of campaign posters, and other illegal tactics, yet chose to do nothing, giving the UIA/555 an unfair advantage in Southern and South Central Iraq. ¶5. (C) On a more positive note, however, Al-Batik expressed his and other rank and file Allawi List representatives' appreciation of the active Embassy role in coalition negotiations. The UIA/555, in his opinion, is overreaching. Only pressure from the U.S. to form a national unity government with non-sectarian, non-militia control of the security ministries would bring the Shi'a Islamists into line, according to Al-Batik. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: As a member of the Allawi list, Al-Batik's statements on the internal affairs of the UIA/555 should be treated with some skepticism. However, his descriptions of the widespread distrust towards Ja'afari and the active machinations against him will bear further watching as coalition negotiations continue. Moreover, Al-Batik's statements indicate that active U.S. involvement is seen by some as an accepted and essential part of the process. END COMMENT. ANDERSON